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Summary 
In 2008, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) and its contractor, ETS 
Europe, failed to deliver Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 3 National Curriculum tests on time. 
Although the majority of scripts had been marked by the deadline for delivery of 8 July, a 
significant minority were outstanding, resulting in considerable disruption for many 
schools and children. 
On 7 July 2008, Lord Sutherland of Houndwood was appointed by both the regulator, 
Ofqual, and the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) to chair an inquiry 
into the causes of the delivery failure. On the same day, this Committee started taking 
evidence on what happened during the 2008 testing cycle. During our inquiry, we took 
evidence from all the major parties, including both written and oral evidence from the 
contractor, ETS Europe in September 2008. Shortly thereafter, ETS withdrew its personnel 
and resources from the UK as a result of its contract with QCA being terminated and it 
announced that it would not be taking part in Lord Sutherland’s inquiry. Lord Sutherland 
was, however, able to rely on the evidence we had already taken from ETS and 
documentary evidence available from QCA. 
The Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, published on 16 December 2008, set out clearly the 
sequence of events leading up to the missed deadline for delivery of the National 
Curriculum tests in 2008 and made a series of recommendations. We have endorsed Lord 
Sutherland’s work. Our inquiry has had a rather different focus and we have considered 
more widely than did Lord Sutherland the role of the Department in the events leading up 
to the delivery failure.  
We have concluded that the Government should revisit the conduct of its relationships 
with its delivery agencies. Whilst acknowledging the difficulty of establishing the 
appropriate dividing line between policy and delivery, we believe that DCSF has involved 
itself too much in the detail of delivery, placing undue constraints on the executive 
decision-making abilities of its agency, QCA. We recommend that the leadership of 
government agencies should be more prepared to stand up to the Government when it 
considers that directions from the Government to the agency are unreasonable or 
incapable of performance. 
We have also considered the role of DCSF observers on various boards and committees of  
non-departmental public bodies generally and QCA in particular. We have no objection in 
principle to the presence of such observers within a public body. However, in the case of 
QCA, we are concerned about the undue influence which appears to have been wielded by 
observers in terms of ‘negotiating’ formal advice from QCA to ministers and in seeking to 
influence QCA’s decision-making. We consider that the role of departmental observers 
should be clarified and appropriate safeguards put in place to assure transparency and 
prevent inappropriate interference. 
We recommend unequivocally that there should be no place for departmental observers 
within an independent regulator. The independence of the new regulator, Ofqual, should 
be put beyond question and that requires the relationship between DCSF and Ofqual to be 
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conducted on a formal and transparent basis. The presence of CSF observers on Ofqual’s 
Board would, in this context, be totally inappropriate. 
Finally, we welcome the abolition of mandatory national testing at Key Stage 3 as a means 
of reducing the burden of testing on English school pupils; but warn against the unduly 
hasty introduction of single-level tests. There are considerable logistical complexities 
involved in delivering single-level tests twice each year and we recommend that the 
Government satisfies itself that the logistical arrangements are robust before introducing 
these tests as a replacement for the current testing regime. We also recommend that any 
significant future reform of National Curriculum testing must include an evaluation of on-
screen marking. 
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1 The inquiries into the 2008 test delivery 
failure 
1. As a result of a procurement process which started in 2006, the Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority (QCA) appointed ETS Global BV (ETS) as the new supplier of test 
operation services from 2008. Over the five-year contract term, ETS would be responsible 
for the administration of all national testing in England at Key Stages 1, 2 and 3 and Year 7 
progress tests. This would include responsibility for the external marking of the Key Stage 2 
and 3 tests and the Year 7 progress tests.1   
2. The parent company of the ETS division to which this contract was awarded is a US 
non-profit organisation with long experience in test administration and which was, in 
2008, responsible for managing 50 million examinations in 180 different countries.2  
Despite this vast experience, the 2008 National Curriculum testing cycle was not delivered 
in its entirety on time. A significant minority of test papers at Key Stage 2 and 3 were not 
marked and returned to schools in time for the deadline of 8 July and some schools and 
pupils were still awaiting their test results in the following Autumn Term.3  Members of 
this Committee are even aware of some cases where results were still outstanding in the 
spring term of 2009.4 
3. The inevitability of ETS’s failure to deliver on time did not, it seems, become apparent to 
the QCA until the week beginning 23 June 2008. By the beginning of the following week, 
senior officials and Ministers at DCSF had been notified and, on 4 July, the QCA issued a 
press release advising of the delay in publication of Key Stage 2 and 3 results.5  On that 
same day, both Ofqual, the regulator with responsibility for overseeing National 
Curriculum tests, and DCSF declared their intention to set up an independent inquiry into 
what went wrong. On 7 July, it was announced that Lord Sutherland of Houndwood would 
chair the inquiry and report to both Ofqual and DCSF.6 
4. Well before the announcement of the Sutherland Inquiry, members of this Committee 
had been aware that there were significant concerns about the 2008 testing cycle and were 
already alert to the serious problems with markers.7  We were, therefore, able to start taking 
oral evidence on the delivery failures on 7 July, when the then Minister for Schools and 
Learners, the Rt Hon Jim Knight MP appeared before the Committee; and we started to 
receive written evidence from concerned individuals and schools from mid-July.8 
 
1 http://www.qca.org.uk/qca_9788.aspx  
2 Ev 8 
3 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, para 1.4 
4 Q 237 
5 Q 26; Q 104; Q 144; Qq 346–349; Qq 379–380; http://testsandexams.qca.org.uk/18339.aspx  
6 http://www.ofqual.gov.uk/1717.aspx; http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/pns/DisplayPN.cgi?pn_id=2008_0142  
7 Q 192-193 
8  Oral evidence of Rt Hon Jim Knight MP given during an oral evidence session on a separate inquiry into the National 
Curriculum, published as HC 651-iii.  The full transcript is printed as part of the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 
2008-09, HC 344-II. 
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5. The very next week, on 14 and 16 July respectively, we took oral evidence from both Dr 
Ken Boston, then Chief Executive of the QCA, and the Secretary of State, the Rt Hon Ed 
Balls MP.9 As the summer break for both Parliament and schools approached, it became 
apparent that a significant number of schools and children would remain without their test 
results. Unusually, we took the decision to sit during recess in order to take evidence from 
both ETS and Ofqual on 10 September. This would be the only formal, public occasion on 
which ETS gave evidence in relation to what went wrong with test delivery in 2008, and 
Lord Sutherland has acknowledged the timeliness and usefulness of our work in this 
respect when he thanked us: 
…for focusing on the report and on the issues so promptly in July, as you did. I think 
you were the first above the line, making very important questions plain and putting 
them into the public arena. I found that a good starting point for me. I recognise that 
the Committee’s work has been integral throughout the sad period since June or July, 
when things started to go wrong. The sessions you held before the school holidays 
were very important. You picked out a number of major issues, and I was able to 
build on that in the evidence I asked for and in some of the cross-examinations that I 
carried out.10 
6. We then suspended our inquiries pending Lord Sutherland’s investigation into the 
details of the 2008 testing cycle. He published his Report on 16 December 2008 and it 
amounted to a very thorough investigation of the sequence of events leading up to the 
missed deadline on 8 July 2008. In his Report, Lord Sutherland identified a large number of 
factors which contributed to the failure in 2008 and he cited this complexity when he gave 
evidence to us on 26 January 2009.11   It has not been the role of this Committee’s inquiries 
to examine the day-to-day management of test delivery at the level of detail considered by 
Lord Sutherland. We endorse the work carried out by Lord Sutherland in exposing the 
detail of the many factors contributing to the failures in the delivery of the 2008 
National Curriculum tests.  
7. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that Lord Sutherland was eventually unable to take formal 
evidence from ETS. Because the contractor was a US organisation and likely to withdraw 
personnel and resources from the UK, time was of the essence in commencing formal 
inquiries. Lord Sutherland stated in the Introduction to his Report: 
In conducting my Inquiry, I launched a call for written evidence and interviewed 
individuals from key organisations. I should say at the outset of this report that ETS 
declined to submit documentary evidence to the Inquiry. It has nonetheless been 
possible to do a thorough investigation drawing particularly on extensive materials 
submitted by QCA.12  
 
9  Oral evidence of the Secretary of State given during an oral evidence session on a separate inquiry into Public 
Expenditure, published as HC 835-ii.  The full transcript is printed as part of the Committee’s First Report of Session 
2008-09, HC 46. 
10 Q 237 
11 Q 237 
12 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, p2 
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From the point of view of demonstrable fairness, it was regrettable that ETS had withdrawn 
its resources from this country and chose not to engage with Lord Sutherland’s inquiry, 
although we understand that there was an exchange of correspondence between the 
inquiry and ETS in December shortly before publication of the Report.13  It was clear from 
Lord Sutherland’s report that he had relied heavily on the evidence this Committee took 
from ETS in September 2008, since ETS submitted neither written nor oral evidence to his 
inquiry.14  Nevertheless, Lord Sutherland considered that he was able to produce a fair 
report given the access he had to QCA documentation and exchanges of correspondence 
between the parties.15  He told us that: 
I have no doubt that there was adequate evidence available to me to make the 
judgments that I believe are definitive about the role of ETS in this report.  
[ETS] believed at one point, in view of something that it said to your Committee … 
that there was an embargo on it in some way. I spoke to the QCA chief executive, 
and he wrote to ETS to make it plain that there was no such embargo. That is point 
one. Point two: we extended the period available to it to submit evidence. Point 
three: it chose not to do so. Point four: the evidence was available to us, through the 
QCA documentation—we had all the exchanges of correspondence and contracts 
and so on, so I believe I had adequate evidence.16 
8. This inquiry provides a good illustration of how a select committee can use its 
authority and powers in a timely manner to investigate problematic incidents as soon 
as they arise. Our swift action in this matter has enabled us to put on the public record 
both written and oral evidence from a party to the incident, ETS, which was not 
available by the time the official inquiry was fully operational. The Sutherland Inquiry 
was then able to rely on the evidence we had secured when it became clear that ETS 
would not engage with the process. 
9. In carrying out his inquiries, Lord Sutherland was given separate, but related, terms of 
reference from both Ofqual and DCSF.17  Dr Boston expressed concern that, by issuing 
parallel terms of reference to Lord Sutherland, DCSF effectively closed down avenues of 
inquiry which should legitimately have been within Ofqual’s terms of reference to his 
Inquiry, namely what he saw as DCSF’s active role in the 2008 test delivery failure.18  Dr 
Ken Boston has argued that, in issuing its own terms of reference, the Department acted to 
prevent Lord Sutherland inquiring into the way it set up the framework of policies and 
other decisions within which QCA was required to work.19 This framework included the 
terms of the annual remit letter from DCSF, which is accepted by QCA and which sets out 
what the Government expects QCA to achieve each year. 
 
13 Letter to the Inquiry from Dr Philip Tabbiner (ETS), 1 December 2008, referenced in the Report of the Sutherland 
Inquiry  
14 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, paras 3.43, 3.68, 3.74, 4.101, 5.20, 5.34, 5.89, 5.126, 5.142, 5.173 
15 Q 244 
16 Q 244 
17 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, Annex C and D 
18 Q 311 
19 Q 311 
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10. It is indeed the case that the terms of reference issued to Lord Sutherland by DCSF 
mention DCSF’s active role in the delivery failure only in terms of the appropriateness of 
its arrangements to monitor the QCA’s delivery against its remit. The terms of reference 
went on to specify that Lord Sutherland could interview “appropriate people” from QCA, 
ETS Europe, Ofqual, DCSF and others.20 It is certainly not obvious from the terms of 
reference that Lord Sutherland was mandated to inquire into QCA’s remit letter and 
related instructions from DCSF. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State told us at the time the 
Inquiry was set up that:  
Nothing is out of bounds for Lord Sutherland. He can look at the whole process, and 
I am very happy for him to look at whether the original remit was properly 
specified.21 
In addition, Lord Sutherland has said that his terms of reference gave him:  
…ample scope and every opportunity to examine the processes, roles and 
responsibilities of all of the key players: not only QCA and ETS, but also Ministers 
and officials at the DCSF.22 
11. It is not clear to us that the DCSF having issued parallel terms of reference 
prevented Ofqual asking Lord Sutherland to inquire into the DCSF’s role, had Ofqual 
considered that appropriate. Lord Sutherland chose not to consider the Department’s 
role beyond its oversight of the particular circumstances of the delivery of the National 
Curriculum tests in 2008. However, this Committee is able to go further than he did 
and comment in more general terms on the line between policy and execution.  
12. Specifically, we will consider whether there was anything in the way the Department set 
up the framework within which QCA was required to operate which led to an increased 
risk of delivery failure. We will also consider the role of departmental observers and the 
implications for QCA decision-making and the independence of the new regulator, Ofqual. 
We develop these themes in more detail below. 
 
20 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, Annex D 
21 Q 139 
22 Q 360, Secretary of State quoting a statement of Lord Sutherland given to the Press Association 
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2 Delegation of responsibility from DCSF to 
QCA 
13. The Government insisted that QCA manages the testing system on behalf of and at 
arm’s length from DCSF. Both the Secretary of State and the Minister for Schools and 
Learners emphasised at different times that they thought it would be inappropriate for 
ministers to be involved in the administration of the testing process. They thought that to 
do otherwise may lead to suspicion that they might be influencing results on the basis of 
which the Government’s record in education is judged.23  The Secretary of State explained 
to us the lines of responsibility and accountability within the testing system: 
It is Ministers who are accountable to Parliament, directly and through the Select 
Committee, for the operation of our schools system, including the testing regime, so 
in the end the accountability comes to Ministers. …  
… We are accountable for the funding of the regime and the way that it operates. We 
ask a non-departmental public body, the QCA, to deliver the tests on our behalf at 
arm’s length from us. The QCA then contracts independently of Ministers with the 
people who do the practical delivery of the tests. So the accountability is as follows: 
ETS is accountable to the QCA for the delivery of its contract; the QCA is 
accountable to us and more widely for ensuring that that contract is effectively 
delivered; and I am accountable for ensuring that the QCA fulfils its responsibilities 
and for the overall operation of the regime. …24 
14. Lord Sutherland also gave us his view of the responsibilities of DCSF and QCA: 
The DCSF set the policy, and it provides the resources—that is its responsibility. It 
has to ensure that delivery is possible, which means it must have an appropriate 
mechanism. It believed it had, and on the basis of the two or three previous years it 
did have, because delivery was made. Below that, we come to QCA, which has a set 
of responsibilities, and so on, down the system it goes.  
In my understanding, the DCSF is responsible for policy, resource and setting up the 
overall mechanism. The kind of mechanism that is set up relates to how well it might 
work.25 
15. An important part of the framework set by DCSF within which QCA had to work is to 
be found in the remit letter, issued by DCSF and accepted by QCA in March each year.26  
This letter covers the areas for which QCA will assume responsibility and sets out the 
funding to be made available. In fact, the letter itself does not go into great detail. The letter 
 
23 Q 193; Q 364 
24 Q 118 
25 Q 251 
26 The remit letter for 2007-08 is at http://www.qca.org.uk/libraryAssets/media/Alan_Johnson_27_03_2007_-
_Remit_ltr.pdf; the remit letter for 2008–09 is at 
http://www.qca.org.uk/libraryAssets/media/Ed_Balls_to_Sir_Anthony_Greener_12032008.pdf.  
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sent by the Secretary of State in March 2008 specifies in relation to National Curriculum 
tests only that they:  
…are delivered successfully in May 2008, with an improvement in key metrics over 
2007, such as quality of marking, reduction in number of lost scripts, and an 
improved service to schools. Secure timely preparation for 2009 delivery.27 
16. The significance of the remit letter can perhaps be viewed in terms of its symbolic 
nature: it is the point at which QCA formally agrees to work within the framework of 
formal and informal instructions set out by DCSF for the next year. The Department 
maintains that, as a result of the issue and acceptance of the remit letter on an annual basis, 
responsibility for the matters contained in it passes from DCSF to QCA (although 
accountability is arguably a different issue).28  Lord Sutherland noted the prevalence of the 
model of central government delegating delivery responsibilities to non-departmental 
public bodies and agencies. He also noted that the model of delegation is “predicated on 
the sponsor department’s confidence in the NDPB’s capacity and capability to deliver what 
is asked in the remit letter”.29   
17. The remit letter, then, is intended to demarcate the responsibilities of DCSF and QCA. 
However, there did appear to be some confusion in relation to the degree to which QCA is 
separate from DCSF in the context of policy execution. At one point, the Secretary of State 
told us that: 
… Ministers are accountable to Parliament for the overall delivery of our schools 
policy, including the national testing regime. It is my responsibility to ensure that 
that happens, and I do so in an arm’s-length way through an independent body, the 
QCA, which contracts with ETS.30 
However, he later told us that: 
… the QCA is a non-departmental public body. It is not independent; it reports to 
Ministers, who are then accountable to Parliament for the national curriculum and 
the delivery of tests.  
Ken Boston was not an independent decision maker or commentator on 
Government policy.31 
18. Similar inconsistencies were expressed by Dr Ken Boston. In the context of a discussion 
about the level of Government control over the details of the testing system, he said that: 
The QCA’s problem has been that it is not at arm’s length—to use the Government’s 
term—yet it can end up carrying the blame for a whole set of decisions over which it 
had no control.32 
 
27 http://www.qca.org.uk/libraryAssets/media/Ed_Balls_to_Sir_Anthony_Greener_12032008.pdf 
28 Q 364 
29 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, para 3.104 
30 Q 126 
31 Q 364 
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On the other hand, in the context of test delivery he later stated that “Ministers were not 
getting involved in the detail of it at all”.33 
19. Although we do not wish to make too much of these apparent inconsistencies—they 
are, perhaps, explicable in context—it does highlight the broader issue of the extent to 
which DCSF did, in fact, have a hand in the details of the management of the testing 
system. 
20. Ken Boston has emphasised the many areas over which the Government had and 
retained control: 
… the Government, through the DCSF, determine the nature of the tests to be 
procured, the pupils who are to be tested, which subjects they are to be tested in, how 
and when they are to be tested and how much money has to be spent on testing. The 
interval between the date of the test and the date for results—the eight weeks’ 
interval—is set by the Government. They also determine whether the tests are 
marked manually or onscreen; which results data are collected and how they are 
collected; the form in which the data are required; and how the results are returned 
to schools. In those core elements of test development and delivery, neither the QCA 
nor the supplier has any discretion—decisions are made by the Government alone. 
The development and the delivery of these tests are not at arm’s length from the 
Government; the Ministers and the officials are at arm’s length only from the detail 
of the test questions, and from the marking and level setting.34 
Many of the details to which Dr Boston referred in this passage were not set out explicitly 
in the remit letter. This highlights the fact that the framework within which QCA is 
required to operate is actually a complex series of formal and informal, written and oral 
instructions and policies issued by DCSF over a period of time and not in one letter in 
March each year.35   
21. Questions arise where the remit offered to QCA appears to be incapable of 
performance, the budget appears unreasonable or both. Lord Sutherland expressed the 
view in his evidence to us that it was always open to the leadership of QCA to resign if they 
thought that the offer from DCSF was unreasonable and its performance likely 
impossible.36  The fact was that they did not do so. Lord Sutherland later conceded that 
resignation would be a “nuclear option” and that alternatives would be public statements 
or a letter from QCA to DCSF stating that the QCA was being asked to do too much. 
However, he found no evidence of such a letter.37 
22. Dr Boston himself told us that he had come to regret not resigning in 2006 on the basis 
that he thought the remit could not be achieved.38  He said that decisions made by 
                                                                                                                                                              
32 Q 326 
33 Q 332 
34 Q 311 
35  There is also a Memorandum of Understanding between the former Department for Education and Skills and QCA, 
but this does not appear to have been updated since the creation of DCSF; http://www.qca.org.uk/qca_4979.aspx 
36 Q 300 
37 Q 301 
38 Q 325 
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ministers and officials in 2006 had a “marked impact” on the failure in 2008.39  We asked 
him why, when delivery of National Curriculum tests had failed in 2004 and come close to 
failure in subsequent years, he did not raise the matter publicly when he failed to make any 
progress with ministers. He told us: 
That is a good question, and it is one that I have asked myself. I have frequently 
spoken publicly about different approaches to testing and the problems with this 
particular approach and how it was administered. I have also pressed privately for 
reform with Ministers and officials—there is no question about that. Over the past 
few months I have asked myself why I did not resign in 2006. At that point it was 
clear to me that I was not going to get Government buy-in to necessary reform. I 
continued through 2007 and 2008 to run an organisation that was faced with close to 
an impossible task, which I had seen go belly up in 2004 and had the prospect of 
doing so again. Probably my greatest regret in all of this is that I was not more honest 
with myself at that time and did not simply say, “It can’t be done.”40 
23. We are reminded of a report of our predecessor committee on Individual Learning 
Accounts (ILA) which detailed the “considerable shortcomings” of another contractor in 
the delivery of the ILA scheme, as well as the failings of the Department for Education and 
Skills itself.41  In that case, the Department retained “even the smallest details of policy 
design” and missed an opportunity to transfer to the private contractor fuller responsibility 
for the management of the scheme. As a result, it was unclear who was responsible, the 
Department or the contractor, for specific outcomes of the ILA project. The Committee 
concluded:  
We do not under-estimate the difficulty of getting right the balance between policy 
and delivery, but we question whether the DfES could have been bolder and given 
Capita a wider brief to deliver the desired outcomes of the ILA project.42 
The relationship between DCSF, QCA and ETS is, of course, quite different from the 
relationship between the DfES and the contractor in the ILA case. However, there is a 
broader principle here which is that, if Government is to sub-contract certain projects, it 
must not attempt to micro-manage the details of that project, for example, by over-
specifying the means by which it wishes to see delivery made or through the mechanism of 
observers. The role of departmental observers within QCA will be considered in greater 
detail below (paragraphs 28 to 35), but they have essentially acted as mediators of 
information flowing between DCSF and QCA. 
24. We maintain the view of our predecessor Committee, that the difficulty of 
establishing the correct dividing line between policy and execution should not be 
underestimated. However, we are concerned that DCSF appears to be specifying in 
considerable detail the ways in which it wishes to see its policies executed. The DCSF 
 
39 Q 311 
40 Q 325 
41 Education and Skills Committee, Individual Learning Accounts, Third Report of Session 2001–02, HC 561-I, p3 
42 Ibid., para 155 
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achieves this both formally, through the QCA’s remit letter, and informally, through 
regular contact with its agency and through the mechanism of observers. 
25. We agree with the Secretary of State that he is accountable for ensuring that the 
QCA fulfils its responsibilities for the overall operation of the testing regime. However, 
he is also accountable for the policies and other decisions of his Department, including 
the terms of the QCA’s remit letter; and he is responsible for ensuring that the 
directions issued by DCSF are capable of being carried out by the organisations tasked 
with their execution.  
26. If significant areas of Government policy are to continue to be delivered by non-
departmental public bodies and other agencies, the leadership of those bodies should be 
prepared to demonstrate their professionalism by challenging the Government if they 
consider that the impossible is being asked of them. Appropriate mechanisms should 
be put in place to allow them to make such a challenge. We recognise that this should 
never be used as a means to hold the Government to ransom or to impede the execution 
of legitimate public policy. Nevertheless, there needs to be a formal and transparent 
dialogue between the Department and its agencies. 
27. In anticipation of new legislation, the QCA’s regulatory function has already been split 
from its core activities and hived off to the regulator, Ofqual, which is still technically part 
of QCA but is operating largely as if it were already independent. If the Apprenticeships, 
Skills, Children and Learning Bill is passed, what remains of the QCA will be transformed 
into the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency (QCDA). The Director 
General of the Schools Directorate at DCSF has told us that the Government intends for 
Ofqual to be entirely independent, whereas QCDA will be “significantly less” independent 
and is being established specifically as “a delivery agency of Government”.43   
28. In the light of the repeated problems we have identified, we consider that DCSF 
should, in an updated Memorandum of Understanding or equivalent with each public 
body, set out more clearly how it will conduct its relationships with those bodies. We 
urge the Government to adopt a far less prescriptive approach when issuing 
instructions to the new Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency. If it is 
considered appropriate that policy should be executed by an agency rather than by the 
Department itself, the potential benefits of such an arrangement are significantly 
diluted if the Government fails to trust the expertise and experience of the professionals 
chosen to run such agencies. It is clear that micro-management from the Department 
would introduce a degree of confusion into the lines of responsibility and 
accountability, as previously happened in the case of Individual Learning Accounts, 
investigated by our predecessor Committee, and the mistake has been repeated with 
arrangements for the delivery of National Curriculum tests. 
 
43 Uncorrected transcript of evidence taken before the Children, Schools and Families Committee on 8 July 2009, HC 
353-vi, (2008–09) Q 489  
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3 The role of DCSF observers 
QCA and DCSF Observers  
29. One aspect of the constant process of instruction and negotiation between DCSF and 
QCA is the position of DCSF observers on various boards and committees of the QCA. In 
evidence to Lord Sutherland, QCA described the role of a DCSF observer in the context of 
the procurement process as “someone who could contribute to discussions and comment 
on the process, but was not someone who had a voting right in terms of evaluating the 
potential suppliers”.44 Lord Sutherland concluded in his report that, although DCSF viewed 
QCA as a “trusted delivery partner”, it nevertheless had observers monitoring the QCA at 
various levels of the organisation, including at operational meetings between QCA and 
ETS.45 
30. As we have stated, it is not our intention in this Report to rehearse the detail of what 
happened in the particular case of the test delivery in 2008, which Lord Sutherland has 
already addressed admirably. However, there is a more general point about observers 
which we wish to make here. On crucial issues which would go to the credibility of the 
testing system, Dr Ken Boston was unambiguous, that the Government did not interfere 
with QCA’s operations: 
I make it absolutely clear to you that in my time as Chief Executive of the QCA I 
have never had any interference from any Minister or any Government official to do 
with the nature of the paper, the quality of the marking, the standard that should be 
set, or the figure that should be reached in terms of performance, and if I had I would 
be the first person to declare that publicly.46 
31. However, Dr Boston was highly critical of the role of DCSF observers within the QCA 
generally, stating that they undermined its authority: 
By reducing the formality of the relationship between the two organisations—the 
Government and the QCA—it leads to negotiated compromises from time to time, 
which erode public accountability. The role of observers on boards and committees 
has been to take part in discussions, to provide advice to Ministers separately from 
the QCA and to relay ministerial feedback. It is in that third area where the problem 
arises. Observers typically advise in committees and boards that Ministers would be 
“minded to” or “not minded to” agree with this or that proposal or “content to” or 
“not content to” agree to a particular recommendation, or even that, “If I put that 
idea to the Minister it would be laughed out of court.” Now certainly, prior 
consultation with the DCSF is important to inform subsequent decisions by the 
QCA on what advice it should offer Ministers, but too often boards such as that of 
the QCA are put into a position where it is expected that they will seek to negotiate 
 
44 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, para 2.45 
45 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, para 3.105 
46 Q 15 
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that advice in advance. I think that is a pernicious process that compromises integrity 
and independence…47 
32. This relationship between DCSF and QCA, mediated by DCSF observers, paints a 
picture of a Government which is not keeping delivery of national testing at arm’s length, 
but is in constant dialogue with its delivery agency in relation to the method of delivery. 
Indeed, Lord Sutherland told us that: 
I believe there is so much [delegation of responsibility for delivery to government 
agencies] now that it is time to pause and say, “Have we got the best possible 
arrangement that allows such an allegedly arms-length delivery?”. It sounds grand, 
but the arm is a real thing and messages move up and down. It is happening across 
Government.48 
33. The Secretary of State assured us that the role of observers was to ensure an appropriate 
flow of information between the Department and QCA. Observers were not deployed in 
order to influence decisions of the QCA, but to furnish it with policy information relevant 
to the decisions it was taking. In the other direction, observers could relay to the 
Department any concerns they might have about the service delivery (although Lord 
Sutherland considered that, in the case of the 2008 testing cycle, they had not done this 
effectively).49  The Secretary of State pointed to the presence of a Treasury observer on the 
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee as another example of where observers were 
used without any allegations of undue influence.50 
34. Lord Sutherland did not question the legitimacy of delegating responsibility for 
national testing and other issues from DCSF to QCA, quite the contrary; but he did 
consider that the role of DCSF observers on QCA’s operational, programme and corporate 
boards was not entirely clear. He therefore recommended that their role be clarified on a 
case-by-case basis.51   
35. We have some serious concerns in relation to the role of observers and question 
whether, in many cases, they are necessary. In appropriate cases, departmental 
observers may perform a useful function in helping ministers remain accountable for 
policy delivery in a meaningful manner. However, formal advice to ministers from a 
public body should not be negotiated through departmental observers; nor should 
observers exert undue influence over the decision-making of a public body.  
36. We concur with Lord Sutherland’s recommendation, accepted by Government, that 
the role of departmental observers should be clarified. We believe that the 
Memorandum of Understanding or equivalent between DCSF and its non-
departmental public bodies should, in each case, set out clearly the appropriate role for 
departmental observers so that the public can be reassured that observers are not acting 
inappropriately to influence the work and decisions of public bodies. 
 
47 Q 311 
48 Q 254 
49 Q 421; Report of the Sutherland Inquiry paras 4.143–4.146 
50 Q 418 
51 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, para 3.144 
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Ofqual and DCSF observers  
37. The Office of the Qualifications and Examinations Regulator, Ofqual, was established 
on 8 April 2008. Prior to that, the regulatory function had been carried out by QCA in 
addition to its other duties.52  Ken Boston has pointed out the objection to this 
arrangement: 
I support absolutely the notion of a regulatory authority reporting to Parliament 
rather than to Ministers. That has always been a difficulty with the QCA: it is 
responsible for maintaining the assessment standard, the height of the hurdle, yet 
reports at the same time to the Ministers who want to drive up the performance 
standard—the number of people who leap the hurdle. There is a real inconsistency 
there.53 
38. The Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Bill will, if passed, establish Ofqual 
as an independent regulator reporting to Parliament. In the meantime, Ofqual remains 
technically part of QCA, and QCA has set up a new governance structure in order to allow 
Ofqual some independence under the current statutory framework. Nevertheless, Lord 
Sutherland recommended that, ahead of legislation, Ofqual’s reporting arrangements 
should be clarified.54 
39. In relation to the National Curriculum tests in 2008, the role of Ofqual was to oversee 
delivery of the tests rather than to monitor the contract.55 According to Isabel Nisbet, 
Ofqual’s Chief Executive, Ofqual’s responsibility was to: 
… make sure that our regulatory requirements were met. They are that the levels are 
properly set; the standards are properly made; the quality of the marking is good; and 
the tests are delivered in a way that meets the standards of previous years.56 
40. Lord Sutherland expressed the view that the relationship between this Committee and 
Ofqual would become an important aspect of the regulator’s duty to report to Parliament.57  
He considered that many of the problems of the current arrangements could be overcome 
with the establishment of a properly independent regulator with appropriate powers and 
resources.58 He thought that Ofqual should, in future, be consulted on the nature and 
details of the contract for delivery of National Curriculum test results awarded by QCA. 
This would enable Ofqual to ensure, for example, that the contractual requirement to 
provide the kind of information Ofqual needs for quality assurance is built into the 
contract from the start.59 
 
52 Q 172 
53 Q 317 
54 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, paras 6.107–6.110 
55 Q 179 
56 Q 178 
57 Q 237 
58 Q 254 
59 Q 265 
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41. However, doubts have been expressed about the prospects for Ofqual’s independence, 
both now and once it has been established as a statutory body. Dr Boston warned that the 
presence of DCSF observers on the Board of Ofqual could seriously compromise the de 
facto independence of the regulator. He referred to three functions of departmental 
observers: the provision of specialist expertise; the provision of separate advice to ministers; 
and speaking on behalf of ministers. He considered that the first function could be 
achieved by direct consultation between Ofqual and DCSF and that the second and third 
were quite inappropriate in the context of an independent regulator reporting to 
Parliament.60 
42. Dr Boston recognised that a good exchange of information between DCSF and Ofqual 
was necessary but thought that the presence of observers on Ofqual’s Board may lead to the 
relationship becoming “too cosy” and would adversely affect both the regulator’s true 
independence and its strict accountability to Parliament alone.61  He illustrated his point 
with the example of how DCSF observers worked with QCA. Given that formal advice 
from QCA to ministers is made public in due course and other correspondence is 
potentially available under Freedom of Information rules, DCSF officials liked to see draft 
correspondence and often sought to negotiate its terms so that it could be made acceptable 
to both ministers and the public. Dr Boston considered that such practices would be wholly 
unacceptable if applied to an independent regulator.62  He stated that: 
Ofqual will not be seen as conspicuously and unquestionably separate from 
Government so long as it has it accepts DCSF observers on its Board and 
committees. The public and the Parliament need to be absolutely certain that 
Ministers are being told what they need to know, not what they or their officials 
might want to hear.63 
43. We expressed our concerns in relation to the potential for departmental observers 
to exert undue influence on the advice from and decision-making of public bodies. 
Whilst we are content that such observers should continue to have a role within bodies 
such as QCA with appropriate safeguards, we are opposed to the presence of 
departmental observers in the context of an independent regulator. The independence 
of Ofqual should be put beyond question and that requires contact between DCSF and 
Ofqual to be put on a much more formal footing than is suggested by the presence of 
observers on Ofqual’s Board.  
 
60 Ev 76 
61 Q 353 
62 Ev 76 
63 Ev 77 
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4 National Curriculum test delivery post-
ETS 
44. The Committee stated in its Report on Testing and Assessment of May 2008 that 
children in England were tested too much and too often.64  We heard evidence that English 
school pupils were amongst the most tested in the world and that the national test burden 
was displacing real learning and deep understanding of a subject.65  We found significant 
evidence that, due to the high-stakes nature of national tests, some schools were teaching to 
the test and narrowing the taught curriculum in an effort to maximise performance and 
improve standings in school performance tables which were based on test results.66 
45. The Government maintained that the amount of time spent by pupils actually taking 
exams was very limited, but this missed the point that the burden of testing is felt by pupils 
and teachers more in terms of the amount of time and effort spent in preparation than in 
sitting the tests themselves.67 The Government’s view, set out in its Response to our Report, 
was that there was no necessity for national testing to result in teaching to the test and 
narrowing of the curriculum and that the Government did not support excessive time 
spent on test preparation.68  This ignored the strong evidence that we received, from Ofsted 
amongst others, to the effect that these practices were both widespread and damaging.69 
46. Nevertheless, the demise of the QCA’s contract with ETS, which was terminated in 
August 2008 as a result of the delivery failure, provided the Government with an 
opportunity to address our concerns that there was too much national testing.70 On 14 
October 2008, the Secretary of State made an oral Statement in the House to announce the 
abolition of Key Stage 3 tests as a compulsory component of the national testing regime.71  
The Secretary of State said that: 
In my statement [to the House on 22 July 2008], I … made it clear that the current 
testing and assessment regime is not set in stone. I know that some hon. Members 
were disappointed that I was unable to go further at that time, but it was important 
that we evaluated the case for change before making decisions. Over the summer, we 
have been able to study the Select Committee’s report on testing and assessment, 
which was debated in the House last week. … 
…I take seriously the concerns raised by the Select Committee, teachers and parents. 
Testing, assessment and accountability must encourage and reward the best teaching 
 
64 Children, Schools and Families Committee, Testing and Assessment, Third Report of Session 2007–08, HC 169-I 
65 Ibid. paras 141–149 
66 Ibid. para 130 
67 Ibid, paras 148–149 
68 Children, Schools and Families Committee, Testing and Assessment: Government and Ofsted Responses to the 
Committee’s Third Report of Session 2007–08, Fifth Special Report of Session 2007–08, HC 1003, para 15 
69 Children, Schools and Families Committee, Testing and Assessment, Third Report of Session 2007–08, HC 169-I, para 
130 
70 http://www.qca.org.uk/qca_19029.aspx  
71 HC Deb, 14 Oct 2008, Col 677 
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so that it properly supports pupils in their learning and development. Schools should 
be judged fairly on how they support the progress and well-being of every child. … 
Having looked hard at the current testing regime, we do not believe that the three 
principles that I have set out [the provision of information to parents, teachers and 
the public for various purposes] justify the key stage 3 testing arrangements in their 
current form.72 
We welcomed the abolition of mandatory Key Stage 3 testing, believing that a reduction in 
the burden of testing would give teachers greater freedom to offer children a balanced 
education.73 
47. In line with our recommendations in our Report on Testing and Assessment of May 
2008, we welcomed the abolition of mandatory national testing at Key Stage 3 when it 
was announced in October 2008 and we remain convinced that the decision to reduce 
the burden of national testing was a good one. 
48. However, the logistics of National Curriculum test delivery remain complex, even after 
the abolition of Key Stage 3 testing. As Dr Ken Boston told us, the history of delivery of 
national tests is not a happy one: 
We failed in 2004 when Key Stage 3 was late. We were within hours of failing in 
2005, even though we had extended the Key Stage 3 results date. In 2006 and 2007 we 
were fine. In 2008 the whole thing collapsed again. The enterprise, the whole archaic 
nature of this thing, is incredible, and we are persisting with it for 2009. Lord 
Sutherland has made recommendations about end-to-end testing which simply 
cannot be met for 2009. Key Stage 3 is not being run this year but that does not halve 
the risk. It simply means that there will potentially be more markers who will be able 
to do Key Stage 2.74 
Nor are we encouraged by the progress of the Government’s pilot study into ‘single-level 
tests’, which are intended as a possible replacement for the current ‘end of Key Stage’ 
testing regime. Single-level tests are based on the concept of testing when ready, with the 
pupil being tested at a set level to establish whether or not he or she has achieved that 
standard. Children would work their way through each level in turn and would be entered 
for single-level tests by their teacher once the teacher considers that they are ready for the 
relevant level.  
49. If single-level tests were to be rolled out to replace the current testing regime, pupils 
would sit a number of tests over the course of a Key Stage rather than taking a single set of 
tests at the end of the Key Stage. Tests would be made available to schools twice each year 
and would be externally marked. In making the transition from end of Key Stage tests to 
single-level tests, there is the potential for a significant increase in the testing burden, with 
attendant logistical complexities.  
 
72 HC Deb, 14 Oct 2008, Col 677 
73 Children, Schools & Families Committee Press Notice, 14 October 2008, 
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/csf/csfpn141008a.cfm  
74 Q 321 
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50. We repeat our warning, set out in our Report on Testing and Assessment, that new 
tests should not be introduced nationally with undue haste.75  We are concerned that, if 
single-level tests are rolled out as a replacement for end of Key Stage testing, there is 
potential for significant complexity in the logistical arrangements for sending out, 
marking and returning a large number of single-level test scripts twice each year. 
Evidence from the pilot studies so far is not encouraging and demonstrates that there 
remain serious problems to be overcome. We remind the Government that we are 
opposed to an increase in the burden of national testing generally; and we warn that the 
Government must be quite sure that the logistical arrangements for single-level tests 
are robust before they are rolled out nationally.  
51. Ken Boston told us that test administration has made significant progress in recent 
years, a view which is, perhaps, surprising given the regularity with which there have been 
near misses and outright failures in National Curriculum test delivery. However, he argues 
strongly in favour of a move towards on-screen marking as the obvious means of 
increasing the reliability of test delivery whilst, at the same time, improving the validity and 
reliability of marking.76  He pointed to the successful use of on-screen marking of GCSE 
and A Level scripts by Awarding Bodies as evidence that such a system could improve the 
marking of National Curriculum tests.77   
52. What clearly does not work, as Lord Sutherland has pointed out, is a hybrid system 
such as that used by ETS in 2008 whereby scripts are marked manually but many different 
data points for each script are entered into a database manually to capture question-level 
data.78  Even leaving aside the particular problems with the systems developed by ETS 
(identified in Chapter 5 of Lord Sutherland’s report), manual marking coupled with 
manual data entry into a database is an extremely labour-intensive process, ill-suited to the 
pressured environment in which markers must deliver results within very tight time limits. 
53. We have heard a significant amount of argument between Dr Boston on the one hand 
and DCSF on the other about who has and has not recommended on-screen marking over 
the years.79  Dr Boston told us that, from 2004, DCSF “declined to accept QCA advice to 
introduce on-screen marking” on the basis that it should first be demonstrated in a pilot 
study that the results would be the same or better than those resulting from manual 
marking. Dr Boston argued that such a trial would have had no value as on-screen marking 
could not be judged on the degree to which it replicated the “inferior process” of manual 
marking. He considered that the results would inevitably have been different, but not 
necessarily worse.80 
54. The Secretary of State, on the other hand, said that: 
 
75 Children, Schools and Families Committee, Testing and Assessment, Third Report of Session 2007–08, HC 169-I, para 
198 
76 Q 23 
77 Q 8; Q 330 
78 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, paras 5.104–5.110.Question-level data gives information about how particular 
questions were answered, either by individual pupils or by groups of pupils. Schools can use this data to check, for 
example, that teachers are covering the curriculum effectively. 
79 Qq 322, 330, 350, 360, 367, 419, 420; Ev 74 
80  Ev 74 
Policy and delivery: the National Curriculum tests delivery failure in 2008    21 
 
While it is true that Dr. Boston was clearly in favour of onscreen marking, it was the 
QCA itself that decided on the basis of trials that were carried out in 2005 not to 
proceed. Indeed, in his statement about the onscreen marking trials conducted 
during the 2005 test cycle, it was Mr. David Gee [then Managing Director of the 
National Assessment Agency, a division of QCA] who said publicly, “Following 
analysis, I have concluded that it is inappropriate to introduce onscreen marking for 
either maths at Key Stage 2 or English at Key Stage 3 in 2006.”81 
Dr Boston replied that: 
It is wrong for the Secretary of State to claim that the QCA itself decided not to 
proceed with onscreen marking. We were told by ministers and officials that it was 
not an option. The final stumbling block was the Government requirement that 
whole scripts be returned to schools at the same time as the results, as in the past. … 
The purpose of the letter signed by David Gee on 3 November 2005 was to resolve 
uncertainty for 2006, and to paper over what would otherwise have been a very 
public rift between the QCA and Government. With the benefit of hindsight, we 
negotiated for far too long: I should have stood our ground and put QCA advice 
publicly and in writing.82 
55. What matters now is how the testing system is reformed in the future and what 
safeguards are necessary to ensure that testing failures do not recur. Lord Sutherland has 
made a series of recommendations in his report, including a recommendation that “online 
marking” should be piloted. He points to the potential of both enhanced quality of marking 
and greater security for scripts.83  In addition, we believe that on-screen marking is a viable 
way to capture electronically question-level data for diagnostic purposes. We noted in our 
Report on Testing and Assessment the benefits to teaching and learning of question-level 
data on test results, and would consider the routine provision of such data to be a valuable 
step forwards.84 
56. We remain concerned about the consequences attached to high-stakes testing. We 
consider that, if children are to sit national tests, they should derive the maximum 
benefit from that experience. We noted in our Report on Testing and Assessment the 
benefit of receiving question-level data for diagnostic purposes and consider this to be a 
valuable step forwards. However, it seems to us that separating the marking process 
from data capture risks a repeat of the delivery problems experienced in 2008 and must 
surely lead to an increase in opportunity for human error. We believe that any 
significant future reform of National Curriculum testing must include an evaluation of 
on-screen marking from which question-level data can automatically be derived. 
 
81  Q 360 
82  Ev 74 
83 Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, para 5.232 
84 Children, Schools and Families Committee, Testing and Assessment, Third Report of Session 2007–08, HC 169-I, para 
125 
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5 Conclusion 
57. In this Report, we have not sought to revisit the intricate details of how the delivery of 
National Curriculum tests in 2008 failed. Lord Sutherland has carried out a meticulous 
inquiry into those details and we endorse his report as an excellent account of events. Our 
inquiries, however, have taken a rather different approach and we have considered the 
delivery failure in the broader context of how Government has set up the framework for 
delivery of its testing policies.  
58. A common theme has run through our inquiries: that of the independence of the 
public bodies involved in test delivery. We have concluded that, by interfering too much in 
the detail of policy delivery, the DCSF increased the likelihood of its failure. DCSF 
observers may have a legitimate role within QCA, but we consider that that role becomes 
illegitimate if observers seek to negotiate the terms of the “advice” issued by QCA to 
ministers, or to exert undue influence over QCA decision-making. 
59. In terms of the independence of Ofqual, we believe that the presence of observers on its 
Board is totally unacceptable. Ofqual must be, and be seen to be, independent, otherwise 
the legitimacy of the testing system itself might be cast into doubt. This Committee will be 
monitoring the work of Ofqual on an ongoing basis and we will be taking a particular 
interest in how it guards and exercises its independence. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
The inquiries into the 2008 test delivery failure  
1. We endorse the work carried out by Lord Sutherland in exposing the detail of the 
many factors contributing to the failures in the delivery of the 2008 National 
Curriculum tests (Paragraph 6) 
2. This inquiry provides a good illustration of how a select committee can use its 
authority and powers in a timely manner to investigate problematic incidents as 
soon as they arise. Our swift action in this matter has enabled us to put on the public 
record both written and oral evidence from a party to the incident, ETS, which was 
not available by the time the official inquiry was fully operational. The Sutherland 
Inquiry was then able to rely on the evidence we had secured when it became clear 
that ETS would not engage with the process. (Paragraph 8) 
3. It is not clear to us that the DCSF having issued parallel terms of reference prevented 
Ofqual asking Lord Sutherland to inquire into the DCSF’s role, had Ofqual 
considered that appropriate. Lord Sutherland chose not to consider the 
Department’s role beyond its oversight of the particular circumstances of the delivery 
of the National Curriculum tests in 2008. However, this Committee is able to go 
further than he did and comment in more general terms on the line between policy 
and execution.  (Paragraph 11) 
Delegation of responsibility from DCSF to QCA 
4. We maintain the view of our predecessor Committee, that the difficulty of 
establishing the correct dividing line between policy and execution should not be 
underestimated. However, we are concerned that DCSF appears to be specifying in 
considerable detail the ways in which it wishes to see its policies executed. The DCSF 
achieves this both formally, through the QCA’s remit letter, and informally, through 
regular contact with its agency and through the mechanism of observers. (Paragraph 
24) 
5. We agree with the Secretary of State that he is accountable for ensuring that the QCA 
fulfils its responsibilities for the overall operation of the testing regime. However, he 
is also accountable for the policies and other decisions of his Department, including 
the terms of the QCA’s remit letter; and he is responsible for ensuring that the 
directions issued by DCSF are capable of being carried out by the organisations 
tasked with their execution.  (Paragraph 25) 
6. If significant areas of Government policy are to continue to be delivered by non-
departmental public bodies and other agencies, the leadership of those bodies should 
be prepared to demonstrate their professionalism by challenging the Government if 
they consider that the impossible is being asked of them. Appropriate mechanisms 
should be put in place to allow them to make such a challenge. We recognise that this 
should never be used as a means to hold the Government to ransom or to impede the 
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execution of legitimate public policy. Nevertheless, there needs to be a formal and 
transparent dialogue between the Department and its agencies. (Paragraph 26) 
7. In the light of the repeated problems we have identified, we consider that DCSF 
should, in an updated Memorandum of Understanding or equivalent with each 
public body, set out more clearly how it will conduct its relationships with those 
bodies. We urge the Government to adopt a far less prescriptive approach when 
issuing instructions to the new Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency. 
If it is considered appropriate that policy should be executed by an agency rather 
than by the Department itself, the potential benefits of such an arrangement are 
significantly diluted if the Government fails to trust the expertise and experience of 
the professionals chosen to run such agencies. It is clear that micro-management 
from the Department would introduce a degree of confusion into the lines of 
responsibility and accountability, as previously happened in the case of Individual 
Learning Accounts, investigated by our predecessor Committee, and the mistake has 
been repeated with arrangements for the delivery of National Curriculum tests. 
(Paragraph 28) 
QCA and DCSF observers 
8. We have some serious concerns in relation to the role of observers and question 
whether, in many cases, they are necessary. In appropriate cases, departmental 
observers may perform a useful function in helping ministers remain accountable for 
policy delivery in a meaningful manner. However, formal advice to ministers from a 
public body should not be negotiated through departmental observers; nor should 
observers exert undue influence over the decision-making of a public body.  
(Paragraph 35) 
9. We concur with Lord Sutherland’s recommendation, accepted by Government, that 
the role of departmental observers should be clarified. We believe that the 
Memorandum of Understanding or equivalent between DCSF and its non-
departmental public bodies should, in each case, set out clearly the appropriate role 
for departmental observers so that the public can be reassured that observers are not 
acting inappropriately to influence the work and decisions of public bodies. 
(Paragraph 36) 
Ofqual and DCSF observers 
10. We expressed our concerns in relation to the potential for departmental observers to 
exert undue influence on the advice from and decision-making of public bodies. 
Whilst we are content that such observers should continue to have a role within 
bodies such as QCA with appropriate safeguards, we are opposed to the presence of 
departmental observers in the context of an independent regulator. The 
independence of Ofqual should be put beyond question and that requires contact 
between DCSF and Ofqual to be put on a much more formal footing than is 
suggested by the presence of observers on Ofqual’s Board.  (Paragraph 43) 
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National Curriculum test delivery post-ETS 
11. In line with our recommendations in our Report on Testing and Assessment of May 
2008, we welcomed the abolition of mandatory national testing at Key Stage 3 when 
it was announced in October 2008 and we remain convinced that the decision to 
reduce the burden of national testing was a good one. (Paragraph 47) 
12. We repeat our warning, set out in our Report on Testing and Assessment, that new 
tests should not be introduced nationally with undue haste.  We are concerned that, 
if single-level tests are rolled out as a replacement for end of Key Stage testing, there 
is potential for significant complexity in the logistical arrangements for sending out, 
marking and returning a large number of single-level test scripts twice each year. 
Evidence from the pilot studies so far is not encouraging and demonstrates that there 
remain serious problems to be overcome. We remind the Government that we are 
opposed to an increase in the burden of national testing generally; and we warn that 
the Government must be quite sure that the logistical arrangements for single-level 
tests are robust before they are rolled out nationally.  (Paragraph 50) 
13. We remain concerned about the consequences attached to high-stakes testing. We 
consider that, if children are to sit national tests, they should derive the maximum 
benefit from that experience. We noted in our Report on Testing and Assessment the 
benefit of receiving question-level data for diagnostic purposes and consider this to 
be a valuable step forwards. However, it seems to us that separating the marking 
process from data capture risks a repeat of the delivery problems experienced in 2008 
and must surely lead to an increase in opportunity for human error. We believe that 
any significant future reform of National Curriculum testing must include an 
evaluation of on-screen marking from which question-level data can automatically 
be derived. (Paragraph 56) 
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on Monday 14 July 2008
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Witness: Dr Ken Boston AO, Chief Executive, Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), gave
evidence.
Q1 Chairman: May I welcome Dr Ken Boston, chief
executive of the Qualifications and Curriculum
Authority, to our deliberations. We are glad he could
appear before us at short notice. He knows only too
well why we want to speak to him. I have said to Dr
Boston that he will have an opportunity to say a few
words to get us started, but Dr Boston, the reason
why we have called you before the Committee is that
you will know better than most people all the stories
that have been running around in the education
sector and outside the education sector about the
delay in the key stage test results. It was quite hard
to find out by this Monday morning what was truth
and what was fiction, and you are the man to tell us,
so that is what we are here for, but do please make
an opening statement.
Dr Boston: Thanks, Chairman. Let me begin by
saying I make it clear to this Committee as I have to
pupils, schools, parents and Ministers that I
apologise for the failure of our contractor to have
the Key Stage test results available on 8 July and I
share their frustration at this quite unacceptable
outcome. Lord Sutherland will establish the causes
of the failure, which was foreshadowed by a number
of problems in delivery. Among them were problems
with marker recruitment and retention, markers
being given wrong information about the location of
their training and the time of it, delay in getting
papers to markers, unmarked scripts being returned
to schools, data entry requirements impacting on the
rate of marking, inadequate call centre capacity, and
slow and unpredictable data feeds. I want to assure
you that we have responded immediately to every
one of those signals and have done everything
possible operationally and within the terms of the
contract to ensure that Educational Testing Service
(ETS) would deliver to schools. Since the start of the
test cycle in September last year, we have met weekly
with ETS and, since 1 May, daily with ETS to review
risks. We have held ETS accountable for meeting
service levels under the contract, and we have
monitored it closely. We have escalated problems to
the highest levels of ETS, including bringing the vice
president to London. We have co-located 70 of our
sta to ETS o ces. They have been providing
technical support, developing communications with
schools and markers, establishing emergency
marking centres, supporting call centres, managing
and recruiting the data entry senders and supporting
the management of scripts. In other words, we have
pushed to the absolute limit our capacity under the
contract to advise, support and warn. The current
position is that in Key Stage 2, the marking is now
100% complete.1 The results will be published on the
website tomorrow to download and print. Data
entry has been slower than marking. The volume of
results entered as of midnight last night was English
94.4%, maths 97.3% and science 97.3%. The Key
Stage 3 maths and science are substantially
complete, but there is still marking to be done in
English. The majority of results will be posted on
Friday. The schools that do not receive their English
results then will have them posted as they become
available. I assure the Committee that we are
exploring all possible commercial and legal avenues
to ensure that suitable action is taken for the failure.
We have a recovery plan in place, and we need to
attend urgently to the issue of ensuring that the
system will deliver in 2009.
Q2 Chairman: What will be the latest date for all the
results to be out?
Dr Boston: It is di cult to be entirely precise on that.
We have predicted dates before and got it wrong. I
think that it could be well into the holidays before
some of those English results are available.
Q3 Chairman: That would be mainly the English
results?
Dr Boston: Yes. At the moment we have maths and
science substantially complete. We think that they
will be out on Friday.
Q4 Chairman: So this is a mess, but the results will
come out. Will they come out reliably and to a
standard that you can swear by?
Dr Boston: I do not believe that there is any reason
at the moment to have doubts about the quality of
the marking, despite the stories and fears that are
abroad. The people who have marked the papers are
1 See supplementary evidence submitted by Dr Ken Boston;
Ev 7
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the people who have always marked the papers. The
papers have been developed in England by people
who know the English curriculum, English
standards and English schools. The mark schemes
have been developed by those people. The people
who are marking this year are largely the same as
those who marked last year—teachers and retired
teachers. The company which failed in this contract
has been responsible for logistics. The training of the
markers has been done by team leaders and senior
experienced markers, who are also people who have
done the job before. The programme that was put in
place by ETS to benchmark quality this year is
superior to the one used in the past. In the past, self-
selected scripts were examined by senior markers
during the run-up to the start of marking. If the
senior marker ticked them o, the person began
marking. There were some more self-selected scripts
given to senior markers once the marking was two-
thirds through. With this current contract, we
requested that great attention be given to improved
quality. There is a data bank of 80 scripts. They are
live scripts that have been standardised by markers.
At five stages during the marking process, markers
are required to access a batch of four and mark them.
That is a common standard for all markers. If they
have drifted from the mark they are brought back
into line by their team leaders or senior examiners. If
they cannot be brought back to the mark, they are
taken o quickly. The quality of training has been
very sound and the quality assurance—the
benchmark processing—is superior to what we have
had before.
Q5 Chairman: Who supervised all that quality?
Dr Boston: The training was done by the senior
examiners, who are experienced English markers,
and the marks for those benchmarks were
determined by those examiners. The logistics, the
delivery, the distribution of papers, the gathering of
results, the data feeds, were part of the contract. The
actual detail and quality of the work was not. The
final thing is that if there are problems with quality,
they will be dealt with this year just as they have been
dealt with in the past. In English, particularly at Key
Stage 3, we know that a higher proportion of papers
are returned for review than in other subjects,
because English is a more di cult paper to mark—
the mark scheme is not as precise, and the capacity
for variation between markers is greater. Those
papers will be marked in exactly the same way. If
there is a quality problem, it is most unlikely to be
greater than in previous years, but if there is one, it
will be dealt with by the usual process.
Q6 Chairman: Whatever you say, people will blame
the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority,
because you hired those people who have failed. Is
that not what they will say?
Dr Boston: Certainly, the QCA conducted the
procurement process at the end of the previous
period. The procurement had to be done again
according to the new rules. The process took place
over a period of almost 12 months. It followed, at
every step of the way, the requirements and
regulations. It was reviewed by the O ce of
Government Commerce on two occasions and got
“green”, which is the highest rating for the process.
This company was selected with the highest rating
on the various criteria that were identified. This is a
very big company with a lot of experience. It passed
financial due diligence, which was conducted for us
by PricewaterhouseCoopers. References were
checked out for it with organisations such as the
California State Board of Education, with which it
had done, and continues to do, major assessment
programmes. This company has a very good track
record. Its failure here is something that we certainly
did not predict.
Q7 Lynda Waltho: I am wondering about the IT. We
have significant information to suggest that changes
to IT, in terms of marking, were introduced. A
system such as this was surely piloted. Was there no
indication that there could be problems?
Dr Boston: Certainly, the system was piloted
extensively after the contract was awarded. During
the awarding of the contract there was a competitive
dialogue process, whereby the specifications for the
IT and other things were refined in discussion with
the people who were technically bidding for it.
However, despite the pilot, since the system was
scaled up there have been some significant problems.
Marking has been going faster than it is possible to
process the data and set levels against them. There
have been issues that we need to get to the bottom of,
and that clearly is a matter that Lord Sutherland and
we, from the legal point of view, will be pursuing
closely.
Q8 Lynda Waltho: Do you think that the IT system
may have been overly ambitious?
Dr Boston: I think the problem, frankly, was that it
was not ambitious enough. The decisions about how
marking would be done this year were made prior to
the procurement. Decisions about what data would
be sought and how they would be presented were
decisions of Government and were also made before
the procurement was made, in 2006. We have come
a long way in recent years in the general
qualifications, the use of technology, and the use of
on-screen marking, which is rapid, high quality,
reliable and secure. Over half the GCSEs at the
moment are marked on screen. Many of the A-levels
are marked on screen. None of the key stage tests are
yet marked on screen. Although the paper is marked
manually, we have asked the marker then to go to a
computer and key in on computer the item-level
marks—the question-level marks—which has
slowed the process, to a degree and, to a degree,
introduced the capacity for error. Next year one of
the things we have to address is resolving that issue
of slowness, but it is very clear that in the immediate
term we need to move as quickly as possible to using
on-screen marking for key stage tests: fast, reliable,
accurate, secure—all the benefits we have
demonstrated at the general qualifications level.
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Q9 Mr Carswell: There has been a cock-up. It has
aected tens of thousands of people. It has
undermined confidence in national testing and the
reliability of the end product. Is it your fault? Should
the Minister take responsibility, or neither? Is the
quango chief yet again going to pass the buck?
Dr Boston: The issue is complex. There have been,
potentially, problems in decisions made a couple of
years ago; there have been, potentially, problems in
the QCA and in its division, the National
Assessment Agency. There have been, potentially,
significant problems in ETS. Lord Sutherland has
been appointed to sort that out, and I believe he will.
Q10 Mr Carswell: Can we see a copy of your
contract, please?
Dr Boston: I do not have my contract with me.
Q11 Mr Carswell: Could we see it?
Dr Boston: Chairman, is that a reasonable
requirement for this Committee?
Chairman: Members of the Committee have the
ability to ask you questions, Dr Boston.
Mr Carswell: And I believe the Clerk of the
Committee contacted your o ce beforehand to ask
for a copy.
Dr Boston: Well, I am not aware of that contact, but
my remuneration and so on is in the public record.
Q12 Mr Carswell: Sure, but the terms of the contract
that would allow this Committee to hold you to
account for how you do your job—can we see a
copy, please?
Dr Boston: I am prepared to make available a copy
of the contract.2
Q13 Mr Carswell: Could we see that after this
meeting?
Dr Boston: Not immediately after this meeting; I do
not happen to carry it around with me.
Q14 Mr Carswell: Just as well, perhaps. Mr Brown
has rightly said that your successor needs to be
appointed only after confirmation hearings by this
Committee. Given what has happened and given
what some people would say is the need for proper
accountability of the QCA and its head, would you
welcome that? Do you think it is right that your
successor should be appointed only after
confirmation hearings, and perhaps that this
Committee should have the power to issue P45s
when the QCA does not quite get things right?
Dr Boston: I have not given that issue any thought at
all. I welcomed the decision to have this Committee
have confirmation hearings, but I cannot say it is an
issue that has exercised me.
Q15 Mr Carswell: One final thing, if I may. I believe
you gave us evidence saying that you are a fan of the
idea of national testing. Does not this whole episode
suggest that the idea of state-run national testing is
wrong—that government by unaccountable quango
2 Supplied in confidence. Not printed.
is inevitably going to be incompetent government;
that we should not have a quango running
national testing?
Dr Boston: I would have thought that you would
rather have a body that is at arm’s distance from
government running testing, than government
themselves. I think one of the issues with the QCA
has been that there are certain functions it performs
that need to be further distant from government.
That is why I welcome the establishment of Ofqual,
which is the regulatory side. I make it absolutely
clear to you that in my time as Chief Executive of the
QCA I have never had any interference from any
Minister or any government o cial to do with the
nature of the paper, the quality of the marking, the
standard that should be set, or the figure that should
be reached in terms of performance, and if I had I
would be the first person to declare that publicly.
Q16 Chairman: Before I move on to Annette, a
couple of times you mentioned the Sutherland
inquiry. I take it that you are not holding any
knowledge back from the Committee that you are
saving for a future occasion.
Dr Boston: Absolutely not.
Chairman: Just as long as that is clear.
Dr Boston: I am in a position where I must be
cautious about what is said with regard to putting
the commercial and legal side of the issue at risk. As
I implied, we are in a strong position contractually,
and we will seek remedies as a consequence of the
failure. I am holding nothing back from the
Committee.
Q17 Annette Brooke: Could you tell us more about
the late recruitment of markers? In your first
statement you told us that people are employed who
always mark the papers. Why have people been
receiving phone calls until quite recently asking them
to go and mark?
Dr Boston: I understand that there have been
shortages in some subjects. They were partly caused
by people who had previously accepted positions
dropping out and deciding not to continue, and
therefore contact was made with other markers.
Similarly, as part of the support that I mentioned,
when we found in May and June that di culties
were emerging that could put the system at risk and
that needed addressing, we strongly advised ETS to
set up two marking centres and it agreed. We needed
to recruit additional people into those marking
centres. Subsequently, there are seven such centres
established around the country. We have recruited
people to go into those, and they also distribute
papers to people who mark at home. In an e ort to
avoid the problem that has arisen, we put an
enormous e ort into getting more markers in, to
concentrate and improve the rate of marking so that
the deadlines had a chance of being met. That has
not been su cient.
Q18 Annette Brooke: You told us that the quality of
training was sound and as per usual. How can those
late recruits have had the full training that they
would normally have had?
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Dr Boston: They do not start without the full
training and without achieving a standardisation
process. They are given no live scripts until they have
been provided with some training.
Q19 Annette Brooke: Some training. Is that full
training?
Dr Boston: Yes—full training.
Q20 Annette Brooke: Could you tell us where the
shortages have been? Have they been at particular
key stages or subjects, or right across the board?
Dr Boston: It has been pretty well across the board.
The most acute problem has been in English.
Q21 Annette Brooke: Why?
Dr Boston: I think that people find marking English
more challenging than marking subjects where the
mark scheme has perhaps less room for discretion
and interpretation. We have diculty getting
markers.
Q22 Annette Brooke: Are they paid enough?
Dr Boston: The rates vary from subject to subject,
but most markers would make £750 to £1,000 or
£2,000 from a marking season. People keep coming
back to do it. It may be that there is a need to
increase payment. The greater benefit is to make the
marking experience—I was going to say more
enjoyable, but perhaps I should say more
professionally rewarding. That will come when more
and more markers work on-screen, because we do
not seem to have the same problems with the general
qualifications in attracting markets as we do with the
key stage tests.
Q23 Mr Chaytor: Dr Boston, when you first came
before the Committee some years ago, you famously
described the English assessment system as a cottage
industry. To what extent have the characteristics of
that cottage industry contributed to the problems
over the past few weeks?
Dr Boston: In the years since I made that comment,
we have seen tremendous change in a whole host of
things in respect of general qualifications, including
better administration in the exams o ces at schools.
No longer in any of the tests or examinations are
bundles of scripts left on doorsteps or at post o ce
counters unaccounted for; they are barcoded, traced
and tracked. We know the whereabouts of parcels.
However, we have not advanced with the marking
process of the key stage tests beyond manual
marking. We now have a situation in which people
mark manually and then enter the scripts on
computer. The standard scripts that are done in five
batches come on computer. The technology is there.
There is only a sample of 40,000 of single-level tests
that we are trialling in December this year, but that
will be safe and secure on-screen delivery and on-
screen marking. We must move quickly into the use
of that technology with the tests. It will not be next
year. We will not be able to scale up the key stage
tests to on-screen marking for next year. We cannot
have a repeat of what happened this year. We shall
either need more time next year or to find some
alternative. In fact, that last time that we had a fully
successful round with key stage tests was in 2003. In
2004, we were late with Key Stage 3, which was a
problem. In 2005, 2006 and 2007, we delivered
because we kept Key Stage 3 English late, in mid-
August. This year, we tried to bring back Key Stage
3, including English, to July and the result was that
we failed not only Key Stage 3, but Key Stage 2. We
really need to look at how the tests are delivered and
administered, and we need rapid reform.
Q24 Mr Chaytor: To what extent is the underlying
issue not only this year’s delays, but the problem
that has occurred in recent years that you have
described of the sheer volume of assessment that
children in English schools experience? Is online
marking the solution, or will it merely gloss over a
deeper problem caused by the volume of assessment
that takes place?
Dr Boston: I have given evidence on that to the
Committee before, and the alternative to which I
referred at one point was single-level tests to confirm
teacher assessment. In the longer term, that seems to
be a productive direction in which to go. The
teachers come to a judgment about the level that a
child is at; at the moment, £150 million is being spent
through the strategies in training teachers in the
assessment of pupil performance. To then use the
single-level test to confirm whether the child has, in
fact, reached that level of performance seems a
sensible way forward. The alternative, which is to
continue with full cohort testing, is perfectly feasible,
even given the short time frames, and even given that
we are only talking of a matter of nine weeks for Key
Stage 3, but to do it, we have to use technology.
Q25 Mr Chaytor: You referred earlier to the weekly
meetings. The problem was identified publicly
during the week beginning 30 June. For how long
had the weekly meetings taken place before then?
Dr Boston: Since September there has been a
fortnightly programme board meeting, chaired by
the managing director of the NAA and attended by
the very senior people from ETS. There has been a
weekly meeting since September—it is run by the
programme director in NAA, who reports to the
managing director—attended by opposite numbers
in ETS and in other agencies that are involved; we
have other contractors apart from ETS, setting the
papers and so on. As I said, from 1 May we have met
daily with senior people in the organisation,
operationally, to look at risk across the board in
communications, help desk, delivery, training,
market recruitment and retention, and so on. It has
been very hands on.
Q26 Mr Chaytor: So if the weekly meetings have
been taking place since September, at some point
well before 1 May it must have become obvious that
the programme was in di culties. Did something
happen on 29 June?
Dr Boston: It was always obvious that it was a very
challenging programme. Our concern was to identify
the risks and mitigate them right through that
process, which we were doing. I make the point, as I
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did in my introduction, that we were not there
actually managing the thing. Our capacity is to
advise, support and warn. ETS has a contractual
obligation to inform us when it has reached an
assessment that it is not going to meet a key
milestone, and 8 July was a key milestone. We
challenged ETS on many occasions throughout—
particularly the past two months—on that issue. It
was only on 26 June that we got a formal, written
response from ETS, that it was not going to make it.
We subsequently directed ETS, on 27 June, that it
was required to make it.
Q27 Mr Chaytor: The question is, if the NAA
representatives had been meeting ETS since last
September, why did the NAA not report to you that
there was a serious problem here? Why was there no
regular performance monitoring from ETS?
Dr Boston: There was regular performance
monitoring right through that, identifying problems
and mitigating them. We picked the problems o one
by one. Certainly there was an enormous number of
issues, but some of them were small and all of them
were addressed. When we found, as we got into the
latter weeks, that the volume of calls that were going
to come to call centres was greatly underestimated,
we immediately stepped in. We set up another call
centre, which we funded through the NAA, to assist
ETS. We put additional resources into the call
centres at Watford and in Northern Ireland, to assist
ETS to handle calls. We stepped in and found a
backlog of 10,000 e-mails, which were responded to,
finally, by NAA people rolling up their sleeves and
getting on with it.
Q28 Chairman: So this was 10,000 e-mails to ETS
that were not dealt with, and the NAA sta —the
sta of your wholly owned subsidiary—had to pick
that up?
Dr Boston: We stepped in and made it happen.
Q29 Chairman: So was the wrong decision made
about the contractor, in retrospect? I know you have
all sorts of di culties. The word on the street is that
you did have a UK-based supplier which had much
more grasp of the technology, but you went for a
much cheaper option.
Dr Boston: No, it was not a cheaper option—well, it
was the lowest cost option, but it was not picked on
those grounds. There were, finally, three bidders,
from a field that started at six and went quickly back
to five. On the key criteria of capacity to do the job,
this company was clearly up there with any of them.
On understanding and delivery of the contract, and
on innovation in technology, it had a high
reputation. It ticked all the boxes and, in aggregate,
came out well ahead of any competitor. On that
basis, following that process, we made the right
decision. It was subject to all the public scrutiny
required, including very close scrutiny by the QCA
board. Observers from the Department were present
right through the procurement process and were able
to advise Ministers that our recommendation should
be endorsed. Of course, the decision was our board’s
recommendation. It was clearly, on its merits, the
decision to make. However, when we look now at the
late results ahead of us, something has clearly gone
wrong. It is clear that we not only need to deal with
the problem confronting us at the moment, but
ensure that it never happens again, and get this
running for next year. The clock is ticking, and the
development of these tests is a two and a quarter year
cycle. The development of the tests for 2009 is well
under way, which is one reason why the transfer
online would be very di cult at this stage.
Q30 Mr Stuart: It seems to have come as a surprise
to you that ETS failed, yet the whole examinations
community has been saying for months that the
contract was underpriced and that di culties were
expected. How come you were the only people who
did not seem to anticipate the outcome?
Dr Boston: I think we were more closely aware of the
problems that were emerging than the rest of the
community. We were dealing with them. We were in
there working weekly and then daily with ETS—
Q31 Mr Stuart: Do you think it is acceptable to
notify Ministers as late as they were notified of the
fact that it would not be delivered?
Dr Boston: It became clear, as I said, on the 26th,
when contractually ETS had to tell us formally
whether they were going to make it or not. It was
clear at that point that they were not. In recent weeks
up till then, we had had doubts about Key Stage 3
English in particular, but we were doing everything
that we could to ameliorate them and were
reasonably certain that we would assist ETS to
overcome those problems.
Q32 Mr Stuart: So when did you, as the head of the
QCA, first think that the deadline was not going to
be met?
Dr Boston: When I was formally told by ETS on 26
June. But, as I said before, our folk had repeatedly
challenged and pushed in the weeks before that,
saying, “Are you really going to make it?” The
constant assertion from ETS was, “Yes.” From our
examination, the remedies that we were putting in
place were working. The 10,000 e-mails, for
example, were solved. The call centre problem was
solved. Enough markers were brought together to
do the job.
Q33 Mr Stuart: Did the previous board bid for the
contract?
Dr Boston: The previous board?
Q34 Mr Stuart: The board that had previously been
doing these examinations. Did it bid?
Dr Boston: Yes, it did.
Q35 Mr Stuart: That was Edexcel, wasn’t it?
Dr Boston: Yes.
Q36 Mr Stuart: And did it bid?
Dr Boston: Yes.
Q37 Mr Stuart: Why did so many of the boards
not bid?
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Dr Boston: I really cannot speculate on that. They
may not have thought that they had the capacity,
or—
Q38 Mr Stuart: Dr Boston, how can you not
speculate? They wrote to you and told you why they
were not bidding, did they not?
Dr Boston: Why they didn’t bid?
Mr Stuart: They wrote to you and told you why they
were not bidding.
Dr Boston: I’m not sure what you are referring to.
Q39 Mr Stuart: I am referring to letters sent to you
by other boards explaining why major boards in this
country did not bid for the contract. They wrote to
and explained precisely why they were not bidding
for the contract.
Dr Boston: Well, I’m sorry, I—
Q40 Mr Stuart: Is that not true?
Dr Boston: I do not have that information at my
fingertips. If those letters were sent, presumably that
was back in 2006. I am afraid that I would need to go
back to my files to confirm whether that happened.
Q41 Mr Stuart: But that is the source of it, and the
truth is that many of the largest boards did not bid
for the contract, because in the belief of many of the
most experienced and capable boards in this country,
it was badly drawn up and badly briefed. They did
not bid, and you therefore ended up with ETS, which
you said had complete capacity to deliver, and it
turns out that it had anything but.
Dr Boston: We ended up with five very solid bidders,
which went through the process. Three were selected
from the five, all of which were still in the ring. Three
were selected from the five for the last part of the
process. We had five very active—
Q42 Mr Stuart: Is it not disappointing that major
boards did not bid for this contract, and is that not
because they believed that it was poorly drawn up,
it over-specified what was to be done and it did not
recognise their professionalism, and that failure at
the original contract or briefing stage may well have
contributed to the current fiasco?
Dr Boston: I am not able to comment on that
without going back and looking at my files and
correspondence from several years ago, but we were
very confident that we had contributed to building a
better market for this than had existed previously.
Q43 Mr Stuart: So was that the thinking? Was it
desired to bring in new external contractors? Was it
the desire to bring ETS from the United States
because you thought it could do a better job, bring
better technology and raise testing standards?
Dr Boston: No, it was simply that the contract that
we had with the previous organisation had finished
and we were obliged to call for tenders again. We
were very anxious to ensure that there was a genuine
market, that there was real competition. I do not
believe we have ever had a position before where, in
letting a contract, we have had five major active
players. We certainly did not when the previous
contract was let.
Q44 Mr Stuart: Is it true that the parameters of
consistency, which I understand is a key requirement
for testers, were relaxed to allow ETS to recruit the
examiners it required?
Dr Boston: No.
Q45 Paul Holmes: In your opening comments, you
observed that there had not been a satisfactory
round of testing in SATs from 2003 onwards, so
against that background, when you were bringing in
a brand-new contractor, why did you also bring
forward the date of the SATs to July? Is that not
heaping the bonfire?
Dr Boston: We believed we had a better solution than
we had had previously and that that date would be
met. In the competitive dialogue process, we talked
through with all three final bidders the requirement
that in the first year it was still manual marking, but
with electronic marker capture. Everyone realised
that that potentially increased the strain over online
marking, but those who went through to the final bid
convinced us that they could do it and had solutions
to do it.
Q46 Paul Holmes: Obviously, as we have heard,
there is some concern about the role of the QCA, the
contract it put out and so on, but assuming that the
inquiry finds that ETS has a lot to answer for—you
were very critical of ETS in your opening
comments—what are the penalty clauses on ETS? I
asked the Minister that a few days ago, and he was
suitably vague. You put 70 sta in to help sort it out.
You set up an extra call centre. You answered 10,000
e-mails. Surely all that money immediately comes
back, but what are the penalty clauses beyond that?
Dr Boston: There are very significant penalty clauses
and service credits, as they are called, where money
is paid back to us for services that are not delivered.
I want to be very cautious here, because there are
various options, one of which is termination for
failure to deliver, and that has very, very significant
financial consequences. We are not at that point. We
are at the point where we are considering how to deal
with the current situation and how to move ahead on
a more secure basis next year. As I said, we are in a
strong position with the contract, and large sums of
money are potentially at risk here.
Q47 Paul Holmes: When I was first elected in 2001,
one of the first inquiries I took part in with this
Committee or its predecessor related to the ILA
scandal. Over the years, it seems that large
companies such as Capita, EDS and, in this case,
ETS mess up on delivery of programmes such as
ILAs and programmes for the Department for Work
and Pensions, but—
Chairman: Individual Learning Accounts.
Paul Holmes: Yes. But nothing seems to happen. The
argument that I have heard—and your partner over
at ETS said it—is that ETS is one of the largest
players in the field. Capita is the largest player in the
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field. There are not many firms that you can
approach for such contracts, so do they have the
Government over a barrel? Even though they mess
up on dierent schemes, you cannot penalise them
that much or cut them out of the market, because
they are the only players out there.
Dr Boston: I think there is a risk of severe
reputational damage in relation to a failure at this
level. Any large company is concerned with that.
That probably is as significant as the financial
penalties, which could run into the tens of millions.
International companies obviously seek to operate
with footprints in various regions of the world. The
experience at this stage in England is clearly
unsatisfactory.
Q48 Paul Holmes: Last question. If there were
significant financial penalties, would they be at a
level to hurt the company? We have heard that some
companies write into the contract a penalty clause,
knowing that they cannot meet all the targets that
they promised. They build a penalty clause into the
profit margin, so that they still make a profit, despite
the penalty.
Dr Boston: I do not believe that this contract is
costed on that basis. We went through it line by line
as part of the procurement process, arguing the
detail of every piece of work that was contracted. I
do not think there is fat in this system that would
allow for that sort of penalty and for profits still to
be made.
Q49 Chairman: Dr Boston, we are coming to the end
of the session, and another one is following this.
With your hand on your heart, can you tell us as a
Committee that, albeit with the delay, these results
will come out and will be of a standard of which you
can justifiably be proud to show to parents and
students?
Letter to the Chairman submitted by Dr Ken Boston, Chief Executive,
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA)
In my evidence to the Select Committee yesterday I said that marking was 100% complete in all Key
Stage 2 subjects. No further Key Stage 2 scripts were held by ETS.
It has since come to light that a small number of wrongly assigned unmarked scripts had not been collected
by ETS from markers to whom they had been sent. ETS has been directed to retrieve the scripts immediately
and to mark them urgently. Today we have identified 384 Key Stage 2 unmarked scripts that have since been
logged with marking panels for completion. This material represents less than 0.02% of the 1.7 million Key
Stage 2 scripts for the National Curriculum tests 2008 cycle. While in percentage terms this is small, I do
not under-estimate the impact even this small number has on schools, pupils and parents. We have called
the schools that contacted us to explain the situation.
I regret that the information I gave to the Committee did not take account of this small number of scripts
remaining in some schools.
July 2008
Dr Boston: Yes, there will be, as in all years, a
proportion of them that require review. That is a
normal element of the process. They will be dealt
with. All the evidence that we have at the moment is
that the marking is as secure now as it has ever been
in previous years.
Q50 Chairman: You said in so many words to this
Committee that you blame not the Secretary of
State, yourselves, the NAA or Ofqual, but the
private sector companies’ shortcomings. That is
what you have told this Committee.
Dr Boston: Well, if that is the impression, let me
make it clear that there are three parties to this
arrangement. There is the Government who in
2006—not in 2008—determined what they wanted
from the tests and how they wanted the tests
conducted. We are commissioned to deliver that; we
do it through contractors. We, too, may well have
made mistakes—done things that have caused
problems or not done things that might have
avoided problems. When I say “we” I mean the QCA
and the NAA, which are a part. ETS may also have
made some very significant mistakes. It is the body
that failed to meet the deadline that it was
contractually committed to meet, and that it was
paid to meet. I believe that two things will happen
now. Lord Sutherland’s review will be a very
thorough examination of those three components.
In the dealings between ourselves and ETS, there
may well be litigation that runs alongside. There is
more about the cause of this to be found than I am
able to account to you in this session.
Q51 Chairman: Douglas Carswell has asked me
about the contract. How soon can the Committee
see it?
Dr Boston: I could have a copy couriered across to
you in an hour.
Chairman: Thank you. Dr Boston. Thank you for
appearing at such short notice before the
Committee.
Dr Boston: Thank you.
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Ex t S
There is no question that ETS experienced some operational and technical issues that aggravated the
process of marking this year’s national curriculum tests in England early on—and for those we take full
responsibility. These issues were exacerbated by program changes required by NAA, long delays by NAA on
key project decisions and layering on of additional project deliverables. Despite all these challenges, marking
quality was maintained.
I t d t d O
ETS welcomes the opportunity to appear before the Children, Schools and Families Select Committee.
Our most important stakeholders are the millions of English pupils, teachers, schools and parents who
depended on ETS and QCA to deliver a well-run testing programme. They have been let down, and we take
this opportunity to repeat our apology to them.
I am a director and the chairman of the Supervisory Board of ETS Europe, the ETS entity responsible
for delivery of the 2008 national assessment tests. In May 2008, I was given a mandate from ETS President
Kurt Landgraf to investigate ETS and NAA issues a ecting the safe delivery of the testing program.
ETS desires to provide full cooperation to this Committee and to Lord Sutherland’s independent inquiry.
We remain bound by confidentiality obligations under the original contract with QCA and under the August
settlement agreement. We have requested but not yet received permission from QCA to provide full
information to the Sutherland inquiry and the documentary evidence requested by this Committee. We are
hopeful that both this Committee and Lord Sutherland will be able to prevail upon QCA to give its consent.
For the same reasons, we have made limited comment in the public domain. You should not take our
silence as agreement with what has been said about us, but as our commitment to our contractual
obligations.
ETS is a non-profit organisation that administers more than 50 million exams to exceptionally high
standards in all of the 180 countries we operate in. We bid this contract because helping pupils learn and
teachers teach is our mission, not profit. We took it because we believed our expertise could improve
educational measurement in England. We invented large-scale standardised assessment 60 years ago, we
pioneered computer-based testing, we originated online marking and created the largest Internet-based
testing network in the world, and in all that time, we never asked for early release from a standardised
achievement contract.
We worked closely with the NAA throughout the project and, whilst we have not achieved everything we
should have, together we have made real progress in the quality of the marking and the detailed database
of results provided to schools and students.
Q l t M
We are aware that the Committee is particularly interested in quality and we would like to dispel questions
over this year’s marking. We can confirm that the quality of markers in 2008 was in fact even higher than
in previous years. We introduced a more rigorous method of certifying markers to ensure adherence to the
marking scheme and constantly monitored quality during marking. Early on we eliminated hundreds of
markers who could not meet the required NAA standards.
The training that we o ered was delivered by the same senior markers as in previous years. We also used
the same pool of teachers and retired teachers as in previous years. We used the same criteria for screening
new applicants as in previous years, and in addition all markers were recruited according to NAA guidelines.
The ongoing marker reviews are being managed by the NAA and are being carried out by the same markers
we recruited to mark the tests originally.
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There is no question that ETS experienced some operational and technical di culties that hindered our
ability to deliver test results on time and we have not shied away from taking responsibilities for these. For
example, some school allocations were split, which meant that a school was given to two separate markers.
In these cases one of the markers would be unable to view their allocation online. There were also instances
in which scripts were wrongly allocated, so one marker would be able to view a school online, for which they
did not have scripts, and another marker would receive scripts they could not view online so were unable to
enter marks online.
At the same time, NAA also shares significant responsibility for the delivery failure. Through a
combination of the NAA making changes to the contract—against our advice, delaying critical decision-
making and layering on additional responsibilities, we ended up with a much more complex and challenging
task. Thus, I cannot point to just one or two things that contributed to the marking not being completed
on schedule. It was, in fact, that the cumulative interaction of ETS and NAA created a compounding e ect.
For example, the solution we presented in the bidding process and the contract we signed called for
training about 5,000 experienced markers online instead of face-to-face. The online training was one of the
innovations we were led to believe was pivotal in our being selected. In March 2008, just two months before
marking was to begin, the NAA mandated that we should revert to face-to-face training for all 10,000
markers requiring us to find meeting venues, print and ship materials to those venues, co-ordinate marker
invitations, travel schedules, costly overnight accommodations—all at the last moment. Not only did this
specifically impact future delivery milestones, but it also prohibited markers from going online and accessing
training materials early. This caused frustrations for markers because they had to understand how to use
the entire system in a shortened time period.
Additionally, we were not supplied with critical information on operational failures experienced by
previous suppliers that could have informed our decisions. For example:
— We were not made aware that recruitment of Key Stage 3 English markers has been a historical
problem and that we would face di culties identifying markers.
— When the NAA set milestones, it indicated that the previous supplier had accomplished similar
deadlines when in fact this was not the case. For example we were told 100% of results had been
returned on time, when, as this Committee well knows, suppliers had historically had problems
achieving this.
Our view is that the NAA changes to the agreed program, the long delays by NAA in reaching decisions
and the layering on by NAA of additional tasks, combined with ETS operational and technical issues, and
compounded each other and we believe this lies at the heart of the delivery issues.
C l
As I stated before, we accept responsibility for all of ETS’s operational and technical issues that a ected
the experience of markers and the return of results to schools. And, not withstanding the challenges
presented by the NAA, I honestly believe we introduced more quality improvement measures into the
assessment than ever before with the result that students, parents and schools got good quality scores. Once
more I reiterate my apology and welcome this opportunity to answer your questions.
Dr Philip S Tabbiner
Director and Chairman of the Supervisory Board
September 2008
Witnesses: Dr Philip Tabbiner, Director and Chairman of the Supervisory Board, ETS Global and Andrew
Latham, Vice President, ETS Europe, gave evidence.
Q52 Chairman: May I welcome Dr Tabbiner and
Andrew Latham to our proceedings? We are very
grateful that you are able to appear before the
Committee at this time of year. A certain Clerk who
has an association with the Committee said that if
this is a precedent, it might be a dangerous one—
under my chairmanship, this is the first time that we
have met in the recess. There are two reasons why we
are meeting today. First, this is a very important
issue. What happened in July disappointed many
parents and students, and many people feel very
strongly that we should run an e cient and e ective
testing and assessment system. It seemed to us that
to wait until October or November to have this
session would have been inappropriate. Also, we
have had Ministers and the Qualifications and
Curriculum Authority in front of the Committee,
but we have not had the other side of the discussion,
so this is a chance to show that the Committee
believes in fair balance. Dr Tabbiner, on that note I
am going to ask you to say a few words about what
went wrong.
Dr Tabbiner: ETS welcomes the opportunity to
appear before the Children, Schools and Families
Select Committee. The reason we have not
commented in detail in the public domain on this
year’s national curriculum tests is our
confidentiality agreement with the QCA. It is
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disappointing for us that we have been unable to co-
operate with Lord Sutherland’s inquiry to date for
that reason. ETS is a not-for-profit organisation that
administers more than 50 million exams to
exceptionally high standards in 180 countries. We
bid for this contract because we believe that helping
pupils learn and teachers teach is our mission. Our
mission is not to generate profits. We believe that we
introduced more quality improvement measures
through the quality control aspects in this year’s
assessment than ever before, with the result that
parents, pupils and schools received good quality
results. We would like to apologise for not delivering
100% of the marks to schools by the required
deadline. There is no question that we experienced
some operational and technical diculties, which
hindered our ability to deliver 100% of the test
results on time. We have not shied away from taking
responsibility for these issues. We cannot point to
just one or two factors that contributed to the marks
not being completed on schedule. It was, in fact, the
combination of ETS’s and the National Assessment
Agency or QCA’s operational di culties that
created a compounding e ect and the missing of the
dates. ETS worked in close, transparent partnership
with the NAA, which guided the ETS throughout
the process. Through a combination of the NAA
making changes to the contract and delaying critical
decision making and the layering on of additional
responsibilities, we ended up with a much more
complex and challenging undertaking—much more
so than we had originally envisioned or contracted
for. Once more, I reiterate my apology on behalf of
ETS for the delays in returning results to schools. I
welcome the opportunity to be with you today and
to answer your questions.
Q53 Chairman: Thank you, Dr Tabbiner. Has every
student at Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 3 now received
their results?
Dr Tabbiner: No, not every student has. There are
still marks under way, and we still are data entering
those that are being marked by the NAA.
Q54 Chairman: These should have been out
originally by 8 July?
Dr Tabbiner: That is correct.
Q55 Chairman: When can every student in the land
expect to get all their results?
Dr Tabbiner: As of now, we are no longer responsible
for the marking or for the reviews cycle in cycle 1.
Our role is data entering the marks as they come
from unmarked scripts. At this point in time, that
aspect is in the hands of the NAA.
Q56 Chairman: It has been an extraordinary, drawn-
out process this year for one reason or the other, has
it not?
Dr Tabbiner: That is correct.
Q57 Chairman: Even standing on the sidelines, do
you know when the last result will be out?
Dr Tabbiner: At this point in time, I do not have the
answer for you as to when—
Q58 Chairman: You do not know. Andrew, you do
not know either?
Andrew Latham: No. I know that we have returned
to the schools all the materials that we had in the
warehouse, but if, for example, a school discovers
that some of the test papers are unmarked when it
opens them up, the test papers would come back, so
we do not know exactly when they will be finished.
Q59 Chairman: Are we talking about large numbers
or about 1% or 2%? What are we talking about?
Andrew Latham: We are talking about very small
numbers like 1% or 2%.
Chairman: For those 1% or 2%, it is not very
encouraging.
Andrew Latham: Absolutely.
Q60 Chairman: Okay. Let us drill down into what
you have said. Are you saying, Dr Tabbiner, that you
had glitches with the technology? From the very full
letter that you sent to the Committee, it seems that
there were technical problems that you did not
foresee.
Dr Tabbiner: I would call them operational more
than technical, just to put the point on it. It was more
the nature of operational technology, as well as the
interactions with the NAA, that created knock-on
e ects, or operational circumstances, and that
created issues for us. For example, we had significant
delays in terms of the response from the NAA as to
whether we could conduct online training, which is
what we had originally contracted for, and we were
required to do face-to-face training. That created
operational issues around venues and having
training materials for all the trainers done in a very
compressed period.
Q61 Chairman: So you are saying that the NAA and
the QCA substantially changed the contract after
you had signed it.
Dr Tabbiner: That is correct.
Q62 Chairman: With your agreement?
Dr Tabbiner: One of the issues as I looked at our side
of the operation was that we were quite amenable to
changes. In a number of instances, we put forward
change orders, which was the required process under
the contract. But we also made a number of changes
on the fly, as we might have been asked to do in the
course of a day’s or a week’s work under the process,
for which we did not go through the rigorous process
of seeking a change order.
Q63 Chairman: Standing on the sidelines, as
members of the Committee felt we were, we got the
impression—we all know about your formidable
reputation in other parts of the world, including
North America and beyond—that when you arrived
in this country, the people who took you on thought
that you would bring your whole operation from the
United States and transplant a bit of it over here.
The word that seems to have come out is that you did
not do that and that you started a brand-new
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company here. You therefore ran into a lot of
diculties because you were almost a start-up
company. Is that true?
Dr Tabbiner: It is important to recognise what has
happened in the creation of this agreement. As you
often have when you get a five-year agreement, you
then begin to pursue the course of that agreement.
This agreement was, in very large measure, a supply
agreement, and that is the part we fulfilled—
fulfilling a standardised test that was already created
and using methodologies that were, in general,
already accepted and dictated. We were then filling
in certain supply elements—certain systems, delivery
logistics and the accumulation and implementation
of quality control—rather than fully developing the
standardised methods that would be in the test. In
that light, we used some people whom we already
had, as well as building up sta locally. We also
applied a significant amount of resources during the
heightened period of the May, June and July time
frame, when we ran into significant delays.
Q64 Chairman: Was there any element of that where
you were working in a rather di erent culture from
the one you are used to working in and where some
local knowledge was missing on issues such as how
many qualified markers there might be in a pool to
do your marking at a time when there was an awful
lot of marking to be done?
Dr Tabbiner: We have the good fortune to be
working in 180 countries with many di erent
cultures. We do standardised testing in Serbia, Egypt
and Korea, so we have experience of many di erent
cultures. The other thing that I would say in the
context of how we approached our agreement with
the QCA and the NAA relates to the issue of
complete transparency. We looked to them to give us
guidance and direction on some of the issues that
might be encountered. In many instances, when we
would implement e orts to resolve an issue, it was
only later that the NAA would point out what had
traditionally happened. We found that some of the
useful information or data that would have helped to
inform early decisions was not shared with us.
Q65 Chairman: Dr Tabbiner, looking at your date of
arrival, it sounds a little bit like you came in when
things started going wrong. You came over when
things were in trouble.
Dr Tabbiner: I arrived in mid-May.
Q66 Chairman: May I switch to Andrew Latham
who has been involved in the operation rather
longer? When did you first think that things were
going wrong?
Andrew Latham: We knew that we had challenges as
far back as December, when we were pilot testing the
marking solution. From that time on, we worked
very closely with the NAA to try to address the issues
that we saw arising.
Q67 Chairman: Was that before the NAA asked for
any changes in the contract?
Andrew Latham: No. We talked about changes to the
contract. The example that Dr Tabbiner used was
moving to a face-to-face training model, but many
other changes were asked for, such as the marking
pilot test itself. In the contract that had been signed,
we had said that we would do a small-scale pilot with
focus groups of about 25 people or so just to
demonstrate that the model worked. In fact, the
NAA insisted on a very complex pilot with more
than 800 di erent markers.
Chairman: We will drill down into a couple of those
issues in a moment, but let us carry on looking at
what happened.
Q68 Mr Chaytor: Dr Tabbiner, is this the first time
that ETS has had to withdraw from a contract before
its completion?
Dr Tabbiner: This is the first time that we have asked
to withdraw from a standardised achievement
contract, yes.
Q69 Mr Chaytor: Have you been asked to withdraw
from a contract? Is this the first time that you have
asked to withdraw? Have you previously been asked
to withdraw?
Dr Tabbiner: No, we have not.
Q70 Mr Chaytor: There has been no previous
experience such as this, in which the whole project
has got into such di culties that the contract was
terminated?
Dr Tabbiner: That is correct.
Q71 Mr Chaytor: In your written statement to the
Committee, you repeat the acceptance that there
were technical and operational di culties. Just now,
you said that the di culties were more operational
than technical. You give two examples of work from
schools being allocated to two di erent markers, or
some markers not being able to access online the
work of their students. Could you list all the
operational di culties of which you are aware, for
which you or your company accepts responsibility?
Dr Tabbiner: One of the things that I would identify
is that as you look back over a contract and you
examine some of the issues that arose from the
delays, we can say that if we had moved on into cycle
2, we would have made modifications to try to deal
with some of the technical issues. For example, we
had set up a process for the marker allocations. We
did not bundle up the materials that were to go to the
markers until such time as each mark was
standardised, then we submitted the materials. In
retrospect, that cost us some time. In a future year,
we would pre-bundle the materials and they would
be ready for standardisation. That is just an
illustration. Another fact is that we had designed the
systems in a way in which the schools had to fill in
the student register. If a school did not fill in the
register, the system was designed without a default
for it, and there was an absence or a block that was
left empty. When teachers went to enter the marks
and they ran into that block, they had to call the
helpdesk to deal with a registry issue rather than an
online issue. In retrospect, that is something that we
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would have made adjustments for, knowing that
schools, in some instances, would not necessarily fill
in all the data points. The next point concerns the
return of materials. Markers were asked to put the
marked scripts on the top of the box, which they did.
We took them to be 100% marked scripts and
returned the boxes, as appropriate, to schools. Later,
we found that, in some instances, there were
unmarked scripts in those boxes, which schools later
returned to us. In a future circumstance, we would
do a 100% visual inspection of the scripts.
Q72 Mr Chaytor: Should those operational
diculties not have been identified in the pilot
scheme that was carried out last December?
Dr Tabbiner: We intended to do an end-to-end pilot
run, but we were refused the opportunity to do that.
All we were allowed to do was a small pilot on
logistics with the schools in only 25 schools.
Q73 Mr Chaytor: Andrew’s response just a moment
ago was that one of the NAA’s decisions was to
extend the scale of the pilot, not to reduce it. Can you
clarify that?
Andrew Latham: Sure; I was talking about the
marking pilot in which we were supposed to
demonstrate that the elements of our solution that
were new this year were e ective, such as having the
markers actually enter their marks online or having
the markers be trained online, which was totally
separate from the logistics pilot.
Q74 Mr Chaytor: Okay. So the marking pilot took
place last December and, if I can put this to Andrew,
from your point of view was that completed
successfully?
Andrew Latham: The marking pilot—yes.
Q75 Mr Chaytor: But when was the logistics pilot
completed?
Andrew Latham: We never conducted a full scale
logistics pilot in the end. We did a small scale
logistics pilot where we sent some packages to a
couple of dozen schools and said, “Does this
packaging look right; does it work; are the
instructions clear?” It was that level of pilot.
Q76 Mr Chaytor: So in retrospect should there have
been a full scale logistics pilot?
Andrew Latham: Absolutely.
Q77 Mr Chaytor: But that was not specified in the
contract.
Andrew Latham: No.
Dr Tabbiner: But we desired to do it and were refused
the opportunity.
Q78 Mr Chaytor: Right. So you asked the NAA to
do it.
Dr Tabbiner: If we could do it.
Q79 Mr Chaytor: If you could do it—for permission
to do it. They refused for what reason—lack of time?
Dr Tabbiner: They asked us to do the small 25-
school logistics pilot.
Q80 Mr Chaytor: Which you did?
Dr Tabbiner: Yes.
Q81 Mr Chaytor: Okay; and when was that done?
Andrew Latham: In February or March, I believe.
Q82 Mr Chaytor: Again, in retrospect, given that
tests take place in the early summer, was February or
March not too late to have completed the logistics
pilot, whatever the size of the logistics pilot?
Dr Tabbiner: A number of facets of the contract were
dictated for certain timing, but because of delays
regarding the design of the online training and the
design of contracts with teachers, we ran into severe
delays. We lost three to five months, depending on
how you look at that, in the cycle as a result of the
NAA procrastinating around decisions, online
training and the contracts for markers.
Q83 Mr Chaytor: In respect of the online training,
then, you have said that there was a request to
change the contract. Did the original contract not
specify online training?
Dr Tabbiner: It did.
Q84 Mr Chaytor: Is that not a fairly major
contractual change? Could you simply have refused
to change the contract in that way?
Dr Tabbiner: You have raised a valid point. One of
the things that I would say from our side—I would
point to this as a responsibility of ours—is that we
were too amenable to change without saying, “No,
we won’t do that.” This is a classic example of that.
By the time we were told not to do the training
online—to do face-to-face training—we realised
that the time frame meant that we would have to
drive with complete focus and vigour to the goal of
8 July.
Andrew Latham: But I would add to that that we
were very clear in cautioning that we felt that to
make such a move would greatly increase the risk
and was therefore not advisable.
Q85 Mr Chaytor: You have referred to a delay of
maybe three to five months because of the change
from online training to face-to-face training. When
were you told it had to be face-to-face training?
What was the time scale?
Dr Tabbiner: March.
Q86 Mr Chaytor: And when should the training
have taken place?
Dr Tabbiner: May. The training still took place in
May, but for us the rush was to find venues and sta ,
to obtain the materials, to conduct the training
e ciently and to get the markers in place.
Q87 Mr Chaytor: So if you were told that the
training had to change from online to face-to-face in
March, did you then not point out to the NAA that
this would result in a delay of three to five months
and that the tests were supposed to be completed and
reported by July? I do not understand the time
scale there.
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Andrew Latham: We were worried that this was
going to come to pass, so from January we had been
advising, “Please don’t do this, because we really
believe that the online is the way to go, and that you
will greatly increase the risk if you do.” We assumed
that that was what they were eventually going to do
in March and that that was the decision they were
going to come to, so we were trying frantically
behind the scenes to line up venues and recruit
trainers and others in that eventuality.
Q88 Mr Chaytor: Yes, but contractually you could
have refused to have carried out face-to-face training
and stuck with the online training.
Dr Tabbiner: Contractually, we could have used the
change order mechanism, which is the way you deal
with alterations from the original contract.
Q89 Mr Chaytor: This is my final question. Had the
contract continued into next year—the next cycle—
which of the operational problems would have been
the most dicult to resolve, or do you think that
they could all have been equally resolved in year
two?
Dr Tabbiner: We certainly categorised and looked at
process changes for cycle 2. The challenge that we
would have faced is the lack of timely decision
making. If it were said, “What you did in cycle 1, we
want you to do in cycle 2,” it would be reasonable to
capture those changes and successfully embed them
in the design and planning. But the endemic amount
of decision making and the challenges of timely
decision making made it very di cult for me to
believe that there was a probability that we would
see success in cycles 2, 3, 4 and 5, which is why I said,
“We either completely re-craft this contract, or you
let us out.”
Q90 Mr Chaytor: When did you say, “We either
completely re-craft the contract”?
Dr Tabbiner: Approximately mid-June. I cannot
give you the specific date, but it was mid-June.
Q91 Mr Chaytor: Finally, at what point did you alert
the NAA to your feeling that you would not be able
to meet the July deadline, because of its request to
change from online to face-to-face training? When
did you first alert it to the fact that you felt you
would not meet the deadline?
Dr Tabbiner: As I mentioned earlier, from the
beginning we purposefully operated in a completely
transparent fashion. The NAA had sta embedded
in our organisation in Watford on a day-to-day
basis. They had early morning briefings and
meetings throughout the day, and they received all
the management information that we saw, all the
data that we saw and all the results day by day
throughout this process, so we operated as if there
were no divide between the two organisations in the
context of ongoing and daily operations. When we
knew data, they knew data; when we saw them, they
saw them. So, it was not so much a point in time
where we would say, “There are concerns”; we
identified specific concerns on decisions that were
being made around implications, but the NAA was
fully briefed and fully aware throughout the process.
Q92 Paul Holmes: Can I just clarify from what you
said that you clearly asked the NAA to terminate
your contract, rather than the NAA telling you that
the contract was terminated?
Dr Tabbiner: I asked that we would mutually exit
this contract, yes.
Q93 Paul Holmes: And you asked that in June?
Dr Tabbiner: I did.
Q94 Paul Holmes: So when Ministers and Ken
Boston came before the Committee in July and I
specifically asked them what the penalty clauses were
for the company and so forth and they said, “That’s
all ongoing,” and did not give an answer, they
already knew that the contract was going to be
terminated?
Dr Tabbiner: I cannot speak to the fact as to whether
Ken Boston knew the contract would be terminated
at that point; what I can tell you is that in my
discussions with the NAA managing director, I said,
“We either have to renegotiate the contract or we
need to end this, because what we are operating
under is not the contract we signed and contracted
for.”
Q95 Paul Holmes: We can assume that Ken Boston
and Ministers knew that but did not tell us when we
asked them the question in July. In all the material
that you have submitted, including the statement
dated today, you emphasise your massive
experience, that you started maths assessment 60
years ago, that you are very experienced, that you
won the contract on quality and that the contract, as
you have just said, was for delivery, logistics and
quality control. We will talk about the quality later,
but the delivery and logistics collapsed. How is it
that such an experienced and qualified company
oversaw that collapse? Are you saying that it is all
down to the NAA changing criteria, contracts and
requirements, or is some of it your fault?
Dr Tabbiner: Clearly, I would want you to leave
today’s meeting with the view that we share
responsibility. I am not here to place blame on
anyone—it is for this Committee to determine the
predominance of blame and who holds it. We are
clearly responsible for activities and misses on the
logistics and operational fronts.
Q96 Paul Holmes: On the logistics front, you seem to
be saying that that is because the NAA would not let
you run a full pilot, so was that its fault or your fault?
Dr Tabbiner: As I said in my opening statement, it is
near-on impossible to pull out single factors and say,
“That was the causative factor.” You have a
confluence of issues that create a knock-on e ect
through a process, which had a dead end of 8 July.
When you have that compounding e ect of
decisions and actions against a fixed time frame, you
then spin out of control at that 8 July time frame
with those compounding e ects. Clearly, we have
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responsibilities, and clearly there were shortcomings
in how we dealt with them and responded to some of
the issues on the table.
Q97 Paul Holmes: You said in the written statement
that you thought you were taking over an existing
body of qualified markers and that, in fact, you had
not been told that there were problems in recruiting
markers. Why had you not done the groundwork?
Why had you not done a press search and found
that, in every year since 2003, there had been
problems and that delays and targets had not been
met? Why did you not know that?
Dr Tabbiner: We did due diligence, but I submit that
we probably did not do a sucient amount. At the
same time, during the tendering process and dealing
with the NAA, when we outlined the fact that we
wanted to use the online training method, we got
into dialogues about some of the issues that had
existed in the past. We were assured that issues, such
as marker availability, were no longer problematic or
would have been dealt with in large measure by some
of the other programmes that we had put in place.
Q98 Paul Holmes: Again, I want to be clear. You
continued to use the online training as planned for
5,000 experienced markers, but you said that the
NAA insisted that you do face-to-face training for
the 5,000 new or less experienced markers. Is that so?
Andrew Latham: No. The original plan was for the
new inexperienced markers to attend face-to-face
training, while the experienced markers in maths
and science would be trained online. What happened
was that the NAA asked us in March to make it
optional and allow everyone to decide whether to do
face-to-face or online training. We said that that
could not be done, because it would double the cost
and double the risk. We said that matters had to be
decided one way or the other. The decision was to go
with face-to-face training.
Q99 Paul Holmes: For the whole 10,000?
Andrew Latham: For the whole 10,000.
Q100 Paul Holmes: Dr Tabbiner, you have said that
you put resources into the whole thing in May, June
and July, when it became apparent that problems
were emerging. Ken Boston said in July that when he
started to look into things, the QCA found, for
example, 10,000 e-mails that had not been answered
and that that they were dealt with only because the
NAA put in 70 members of its sta . Did you clear
the backlog or did the NAA clear the backlog?
Dr Tabbiner: Frankly, the backlog in helpdesk e-
mails and issues was not completely dealt with until
such time as it was clear that the marking by markers
at their home locations was over. We increased the
helpdesk capability substantially. Originally, we had
one helpdesk location, and we doubled the sta
there. We added a second location and then a third
location in Watford. We added a fourth location of
folks in the US who just did outbound calling—calls
to markers. We then added a fifth location that did
nothing but e-mail responses 24 hours a day, seven
days a week. We threw huge resources at the
helpdesk and then broadly at the whole project. The
frank answer is that the helpdesk questions—the
backlog—were not completely dissipated until such
time as markers had finished their work at their
home locations. The volume dropped o by virtue of
lack of calls.
Q101 Paul Holmes: As for Ken Boston’s apparent
claim in the minutes of the meeting on 14 July that
the 70 sta whom the NAA put in cleared it, are you
saying that you put in a greater proportion of the
e ort that was made or an equal proportion?
Dr Tabbiner: A greater proportion. From the overall
contract, we expected to have about 60 sta involved
in running the project. At its height, we had more
than 400 sta .
Q102 Paul Holmes: How can such an experienced
company—which you keep emphasising that you
are—have made such a miscalculation in that you
thought 60 sta would do, but you needed 400 in
the end?
Andrew Latham: The decision-making delays and
losing five months in the cycle mean, in e ect, that
we should not have had to deliver the results until
November. To catch up that kind of distance, we had
to be prepared to put a significant amount of
additional resources into play.
Q103 Paul Holmes: So, you are back to saying that
the most significant factor behind all the problems
was a five-month decision-making delay, which was
the responsibility of QCA and NAA.
Dr Tabbiner: That is certainly one illustration. Other
illustrations compounded the impact.
Q104 Paul Holmes: Finally, at exactly what point did
you realise that you would not meet the 8 July
deadline?
Dr Tabbiner: We recognised that, and informed the
QCA late on 25 June.
Q105 Chairman: Can we just clear up one thing that
came out of that? You came to the UK in what
month?
Dr Tabbiner: Mid-May. I took over responsibility
for the NAA as a part of my role as director and
chairman of the Supervisory Board of ETS, the
global subsidiary.
Q106 Chairman: So you were in charge of the
relationship with the NAA?
Dr Tabbiner: That is correct.
Q107 Chairman: Andrew, you were here the whole
time?
Andrew Latham: That is right.
Q108 Chairman: At what level were you talking?
Who were you talking to on a daily and weekly basis
in the QCA and the NAA? What sort of people?
Andrew first.
Andrew Latham: On a daily basis, I would deal with
my counterpart at NAA, the project director, who is
a level below the managing director.
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Q109 Chairman: Okay. Who was that?
Andrew Latham: His name is David Barrett.
Q110 Chairman: When you arrived, Philip, everyone
must have said, “Wow! The boss is coming from
America.” Who were you talking to?
Dr Tabbiner: Most of my interactions were with
David Gee, who is the managing director of the
NAA.
Chairman: Thank you for that. Fiona.
Q111 Fiona Mactaggart: I am interested that you
have described the problems that you faced as being
largely operational, rather than technical. However,
when I speak to markers, I hear tales of really
frustrating technical problems, such as not being
able to enter marks and not being able to get the
right screen for the scripts. I do not want this issue
to be avoided, because it seems to me that it cannot
be anyone else’s fault—it is your technology, which
you developed. So will you tell us about the extent to
which those matters were part of the problem and
why they were so bad?
Dr Tabbiner: Certainly I can fully appreciate
markers’ frustrations and the issues that they faced.
One of the distinct advantages of trying to do the
online training was giving markers the opportunity
to work with the system and practice with it before
having to go into it with the marking process. The
markers did not have that opportunity, which
created issues. As I said earlier, there were also
technical issues. I know from the helpdesk calls and
the e-mails that we received that those issues really
frustrated markers. As they had to standardise and
then conduct their quality assessments every 80
scripts, they would run into situations where the
pupil data did not match the registry data, which
would create a freeze. Then they would have to call
the helpdesk, for which, as we have already
discussed, there was a very heavy backlog, which
they may not have been able to get through. That
might have driven them to trying to circumvent the
problem or to making their own work-throughs,
which was not something that a marker was really
able to do. So it was a very frustrating process if a
marker hit a stop point in the programme.
Programmes such as this one are designed with fairly
rigid decisions or criteria. In cycle 1 you try to look
for the exceptions or break points to the rule and
make adaptations for cycle 2. That problem was
compounded by our not being able to provide the
online training that we would have liked to have
provided, and also by some of the mismatches on the
attendance register that created the hit points for
teachers.
Q112 Fiona Mactaggart: Presumably you were told
why they wanted markers to have the option of face-
to-face training. What was the reason that you
were given?
Andrew Latham: The concern was that markers
would not like online training and therefore would
not participate in the process. They were afraid that
too many people would not sign up.
Q113 Fiona Mactaggart: You are putting a lot of
weight on that decision causing some of the
problems. I am prepared to accept that it probably
did cause quite a number of these problems. I am
wondering how hard you pushed back, if you see
what I mean. Did you make clear to the QCA the
consequences of doing that? If not, why not? Very
often, for people who do not understand the
technology, it is not their job to understand the
technology and therefore the consequences in terms
of the operational aspects, the technology and the
potential for frozen screens, and so on. That is what
you know; they do not need to know that, because
that is not their job. Unless you push back and say,
“These are the consequences that we foresee,” the
QCA is likely to think, “Oh well, this will be nice.”
Andrew Latham: I did not push back hard enough. I
certainly made it clear that I did not think that that
was the right move and that it increased risks. If I
had known the consequences—I underestimated
how negative they would be—we would not have
proceeded.
Q114 Fiona Mactaggart: How did you make your
views known?
Andrew Latham: Through conversations and e-
mails.
Dr Tabbiner: There were a number of other
circumstances regarding, for example, data feeds.
We had set times when we were supposed to
download the data over to the QCA for it to look at
as we got closer and closer to the 8 July date. There
were prescribed dates. But there was a point in June
when, outside those prescribed dates, the QCA
demanded that we do a data run every single
evening. It took our data sta from approximately 8
pm through to the morning to do it, clean it and
make it available for observation. I formally stated
that that was an issue and that it could and would
severely damage our ability to hit the prescribed data
runs for 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 July. The answer was, “Do
it.”
Q115 Fiona Mactaggart: Was that subject to the
formal change process that you discussed with us?
Dr Tabbiner: In that instance, I said to the QCA that
we would be willing to do it—that it would have to
pay. It agreed. But I also informed it of the potential
risks that it would create.
Q116 Fiona Mactaggart: Ken Boston told us that it
was your fault—that is in the general summary of his
evidence. You say that specific changes that the
QCA made contributed significantly to your failure
to deliver on time. We have heard of the change to
the training, and we have now heard of the extra
data runs that you had to provide. What other
specific changes were made that compromised your
ability to deliver on time?
Dr Tabbiner: On the attendance register, the whole
plan and outline was that schools were required to
fill in “Absent” or “Present” for every student. As
the time came to inform the schools, the QCA did
not allow us to say that they were “required” to put it
in that way, rather that it would be “preferred”. That
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may seem like a simple change, a simple dierence,
but if schools took a default and did not put in the
student register, that had a very significant impact in
terms of the data running. It had an impact on the
helpdesk, because teachers ran into problems in
marking and would then call the helpdesk, but the
helpdesk was not designed to handle attendance
register—it was designed to handle other technical
issues. So that is another illustration of some of the
changes and issues that we faced that had significant
knock-on e ects for the project.
Q117 Fiona Mactaggart: Would it be possible for
you to provide the Committee with a list of dates
when things were changed?
Dr Tabbiner: Just to clarify, are you referring to
dates when things were changed or dates that were
di erent?
Q118 Fiona Mactaggart: Dates when it was agreed—
sometimes informally and sometimes formally—
that there would be changes to the agreements that
you had achieved in the initial contract about the
way you did things regarding, for example, the
additional data run and the change in the training. I
would be interested in seeing a list of the changes
that in your view had an impact on your ability to
deliver. I realise that that will take you time, but you
must have it somewhere.
Dr Tabbiner: There are certainly large-measure
changes that are categorisable. As I mentioned
earlier, by virtue of the co-mingling of sta and of
having people working together in a transparent
fashion on a day-by-day basis, one of the distinct
disadvantages—this was my observation coming
into this in May—is that an ongoing dialogue
develops over the course of many months of working
together, so change can happen in a fairly
straightforward, ubiquitous manner, which makes it
more di cult to characterise and demonstrate.
However, the answer is yes on large-measure
changes.
Q119 Chairman: Fiona is only asking for the
significant ones. Can you supply that list?
Dr Tabbiner: Yes, we can.3
Q120 Fiona Mactaggart: I am hearing that the level
of engagement actually caused some of the
problems. The level of embedding of sta caused
problems, you suggest, because the accountability
went back to di erent places and therefore got
slightly muddled—I think that that is what you are
telling me. This is not an uncommon arrangement in
such contracts for public service issues. Are you
suggesting that it would be wrong, in future, for a
government agency or department to expect an
operational contract from a private company to
work in such a way, with seconded sta and a more
intimate relationship than you might have had
elsewhere?
Dr Tabbiner: It is not my role to opine as to what the
Government should or should not do.
3 Supplied in confidence. Not printed.
Q121 Fiona Mactaggart: No, we will decide. I am
just interested in what your view is.
Dr Tabbiner: What I can say in this situation—I am
not qualified to answer more broadly than this—is
that with regard to us, rather than the Government,
we needed to recognise that it was a supplier-buyer
relationship, where we were providing supply, and
that notwithstanding the co-mingling and ongoing
dialogues and relations, we needed to say, “Right,
that’s a change order, and we have to have it signed
o and dealt with in that manner.” That is how I
propose that it would be best handled in future.
Q122 Fiona Mactaggart: So you are basically saying
that the suppliers need to have more clear
procedures themselves, as a routine, in order to deal
with this relationship?
Dr Tabbiner: Correct.
Q123 Fiona Mactaggart: I suppose the thing that I
find most concerning about your evidence is the
suggestion that the NAA withheld vital operational
information, such as the availability of markers.
From our point of view, that is an important issue of
public accountability. I would like you to be very
specific about what that information was, why you
did not know it, and what you believe the NAA’s
duty was to inform you of those matters.
Dr Tabbiner: The issue that I would use as an
illustration is the number of markers who provide
marks for Key Stage 3 English. We found that after
signing the contract on the understanding that that
was not going to be a problematic group, it was in
fact problematic. It was later stated that that is an
historical fact.
Q124 Fiona Mactaggart: All you need to do is read
The Times Educational Supplement to know that.
You do not have to be a detective.
Dr Tabbiner: We also found that same issue
regarding the attendance register in schools. As I
have said, we were not allowed to say, “You must fill
in the attendance register,” but only to say that that
would be preferred. We later found that that was a
documented relationship issue, and that in previous
contractor experiences with a di erent system it was
handled by using a postcard system later in the cycle.
That information was not known to us at the front
end of this contract. All that damaged the time
frame, and in some instances it damaged relations
with markers and markers’ view of our capabilities.
Q125 Lynda Waltho: I am particularly concerned
about IT. At our meeting on 14 July, I asked Ken
Boston whether the IT was overly ambitious,
because it was my experience, having spoken to
markers, that they felt that that was a very great
di culty. He said that he thought it was not
ambitious enough. Indeed, he said that although
there was a pilot, once it was upscaled, that is really
when it hit the fan, so to speak. Scripts were marked
in hard copy, with data entered electronically, rather
than being marked on screen, which is what we
mostly have with GCSEs and A-levels. An
organisation such as yours, with operations in more
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than 180 countries, presumably has this level of
engagement across many markers. Whose decision
was it to have a split between hand marking and data
entry? Was that specified in the contract, or was it
completely up to you how you delivered things?
Dr Tabbiner: No, that was specified in the contract.
The request for proposal was online training with
hard-copy marking and then entry by teachers. That
is what we bid for, and that is what was set up.
Q126 Lynda Waltho: Do you do that elsewhere?
Dr Tabbiner: We certainly do paper-and-pencil
testing in other tests in other countries.
Andrew Latham: As part of the contract, we were
asked to prepare two innovation cases for future
innovations that the QCA would want to introduce:
one was for a full online marking solution, where the
papers are scanned in and everything is marked
online; the second was for delivering the tests via
computer. The intent was that these innovation cases
would be implemented during the five-year course of
the contract. When we began exploring those cases
with the QCA over the summer and talking about a
timeline for when we could implement them in 2007,
it said, “Hold o on the innovation cases. We’re not
going to proceed any further with those at this
point.” That was in the fall of 2007.
Q127 Lynda Waltho: So had the relationship worked
a little better and things had worked out better, how
would you have developed the system for the next
cycle? Where would you make your innovations?
Dr Tabbiner: One of the things that we do is capture
the exceptions that were asked for throughout the
process and then make adaptations because of those
exceptions. We saw that we had to make exceptions
to handle the pupil register, so, in cycle 2 we would
have adapted the technology to make a decision in
the absence of a notation that the pupil had taken
the test. Later, we also had to do split allocations
with markers, which was mentioned earlier. Some
markers were not able to access information online,
because they had a split allocation with another
marker. We would have adapted the system to allow
two markers to enter results from one school in a
certain subject.
Q128 Lynda Waltho: Have you ever had such a
catastrophic breakdown, as appears to have
happened here, in any other country or system?
Dr Tabbiner: As I said earlier, this was such that we
felt that this was a contract that we had to withdraw
from, and we made that case clear.
Q129 Lynda Waltho: And the changes to the
contract? Have you ever experienced that under any
other system?
Dr Tabbiner: To my knowledge, this is a significant
change in the way the contract was originally let. All
contracts have some adaptation, but the nature, tone
and tenor of this was beyond that which I had seen
previously.
Lynda Waltho: Thanks very much.
Q130 Mr Carswell: I may touch on one or two points
that you have touched on before, but I want to be
absolutely clear. In your view, was there a significant
di erence between the contract that you signed and
the contract that you ended up being asked to
deliver?
Dr Tabbiner: Absolutely.
Q131 Mr Carswell: Had the NAA and QCA known
what they wanted straight up, would that di erence
have been avoided?
Dr Tabbiner: Had they known what we ended up
working through, the contract would have been
di erent, and it would have been a completely
di erent outline.
Q132 Chairman: Do you agree with that Andrew?
You have been here throughout the whole cycle.
Andrew Latham: One point of evidence I can point
to is that we went through a nine to 12-month
procurement process, where we would go back and
forth designing the contract and exactly what the
solution would be. Within the first six months or so
of winning the contract, five significant change
orders were put to us saying, “Could you examine
this change?” I remember thinking at the time, “Why
didn’t this come out during the previous nine to 12
months?”
Q133 Mr Carswell: So the client not being clear in
their mind would be the way some people might
characterise things, and you would not disagree
with that.
Andrew Latham: I would not disagree that what was
wanted evolved over time.
Q134 Mr Carswell: Just one thing I may have
missed: why did you ask to be released from the
contract with the QCA?
Dr Tabbiner: It was very clear to me that the contract
was not what we were operating under. As I
mentioned earlier, we are a not-for-profit
organisation. The cost burden of this contract in
cycle 1—and the fact that it was not going to be
di erent in cycles 2, 3, 4 and 5—was such that it was
prohibitive for us.
Q135 Mr Carswell: Apparently, you have repaid a
substantial amount of the fee for your services in
2008. How much?
Dr Tabbiner: The settlement agreement was £19.5
million.
Q136 Mr Carswell: That is paid back?
Dr Tabbiner: That is what we paid as a settlement
agreement.
Q137 Mr Carswell: Do you have a view of the
conduct of the QCA and its head, Ken Boston? Are
they up to the job?
Dr Tabbiner: That, I would submit, is for someone
else to consider.
Processed: 17-07-2009 19:04:48 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 406183 Unit: PAG2
Ev 18 Children, Schools and Families Committee: Evidence
10 September 2008 Dr Philip Tabbiner and Andrew Latham
Q138 Mr Carswell: Given your experience around
the world—in Egypt, Korea and wherever—do you
have a view about the process and how we need to
change the process to avoid this sort of public policy
procurement failure? Do other countries have a
better process of public procurement contracts? If
so, what is it that they do dierently?
Dr Tabbiner: I was not here during the procurement
process. I know that it was lengthy, involved and
complex. I do not believe that it is the procurement
process, but the implementation of a contract. If a
contract is implemented as written, in large measure,
things will go much more e ectively.
Q139 Mr Carswell: Were you always clear—I do not
mean as individuals but as a company—as to who
was working with whom, where the reporting lines
were, and who had oversight on each side of the
fence? Was that always clear?
Dr Tabbiner: Certainly, from a contractual and
operational view it was very clear who the
relationship management person was, and who the
next and the third escalation points were. From a
functional group beneath Andy, there were straight
relationships from our team to folks at QCA or
NAA.
Q140 Mr Carswell: Do you think that they were
always quite so clear as to who was in charge on their
side of the fence?
Dr Tabbiner: When you say “on their side of the
fence”, do you mean our sta ?
Mr Carswell: No, the QCA and the NAA people.
Dr Tabbiner: I know that there were times when it
was very clear and we got good feedback. There were
times when we had more than one person responding
on a specific item with a di ering view, giving us
di ering directions.
Q141 Mr Carswell: Being quite a new Member of the
House of Commons, I am quite surprised at how
remote this whole process is from any elected,
democratically accountable Minister. That
personally surprises me. Does it surprise you?
Dr Tabbiner: When you say this process, do you
mean the procurement process?
Mr Carswell: Yes, and the management and
oversight of it.
Dr Tabbiner: It is for the Government to determine
how it should best be operated in the public trust.
Q142 Chairman: Just on that point, as you have been
giving evidence, it strikes me that, as grown-ups, we
all know that with vast contracts such as this,
stretching over five years and costing £156 million of
taxpayers’ money, there is bound to be both give and
take. You were two teams working together. This
could have worked out absolutely fantastically,
could it not? Day to day, you have to have an
embedded relationship in something this complex.
You seemed to know quite late on, Dr Tabbiner, that
things were going wrong. You say that you arrived
in May. You decided—you did not make it clear at
what level—that you were going to withdraw from
the contract in June. You must have been pretty
worried to come over in May and realise what was
happening.
Dr Tabbiner: I would submit that part of the reason
why I was asked to take on this project was that we
saw some of the risks and we were aware of them.
They asked for me to have oversight and to come in
and provide my perspective.
Q143 Chairman: So how early on after you arrived
in May did you meet Ken Boston?
Dr Tabbiner: I did not meet Ken Boston until mid-
July.
Q144 Chairman: Mid-July? Surely, if things were
going as wrong as you say they were, you would have
been banging the desk and saying, “I need to speak
to them.”
Dr Tabbiner: I spoke with David Gee. That was the
person whom I interacted with on a high-frequency
basis.
Q145 Chairman: You never thought that a £156
million contract to your organisation—whether it is
not-for-profit or not—was so important that you
should have gone to see Ken Boston.
Dr Tabbiner: It was very clear that the escalation of
the contract called for the interactions with David
Gee, and that is the pursuit that I had.
Q146 Chairman: Andrew, you never thought that
that was necessary—that really going for the top on
this would have been advisable.
Andrew Latham: No. I felt that my responsibility
was to inform my counterparts at NAA. I had some
interactions with David Gee as well, and then some
to escalate the issue within my organisation, so that
Phil and my chief executive o cer and others were
very closely apprised of what was going on.
Q147 Chairman: We will turn to the future, then.
Some things you have said worry me, in the sense
that schools are schools. In your business you must
know that schools are ine cient—sometimes. They
can be average, brilliant, sometimes awful, but they
will fill in the forms and do things. That is your
business and you should have anticipated that. You
should have known about the markers issue, but if
the decision to move from online training to face-to-
face training was so crucial, you should have gone to
the top and said, “Come on: this changes the whole
nature of the contract and will end with serious
consequences.” At what stage did you say that—
really robustly? Surely you should have done.
Andrew, you were here.
Andrew Latham: I reiterate what I said earlier. When
the decision was being made, I advised, “I really
think this is the wrong move and increases risk,” but,
in fairness, I did not anticipate how badly it would
impact us. I underestimated the negative impact.
Q148 Chairman: Someone on the NAA must have
said to you, “Look guys, this has got to change.”
Who was it? Who said it?
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Andrew Latham: I believe that the decision was
probably made by David Gee, working with David
Barrett. Based on the pilot test, they made the
decision: “We feel people won’t like online training,
therefore you have to make it optional.”
Dr Tabbiner: The other thing is that from our
interactions with, and feedback from, David Gee
and David Barrett, it was very clear that they were in
communication with people up-line from them and
with Ministers, because they were certainly asking us
for data and information going to meetings. So we
were of the view that the information we were
passing on in a very transparent way was being used
and harnessed throughout their organisation, much
as we were escalating issues in ours.
Q149 Chairman: But I wanted to get back to you on
the heart of the problem, which seems to be markers
and marking. I have listened to every word of your
evidence, and something seriously went wrong with
markers and marking. You were already pretty
stretched in looking for qualified markers, especially
in English, so did someone in the NAA suspect that a
new online marking system with which markers were
unfamiliar would deter even more markers from
trying to do the job?
Dr Tabbiner: Clearly, the heart of the whole contract
is markers and marking; that is the essence of the
kernel of everything that we had to do and
everything that the QCA was concerned about. But
there is no doubt that there were times when we
thought an assertive approach would have been
good, but that was not necessarily a shared view. I
can appreciate that aspect, too, because we did not
want to be o-putting, so we also reflected on the
NAA’s historical views about how best to approach
schools, markers and circumstances.
Q150 Chairman: But, Dr Tabbiner, you are
professional managers, and it seems to me that at
some stage something went wrong with your
professional management. Otherwise, explain to me
why you have walked away from this contract—on
quite generous terms, it seems to me, from looking at
the figures—with the Government and the QCA.
You have not robustly said, “Look, we were unfairly
treated, we shouldn’t give an inch.” You have made
big financial concessions to walk away from this
contract.
Dr Tabbiner: Looking at contracts and ending
contracts is a business-related decision, and as I said
earlier, I looked at the losses that we were facing in
cycle 1 and could see only continuing losses in cycles
2, 3, 4 and 5. This year we have lost £50 million as a
result of this contract. We are a not-for-profit
organisation: we have no shareholders and we are
not traded on a public stock exchange. We are not in
a position to absorb £50 million losses per annum, so
for us it was a business decision and that was the
most expeditious one.
Chairman: Thank you.
Q151 Paul Holmes: We have established that there
were three parts to the contract—delivery, logistics
and quality control—and that delivery and logistics,
whoever’s fault it was, was a shambles and went
belly up, but you are saying that quality control is
better this year than it has ever been. You say in the
written statement, “We can confirm that the quality
of markers in 2008 was . . . higher than in previous
years. We introduced a more rigorous method of
certifying markers”. Do you stand by that?
Dr Tabbiner: Yes, I do. The marker pool and the
work that the markers did and the e ort they put
forward was very good and we appreciated their
perseverance through some very challenging and
di cult times. I would also point to the quality
control measures that we put in place. At the end of
their training, markers had to go online and
standardise, and then every 80 scripts that they
entered, they were called on to do a qualification
check and it was determined whether they could
continue or not, so every 80 scripts a quality control
step was introduced into the process.
Q152 Fiona Mactaggart: How many failed that step?
Andrew Latham: Four hundred and five—about 4%.
Q153 Fiona Mactaggart: Out of how many markers?
Andrew Latham: About 10,000.
Q154 Paul Holmes: The National Association of
Head Teachers sent round yesterday a summary of
the hundreds of e-mails and phone calls it has had
from head teachers during the summer period. I have
here 30 edited highlights, of which I shall read just
three or four. A Barnsley school says the quality of
the marking is “abysmal”. A Rochdale school says
there were 30 marking mistakes out of 56 pupils’
papers. The markers were “unable to apply the
marking criteria accurately”. Weak candidates were
given the same marks as strong candidates; that is a
Yorkshire school. Warrington’s primary strategy
managers recommended that all their English papers
be returned. The quality of marking is “very low,
sending 24 papers back, marking shows a complete
lack of understanding of marking scheme”; that is
Northants. There are also comments from
Nottinghamshire—it just goes on and on and on.
How do we square what the head teachers are saying
now they have the papers back and what you are
saying? You have said the quality is better than ever
and the head teachers say it is worse then ever.
Dr Tabbiner: All I am able to tell you is that we put in
quality control steps throughout this process. There
was one immediately after training, so that everyone
had to standardise, and then every 80 scripts there
was a stop and check as to how folks were doing vis-
a`-vis a quality standard that was applied to every
one.
Andrew Latham: I would like to point out a
significant di erence from the past model of quality
control whereby the markers self-selected their own
scripts up front. They would send a set at the very
beginning and they would send a self-selected script
at the very end. They would send them to their own
individual team leader, who would evaluate them on
an individual basis, whereas we were using a national
standard, an objective set of scripts that were
marked by the most senior leadership in advance, so
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everyone was being evaluated against the same
standard and if you did not meet that standard, you
were not allowed to go on. It was much stricter than
has ever been used in the past.
Q155 Paul Holmes: But was that not in eect what
has always happened? I was a teacher for a long time
and marked exam scripts for a long time. You always
had the team leader, an experienced examiner, who
produced sample scripts and you all marked them
blind and then compared what you had done. Why
is what you have done any di erent?
Andrew Latham: No, my understanding of the
model that was used in the past for the NCTs was
that the markers themselves would select the ones
that they wanted to send in and then they would send
them in to their team leader. It was not the team
leader who was selecting them.
Q156 Paul Holmes: Well, perhaps I am thinking of
the old days when they used to get together face to
face and do it round a table over two days. There is
a huge discrepancy between what head teachers are
telling the NAHT and what you are saying about the
quality. How will we establish what the truth is?
Andrew Latham: That is what the reviews process is
for. If teachers or head teachers feel that the marks
are not accurate, they send them in for the reviews
process—to be re-evaluated.
Q157 Chairman: Is a larger number of papers than
normal coming back for review?
Andrew Latham: I do not know the answer to that
because that is something that the NAA—
[Interruption.] Yes, we are no longer doing the
reviews.
Q158 Paul Holmes: Looking ahead to the next year,
someone else now has the contract just for one year
while the Government rethink the whole thing. Will
they use the same systems that you have set up—IT
systems, delivery, logistics—or will they start all
over again?
Dr Tabbiner: They are not going to be using the IT
systems we have set up.
Q159 Paul Holmes: Is that because you, under the
contract, are saying, “You’re not using our system,”
or because they have said, “This system’s not
working. We’ll start again”?
Dr Tabbiner: I have no idea what they have said to
the NAA.
Q160 Chairman: But Dr Tabbiner, others have told
the Committee that you o ered them the technology
and the stu that you pioneered this year and they
did not want it.
Dr Tabbiner: When you say “they”, do you mean the
other company?
Chairman: No; the QCA and the NAA. You o ered
them the kind of technology and intellectual
property that you developed over this first year, at a
price, and the QCA and NAA were not interested
in that.
Dr Tabbiner: That is correct.
Q161 Paul Holmes: What parting advice would you
o er to the new one-year contractor so that they
avoid the shambles that you say was imposed on you
by the QCA and NAA?
Dr Tabbiner: I think, given the timetable that they
now face, that having a crisp, well-detailed end-to-
end project lined up and well documented is the only
way they are going to be successful at this juncture.
Q162 Mr Chaytor: In terms of the number of scripts
and the value of the contract is this the largest
contract that ETS has taken on board outside North
America?
Dr Tabbiner: Outside North America I believe that
to be the case, yes.
Q163 Mr Chaytor: And within North America how
does it compare to other contracts?
Dr Tabbiner: It is not our largest contract.
Q164 Mr Chaytor: Do you think there are problems
in terms of the size and scale of the assessments that
we have? Is there something intrinsic about the sheer
volume of assessments and scripts that we are trying
to manage in one contract?
Dr Tabbiner: No, I do not think so.
Q165 Chairman: Dr Tabbiner, you are in a sense an
outsider, coming from the United States, with all this
experience, of, I think, 80 countries—I think Lynda
over-egged it a bit when she said 180; it is 80, is it not?
Dr Tabbiner: It is 180.
Chairman: A hundred and eighty?
Dr Tabbiner: That is correct.
Chairman: Well, with all that experience, tell us—as
someone who has come to our country and whose
contract has gone wrong, you have something of an
overview, from 180 countries; you have looked at the
way we administer tests, and the way we test and
assess: have you any general feeling about the kind
of testing and assessment regime that we run in this
country?
Dr Tabbiner: Well, first I would point out that at
ETS we develop and live by standardised testing
each and every day, so I tell you straight out we are
proponents of standardised testing. I would also say
that for the future of the tests we have, I think online
marking—not just online training—would be a very
viable way in which to do this volume and to have a
higher level of success and lower risks in the transit
of materials and the training of individuals.
Q166 Chairman: That is interesting; but when you
look at us, compared to the 179 countries you work
in, do we test and assess too much?
Dr Tabbiner: That is really a public policy and
educational decision.
Q167 Chairman: But you are an outsider; you are a
very experienced educationist. You have amazing
experience in the education world. Do you think you
can go to a system where you have too much testing
Processed: 17-07-2009 19:04:48 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 406183 Unit: PAG2
Children, Schools and Families Committee: Evidence Ev 21
10 September 2008 Dr Philip Tabbiner and Andrew Latham
and assessment, so that in a sense you teach to the
test and drive away from access to a broad
curriculum?
Dr Tabbiner: We are large supporters not only of
testing at a summative level, at the end, but also of
formative testing, which is testing throughout the
process.
Q168 Chairman: So you do not think we test too
much.
Dr Tabbiner: No.
Q169 Chairman: Lastly, do we have to have the sort
of bureaucracy we have had this year and for many
years? This is not company-specific. Could not the
tests be delivered locally? Could we have a national
test administered in schools where the teachers know
the pupils? The tests can be set nationally; why not
mark them in the schools? Why do we have to have
an environmental disaster of all these scripts running
around the country? Would not it be better to do it
locally, administered nationally, in a lighter way?
Dr Tabbiner: We certainly, as I said, believe in the use
of formative testing through process, but we also
believe in the value of summative testing, so I submit
Witnesses: Isabel Nisbet, Chief Executive, and Kathleen Tattersall OBE, Chair, Ofqual, gave evidence.
Q172 Chairman: May I welcome Kathleen Tattersall
and Isabel Nisbet of Ofqual to our proceedings? You
are not as unfamiliar to the Committee system as the
previous witnesses, so we do not have to ride you
through the process. However, Kathleen, I will give
you a chance to say a few words to open the session.
You have been sitting here, listening to the
proceedings, and, knowing your background and
that of Isabel, I know that you will have looked at
every bit of evidence that we have had in this inquiry
already, so you will be well primed. Kathleen, may I
ask you to say a few words to open the session?
Kathleen Tattersall: Thank you very much, Chair,
for inviting Ofqual to give evidence today. As you
know, we are the new regulator for examinations and
tests in England. In our interim form—that is, before
the legislation governing us is passed—we are part of
QCA. We began our operations on 8 April 2008,
with myself as the chair and Isabel as the acting chief
executive. Before Ofqual came into being, regulation
was undertaken by the regulation and standards
division of QCA and Isabel was the director of that
division. This summer, we have monitored both the
national curriculum tests and the A-level and GCSE
examinations. We have had a very successful
summer with A-levels and GCSEs. Sadly, that was
not the case with the national curriculum tests,
where there have been some very well documented
problems. We share this Committee’s
disappointment that the delivery problems were
such that many students are still waiting for results,
as was said earlier. It is unacceptable that pupils and
schools did not receive those results in the time scale
to you that from a public policy or educational
policy perspective the Government have to
determine which suits the needs that they have got.
Q170 Chairman: But that does not answer the
question whether this could be done locally. We
could still have both kinds of tests but they could be
delivered and dealt with much more locally, could
not they?
Dr Tabbiner: You could certainly use a standardised
test and deliver it on a local basis, and then
accumulate it up from there.
Q171 Chairman: What do you think, Andrew?
Andrew Latham: Are you talking about the marking
of the assessment, because it is delivered at a local
level in that sense? It certainly is a viable model and
can be done. Of course, what you lose if you do that
is the concerns about national comparability of a
purely objective set of markers marking the
assessments.
Dr Tabbiner: But if you then roll it up and it gets
marked online, I think that you accommodate that.
Chairman: Right. We have had a very good session.
Thank you very much for your full, frank answers to
our questions. We look forward to keeping in touch
with you as we write up your report.
Dr Tabbiner: Thank you very much for your time.
that was laid down. However, I must say, as an
evidence-based regulator, that there were many
processes in the national curriculum tests this year
that were successfully delivered. You heard about
some of them earlier. They included the delivery of
the test papers themselves, the printing and delivery
of 10 million of those papers to schools and the
administration of the tests by the schools
themselves. So the pupils at that point had had a
good experience. I think that it is also important to
note that the plans that were in place for controlling
the quality of marking were better than in previous
years. However, the marking process is the heart of
testing and examinations. Communications with
schools and markers and the data entry processes all
went badly wrong. We have set up an independent
inquiry, as you know, led by Lord Sutherland. He
will be looking at the whole of the processes,
including our actions as the regulator. The DCSF
has also asked Lord Sutherland to report to it on
areas outside our remit. We are continuing to
monitor the national curriculum tests and NAA’s
management of the review process. However, from
the processes that we have observed so far, we believe
that the quality of marking is as good as in previous
years. We will, of course, be looking carefully at the
reviews. Going forward, the priority is to regain the
confidence of teachers, pupils and the public in
national curriculum tests. To do that, we will be
looking carefully at the 2009 series and monitoring
it carefully to ensure that pupils get what they
deserve. We want to ensure, as far as we can, that the
problems that have been experienced this year do
not recur in 2009. Thank you, Chair.
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Q173 Chairman: Thank you, Kathleen, but you have
not said anything about what went wrong. You
heard the evidence that was given to the Committee
just now and you know about the evidence from the
QCA. Who do you think made things go wrong?
Was it an inecient contractor or too much
interference from the NAA and the QCA?
Kathleen Tattersall: The evidence that we have all
heard today is the first time that I have heard ETS
give its side of the story, so there is clearly something
there to be absorbed. But from my point of view not
only as chairman of Ofqual, but previously as the
chief executive of a very large awarding body—the
AQA—I know that at the heart of any testing and
examination process are the communications with
markers, the management of those markers and the
management of the scripts. In terms of the problems
that we experienced, the way in which markers were
managed and dealt with throughout the marking
process was very much at the forefront. It is di cult
to recruit markers, and you always have to be
acutely aware that these are professional people who
want to do a good, professional job, but that they are
doing that job over and above the job that they hold
as teachers, so you have to treat them in a very
professional manner. Some of the stories that we
have heard would suggest that markers were very
upset by the way in which they were treated, so that
is one of the aspects. There are also the basic
logistics—the movement of scripts from schools to
the markers concerned. Again, there was some
evidence that the scripts in particular subjects did
not make it to the markers of that subject and had
to be redirected. There was also evidence that some
scripts did not make it at all to markers. I would have
thought that one of the basic requirements of any
system of assessment and examination is that there
is a checking process to ensure that everything is out
with the markers. So the logistics around script
movement—getting the scripts back to the
warehouse and checked for marking—and the
handling of markers are at the heart of the problems.
But I would emphasise what I said in my statement,
which was that as far as the training of markers was
concerned—regardless of what was said about
whether it should be online or face to face—what we
observed was very good, and that has led us to the
view that the quality of the marking should be okay.
Q174 Chairman: But Kathleen, with great respect,
you were the chief executive of the AQA and you
heard representatives of a similar organisation
giving evidence to the Committee just now, saying
that they had signed a contract and that that
contract was quite dramatically altered, which made
it di cult for them to deliver on the basis that they
thought they were going to deliver, particularly in
terms of the training of the markers. Was it your
experience as the chief executive of a major
examination board that that is normal? Would the
QCA or the NAA dramatically change the nature of
a contract after you had signed it, when you were
actually running the operation? Did that happen to
AQA?
Kathleen Tattersall: The examination system is
slightly di erent. Certainly, the awarding bodies do
not operate under the same contractual arrangement
with a local education authority as ETS did. In terms
of the contract, the events that were described
happened before I joined Ofqual, but my colleague
Isabel might be able to throw a bit more light on
the issue.
Q175 Chairman: If that contract had been changed
dramatically, would you not have been shocked?
Kathleen Tattersall: I would not expect a major part
of the requirements to be changed unless it was clear
that the process was not working as it should do, in
which case it would be very foolish to continue with
whatever was there in the contract. There would
need to be in a place a fallback system to enable all
the processes to go forward. If online training caused
a problem—with your permission, Mr Sheerman, I
shall ask Isabel to talk about that—there would have
been no point in persisting with it because we might
well lose the very people whom we wanted to retain
in the marking system. Throughout an examination
cycle, including the awarding bodies as well as the
national curriculum tests, things do go wrong and
one has to be fairly nimble footed to change tack to
accommodate that. Things do not always go as
smoothly as we plan. As for online testing, I would
rather Isabel commented on that.
Isabel Nisbet: In February 2008, Ofqual, the
regulatory part of QCA, attended a meeting with the
NAA and ETS when they reported back on a pilot
that they had been doing on di erent aspects of
quality assurance.
Q176 Chairman: What date was that?
Isabel Nisbet: It was 21 February 2008. On that
occasion, one of the things reported back on was the
online trials of the online training of markers. The
response of the markers to that was poor. The
conclusion at the meeting was that it would be better
to give them the option of face-to-face training. The
regulatory part of QCA and I agreed with that
judgment. The reaction to the online training was
not good. In addition, the regulator was not
responsible for the detailed scrutiny of the contract,
but we were monitoring how everything was going
overall. A lot of things that went wrong later were
not about training, but about parcels not being
checked before they were sent out, for example. I
should say that, as regulator, we had great di culty
getting good data on where all the scripts were.
Q177 Chairman: Who was responsible for the details
of the contract, if you were not?
Isabel Nisbet: The contract was between the NAA
and ETS. We were not supervising the contractual
aspects. Our duty, as set out in our regulatory
framework, was to look at the quality and to make
sure that the tests were delivered in a way that would
command confidence.
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Chairman: Thank you for those opening responses.
Q178 Mr Pelling: I shall ask some basic parameter
questions. What was the role of the regulator in the
actual procurement of the contract with ETS?
Kathleen Tattersall: The procurement process was
long before Ofqual came into existence. Again, I ask
Isabel to comment on that.
Isabel Nisbet: As regulator, my part of QCA did not
have any formal part in the contractual process. The
proprieties of the contracting were overseen by the
Oce of Government Commerce, which reported
on it several times. Our responsibility was to make
sure that our regulatory requirements were met.
They are that the levels are properly set; the
standards are properly made; the quality of the
marking is good; and the tests are delivered in a way
that meets the standards of previous years. Clearly,
a lot of the things in the contract were to do with
that, but the actual contracting was not overseen
by us.
Q179 Mr Pelling: I presume that, if the processes of
the procurement were so limited, there would have
been no oversight role for the regulator.
Isabel Nisbet: It is fair to say we oversaw the whole
delivery of the tests, but we were not monitoring the
contract. We were not a contract checker. Our
requirements are set out in our regulatory
publications, and those are the issues that we were
checking against, not the terms of a contract.
Kathleen Tattersall: It should be said that our
regulatory role was in respect of NAA. That is where
our regulation falls. NAA managed the contract
with ETS. That is the line of accountability.
Q180 Mr Pelling: When did you, as regulator,
become aware of the problems with the testing cycle
in 2008?
Kathleen Tattersall: The testing cycle itself is clearly
between May and June: students take the tests in
May and the marking follows. Certainly at a fairly
early stage in that process, towards the end of May,
we were very aware that there were problems that
were likely to slow down the marking process:
getting the scripts to the correct markers, getting on
with the marking, and getting the scripts back. At
the time that all those concerns were raised, we had
assurances that the date of delivery of results back to
schools was not in question—that it would be met—
but by the beginning of June we were very concerned
about the resources required to deliver the tests on
time. Isabel wrote to David Gee—I think it was on
3 June—about the delivery of tests, and as a result
NAA made available more resources to back up the
ETS operation. If you go back to earlier points in the
cycle, when we expressed concerns about
communication with markers and the resources
available—this is going back to January 2008—
again, NAA put in a lot more back-up to help the
ETS. So we played a role as a regulator. So NAA was
very responsive to many of the concerns that we had.
In answer to your specific question, it was around
the beginning of June that we were really voicing
those concerns, and indeed by 16 June, when we
wrote to the Department, it was clear that we had
real concerns that we were not going to meet the
deadline.
Q181 Mr Pelling: So what do you feel are the most
significant causes of the delay in delivering the
results? I have heard some clear di erences in nuance
between you and the earlier witnesses.
Kathleen Tattersall: Yes. I only today heard ETS
speaking directly about this, and I do not
particularly wish to comment on that or get
involved. From our point of view, the marking was
slower that it ought to have been, scripts did not
move around as quickly or e ciently in the system
as they ought to have, and the checking of the
marking did not appear to be as e cient as we would
have wished. Isabel may be able to add some other
points from her detailed operational side, but that is
my view as the chair and as someone who has been
involved in examinations.
Isabel Nisbet: One other factor is that the
complicated nature and the logistics of what the
markers were being asked to do on the system was
just too heavy a load to bear. They were having to
enter every item separately—millions and millions of
items—and that system was too complicated and too
burdensome for them. I know that that is a
conclusion that NAA has also come to. Expecting
markers to make an entry for every single question,
every single item, on a system that they found quite
di cult to work with just imploded. That is one of
the major burdens on the system.
Q182 Mr Pelling: So the emphasis on good quality
training is important?
Isabel Nisbet: Yes.
Q183 Mr Pelling: You stated that you had concerns
back in February. Do you feel that there should have
been earlier intervention on the contract, as you were
aware in February—having looked at the pilot with
the online approach—that the training process was
in trouble?
Isabel Nisbet: I think that what we concluded was
that even at that late stage NAA was right to ask for
the option of face-to-face training. I do understand
that that would have meant setting up a lot of things
quite quickly and that it would have been a risk, but
the other risk would have been the roll-out of the
e ects of the pilot, when a lot of the markers were
not reacting well to the online training. What they
were being trained to do was quite burdensome, and,
with hindsight, one lesson for the future is that item-
level entry is not really practicable.
Q184 Mr Pelling: The timetable for training, in
terms of altering the approach and putting proper
training in place, was likely to have been a three-
month run-in, rather than one month, which is
something that we heard earlier. Is that correct?
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Isabel Nisbet: Yes, I cannot speak for the details, but
I could certainly look into that further and come
back to the Committee if you would like us to look
at that.4
Q185 Mr Pelling: We would be grateful for that. So
the QCA is blameless in all this, is that right?
Kathleen Tattersall: I really find it very dicult to
answer that question, which is one of the reasons we
have asked for an independent inquiry.
Chairman: This is an independent inquiry.
Kathleen Tattersall: Sorry, Chair. I do appreciate
that and I appreciate the authority of this
Committee, but in terms of who did what, it is
somewhat di cult to unravel the process. There are
questions that we would ask regarding who did what
and when, and what our own role was in that. As to
whether anybody comes out of this blameless, it is
quite possible that there will be some responsibility
borne by all the parties concerned, because
everybody had a responsibility for di erent aspects
of what went on, both in terms of the contract and
the management of the ETS. NAA—part of QCA—
is responsible for that management. For our part,
regarding the regulation that we applied, what we
want to know and what we want an independent
person to judge us on, and you may yourselves make
this judgment, is: whether we asked the right
questions at the right time; whether we evaluated in
a proper manner the answers that we had; and, lying
behind that, whether the management systems for
giving us all the information were appropriate to the
task. That in itself might be one of the problems.
Q186 Mr Pelling: Do you have a view on whether the
degree of change that was required within the
contract is something that is experienced elsewhere,
internationally?
Kathleen Tattersall: That is something that I cannot
comment on; I am sorry.
Q187 Mr Pelling: To the extent that you feel that the
NAA would have had a more hands-on role in this
process, do you think that it is inevitable that if there
is culpability, the NAA is going to carry more
culpability than the QCA?
Kathleen Tattersall: The NAA is the body that was
responsible for the management of the contract. In
terms of the response to our regulation, as I
indicated earlier, the NAA put in an enormous
amount of resource to back up the ETS to deliver the
contract. That was at an early stage, as well as later
in the process. From our point of view, the NAA has
done all it can to avoid the problems that happened
in June and July. Clearly, what it did was not enough
to prevent the problems becoming manifest, but it
was very responsive to the problems that we
highlighted and it put in the resource where it could.
Q188 Chairman: Okay. A cynical outsider might say,
“The NAA would do that, wouldn’t they?”
Everybody was surprised when a new player from
America, with no experience of the UK, was given
4 See Ev 31
the contract by NAA. NAA was responsible for the
contract and the word on the street was that it was
made at a much lower price than any of the other
bidders. Indeed, we heard—astonishingly—that the
American team lost £50 million on the contract this
year. The NAA appointed these people and quite
soon worried about whether they could deliver, so it
is not surprising that it put a lot of support in early.
The two things cannot be separated, can they?
Kathleen Tattersall: ETS has a very good reputation
internationally—I have to say that. Certainly, it was
an organisation that I was aware of as a chief
executive and it has enormous experience: not just in
the states but, as it made clear in its evidence, across
the world. So I rather suspect that it was somewhat
of a surprise that, in this particular contract, things
began to go wrong. Again, however, it may be that
Isabel, from an operational perspective, has a better
idea than I have about the answer to that question.
Isabel Nisbet: The first year of a new contract for any
organisation is a heightened risk, and it was made
explicit between us and NAA that we would expect
them to take extra care in the first year of a new
contract to ensure that it went well. If that meant
outposting people to get the right results for pupils,
then that was the right thing to do. There were
similar problems, tensions and high risks in the first
years of other contracts in history.
Q189 Lynda Waltho: You quite rightly said earlier,
Isabel, that the regulator does not have a direct role
in procurement. However, Ken Boston did say that
there is a role to advise, support and warn. I am
wondering why—perhaps you have some ideas on
this—the regulator waited until February 2008 to
advise, support and warn that markers would not
like online training, and also why they did not
advise, support and warn about how di cult it was
to recruit markers in particular areas. Why do you
think that that advice did not come sooner, rather
than later?
Isabel Nisbet: There had been regular exchanges
between the regulator and NAA about aspects of the
tests. Those exchanges did not start in February;
they go on right through the year, including
exchanges about aspects of the tests to do with
markers. There was a clear set of pilot exercises that
NAA, with our agreement, had asked ETS to
conduct, about the quality of marking. There were a
number of things that ETS was trying out. One of
them was this online training of markers. That issue
came to its culmination in February, but it had been
going on for several months before. It was the report
of that pilot scheme that was presented to the
meeting in February, which I referred to. So things
had been going on before February. I was surprised
to hear this morning that our guests from ETS were
surprised at the issues around recruitment of
markers because, rather like Mr Chaytor, I felt that
that was a well-known background fact about the
system.
Q190 Lynda Waltho: It just feels all a bit muddy to
me, Chairman. For something so important, there
just seems to have been a very big delay in knowing
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and agreeing the basis of a contract in which online
training and marking was presumably specified, and
then realising that the markers were not going to like
it. It just seems to me rather unprofessional or even
irresponsible that there was such a gap. I am finding
it hard to absorb that. With all of these
conversations and e-mails that were happening
before, do you think that they were at a level that was
almost unnoticed, and therefore the concern was not
going up the chain to the people who really should
know? I just cannot work out why there was such a
gap.
Chairman: It does all seem a bit messy, Isabel, does
it not?
Isabel Nisbet: Yes, I think that there are issues about
the number of layers in this system and whether they
are really working well. In what was my division, I
had a team of five people looking at national
curriculum tests. They had day-to-day exchanges
with the NAA, whom we regulate against these
documents. Now, if there were concerns coming up,
they would report those up the line. We monitored
risks, as we do in Ofqual, and there would be a time
when we would take a judgment that this matter is
really so seriously wrong that I need to raise it with
David Gee, for example, and there were several
occasions when I did that. However, I understand
what you are saying and we are learning lessons from
this situation, too.
Chairman: What we are getting the feeling of is that
it was all a bit cosy. When we did the Building
Schools for the Future inquiry, in a previous
Committee, we learned one real lesson: if you are
going to build a decent school, you need a good
client. So it is all very well to blame the operator—
the person who is building the house—but if you are
not a good client, you do not know what you want,
you do not set the parameters and you do not do all
that well, then you can end up in a bit of a mess. I
hope that when you contribute to this whole
evaluation, you will not spare the client as well as the
operator.
Q191 Mr Slaughter: Do I understand that you are
saying that you are too remote from the procurement
process to answer questions about ETS’s
employment and performance?
Kathleen Tattersall: I do not think that it would be
right for the regulator to be part of the procurement
process itself. It would be proper for the regulator to
have expectations of the nature of the services that
would be required in any given contract, but it would
not be right for us to be part of the actual
procurement process. As Isabel said, the OGC
oversees that process.
Q192 Mr Slaughter: In terms of commenting now
and helping us to understand what went wrong, is it
reasonable for us to be asking you such questions?
Kathleen Tattersall: We find it very dicult to
comment on the procurement process for the reasons
that we have given. In terms of what we can
comment on, it is the aspects of the tests that we have
regulated. As I said to Mr Pelling, the regulation falls
on the NAA. As Isabel said, there are several layers
here: the deliverer, the body managing the deliverer
and the regulator. We have to think very carefully as
to whether that enables us to regulate e ectively. Let
me compare it with what happens in awarding
bodies. Awarding bodies might have contracts for
some aspects of their work, but the heart of what
happens there—the marking process, the training of
the markers, the taking of the scripts and getting the
results back to the schools—is undertaken by the
body that is regulated by Ofqual. There are some
lessons that we need to think about, such as what the
process of regulation should be in national
curriculum tests.
Q193 Mr Slaughter: And who is policing whom.
Kathleen Tattersall: Yes, exactly.
Q194 Mr Slaughter: We will be coming on to quality,
which you will have more to say about. While we are
on the operational side, you heard—I am afraid that
I missed part of the ETS session—that the changes
in the contract, post-letting, were so great that it was
unable to cope. I am not entirely sure whether that
was simply the process of change in a short time, or
that the requirements were so onerous that it was not
resourced or equipped to do that. Can you comment
on that at all? Can you say whether you think that is
right and whether that is the main explanation, and
even if it is, do you think that the contract was under-
resourced for what ETS was originally asked to do,
or whether it was the right sort of contractor and had
the capability to do what was asked?
Kathleen Tattersall: If I can answer the last part of
that first. As a huge organisation, as we know ETS
to be, with a great reputation in America and
elsewhere in the world, I would have thought that it
was the sort of organisation that could manage a
contract of this size.
Q195 Mr Slaughter: That seems to be an important
point: all the things that went wrong, ETS was
capable of getting right.
Kathleen Tattersall: I would have thought that any
experienced organisation dealing with examinations
and tests should, to use an earlier phrase, be nimble-
footed enough to accommodate changes. No
examination series goes to plan. Things go wrong
and they go wrong at the last minute. You have to
put in all the resources at your disposal to get things
right in order to meet the deadlines. In my own
experience, I have been there. You have 48 hours
before publication and you put in everything in
order for people to get their results.
Q196 Mr Slaughter: So unless it was out of
character, what happened? Is it because it was under-
resourced or because it was asked to do something
that it was not prepared to do under the terms of this
contract?
Isabel Nisbet: I cannot speak for the changes to the
contract because the regulator was not involved in
those processes. What I can say is that a lot of basic
things did not work, not just about markers but
about systems, management information, the fact
that it has been so di cult to know where all these
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scripts are, even to today, and the fact that the
communication was so poor. I would make a
judgment that those were systemic things that went
wrong throughout. They are not all a matter of
resource.
Q197 Mr Slaughter: But they do not just happen.
Isabel Nisbet: No.
Q198 Mr Slaughter: What we are trying to get to is
this: whose fault is it?
Isabel Nisbet: I cannot say that those were all the
result of contract changes. I have no evidence for
that. I cannot comment on those. If you ask whether
the problems of data, not opening parcels and poor
communication with the markers were because of
lack of resources, that might have contributed to
them. All I know, as a past member of the executive
of the QCA, is that the rigour of the procurement
process, which I was not involved in, was of a very
high quality and was overseen by the OGC.
Q199 Mr Chaytor: Can I come back to the meeting
of 21 February, when the results of the pilots for
online marking were reported? It is agreed by both
sides—ETS and the NAA—that that was a key
moment when the decision was taken to scrap the
online training and move to face-to-face training.
ETS’s whole defence seems to hinge on the fact that
it was told by the NAA to scrap the online training
and that lost it between three and five months in the
whole process. It did not explain to us earlier this
morning that the reason why it was told that was the
poor response of markers to the online training. At
the meeting of 21 February, did ETS point out that
it would cause huge delay to the project if online
training was scrapped in favour of face-to-face
training? Did either you, as the then head of the
regulation and standards division, or the NAA make
any comment on that in terms of the likely impact on
meeting the 8 July deadline?
Isabel Nisbet: The answer to that, Mr Chaytor, is
“Not to my memory.” I was at that meeting and it
was a presentation by ETS of the results of the pilot.
There was some discussion with the NAA and
ourselves, and then we as a regulator went away to
decide what we thought about it. There were some
other things as well as that point about the online
training of markers. I do not recall that being said,
but we will go back now and check the records to see
whether there is anything I can say to—
Q200 Mr Chaytor: Okay; and do you recall any
subsequent occasion when ETS was absolutely
specific about the scale of the delay that would be
caused if online training was replaced by face-to-
face training?
Isabel Nisbet: I have just been passed a note. In fact,
ETS was not at the particular meeting that I was
talking about. I am sorry—I misled the Committee.
It was the NAA reporting what it had said to the
NAA, so it was a meeting largely with members of
sta of the NAA and us.
Q201 Mr Chaytor: But you were present or some
sta from the regulation and standards division
were present?
Isabel Nisbet: Yes, we were. If you ask me whether
the NAA reported to us that ETS had said that this
would lead to a long delay, I do not recall that, but I
will check.5
Q202 Mr Chaytor: My next question is, did you or
your representatives or the NAA ask what would be
the time implications of scrapping the initial plans
for online training and suddenly moving to face-to-
face training, given we are talking about—
Isabel Nisbet: I do not recall that we did.
Q203 Mr Chaytor: Can I ask about the regulation
and standards division? The functions of Ofqual are
essentially the same as the functions of the division.
It has just been taken out of the QCA and made
more independent. I am interested in the relationship
between the regulation and standards division and
the NAA, because in terms of Ofqual, you have been
in existence only since April 2008, but the work of
the division has been going on for a number of years
and the NAA has been formally in existence since
April 2004. What is the exact relationship between
what are essentially two divisions of the QCA over
the last four years and particularly in terms of
considering the standards implications of the
processing or the progression of particular
contracts? At what point, as the head of the
regulation and standards division, were you able to
say to the NAA, “We think there are standards
implications in the way this contract is being
implemented”?
Isabel Nisbet: When regulation was passed to the
QCA, there was a framework that was set out, that
we regulated the NAA as if it were an awarding body,
but within the QCA; so on particular issues of
standards, like, for example, the level setting, what
would happen is that there would be a lot of
discussions between my sta and the NAA about the
technical parts of level setting. The NAA would
make a proposal to Ken Boston, then I and my sta
would come in afterwards and say what we thought
about it from the point of view of the regulatory
division, and then an overriding QCA decision
would be made, Ken having listened to the advice
from my people and from the NAA. The di erence
now, with Ofqual, is that we are doing the same
functions, but with quite di erent governance and
accountability; so now that does not happen that I
report to Kathleen and we make our separate
judgments and communicate them separately.
Q204 Mr Chaytor: In terms of the standards
implications of quality of marking, would you have
been expected to report your concerns about that to
the chief executive of the QCA? If you had concerns
about marking or the training of markers, would
that have been an issue for you?
5 See Ev 31
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Isabel Nisbet: Yes. I would first of all normally have
notified David Gee if things were escalated to me
from the team. I did that on several occasions on
dierent matters, and they took action each time. If
I felt it was getting more serious than that, the next
step would be for me to raise it at the top of the QCA.
Q205 Mr Chaytor: But coming back to the timeline
and the 21 February meeting when you gave a report
back of the concerns about the online training of
markers, you said you wrote to David Gee on 3 June
about the delays. There is a long time between 21
February and 3 June. Was it not until 3 June that you
were seriously concerned about the possible delays
because of what you had seen in respect of the
training of markers?
Isabel Nisbet: There were other exchanges with the
NAA from the regulator about issues including, for
example, some of the communications issues with
markers, which we wrote to the NAA about in
January. Also there were some aspects about the
load that the data system for marking was having to
bear. As a result of each of our interventions the
NAA did things: for example it put some extra
resource in on the communications side in January,
and did some load testing that we had asked for. So
in each case there was an exchange when something
happened. What happened in June was that after the
young people had sat the tests and there had been
reported delays in getting to mark them there began
to be accumulated reports of things going wrong. As
the chairman said, in mid-June we took the view that
there was overall now on balance a high risk that the
results would not be delivered on time. That is when
we did ask Ministers.
Q206 Chairman: Just to nail this down, can we have
a list of the number of interventions you made, and
when you made them?
Isabel Nisbet: Yes, we can send that.6
Q207 Chairman: Because what is worrying me, as
someone who is listening to both lots of evidence, is
that there were reports in the press that things were
not going well quite early on. You as regulator, we
would have thought, would have been on the case.
Isabel Nisbet: Yes.
Q208 Chairman: It seems that it is in the May–June
period that suddenly everybody realises it is all going
to hell in a handcart—Dr Tabbiner flying over in
May, and by June saying, “We want to walk away
from this contract.” You as regulator should surely
have known that by then.
Kathleen Tattersall: In answer to Mr Chaytor’s
question about what happened between February
and June and your request for a list of the exchanges,
you will find that there were almost weekly
exchanges about problems, but that those problems
were isolated problems that we dealt with. It was not
something that sat around and suddenly appeared
again in June. Things were being handled on a day
by day basis by Isabel and her sta and there were
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lots of exchanges of e-mails about particular issues
and the responses to those particular issues. It was
not as if there was a great big hole and a great big
silence at that point. I think that the importance of
late May and June is that we were now in the period
when the pupils had taken the papers and it was
getting to the marking period, and the getting of the
scripts to markers, and so on. That is when things
began to escalate, and the problems really did begin
to pile up. Earlier, we heard the reference to the
helpdesk and the number of e-mails that were being
received about particular problems.
Q209 Mr Chaytor: How long did it take to conduct
the face-to-face training of all markers? Presumably,
it did not start until well after 21 February.
Isabel Nisbet: I do not know the answer to that, but
I can provide it to the Committee.7
Q210 Mr Chaytor: That seems an incredibly short
time scale, given that markers were being trained
only after 21 February for a set of assessments that
had to be done and dusted by July.
Kathleen Tattersall: Can I just make a general point,
although the note that is being passed to Isabel
might have the answer? Generally, when we talk
about training the markers, we are actually talking
about training them on the live scripts, as well as any
preparation that might be done for that; it is the
point when markers are standardised, when they are
there with live scripts and they know what the
standard is. It is not as though the training had to
take place at the end of February; there is a longer
period than that to regroup your resources and look
at how a di erent system might work. But Isabel has
an answer that has been given to her, which might
very well contradict what I have just said.
Isabel Nisbet: Not at all. I am advised that the bulk
of the training was in early May. My own sta
attended 18 of the meetings—a lot of them were on
di erent subjects and happened concurrently. There
was one day per session, so markers would go to a
one-day session. A lot of that was at weekends, and
we observed 18 of those meetings.
Kathleen Tattersall: If I can just draw on my
previous experience, Isabel has just confirmed that
when you get all your markers together—Mr
Holmes has been a marker, so I think he will
understand what I am saying—you get the scripts in
and you get all your markers organised into groups
with senior markers. They go through a session of
marking the scripts against the mark scheme and
they have a discussion about the mark scheme. They
come away from that able to understand and apply
the mark scheme. As was described earlier, you then
have an exercise on the process of the marking,
which enables you to be sure that the markers are
keeping to the standard. In the three months, or
whatever it was, between the stopping of the online
marking and the point where markers were being
standardised, it was possible for the alternative
arrangements to be put into place.
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Q211 Mr Chaytor: There is an issue about the
training involving the standardisation of marking,
but was there not also an issue about the training
dealing with the new software? Isabel, you expressed
concern about the sheer volume of input that was
required and you indicated that the software was
over-ambitious.
Isabel Nisbet: Yes.
Q212 Mr Chaytor: So when was that training done?
At what point were markers trained in the handling
of what you consider to be over-ambitious software?
Was that done in early May as well?
Isabel Nisbet: I believe it was at the same time, but I
will check on that and come back to the Committee.8
Q213 Mr Chaytor: Finally, with the benefit of
hindsight, do you think that Ofqual should have
issued a warning notice earlier than it did about the
potential danger of not meeting the deadlines?
Kathleen Tattersall: If I may, I will answer that. Up
to the point where the pupils took the tests, things
went relatively smoothly—there might have been
problems, but they were addressed. So we are talking
about the approximately six-week period from the
point where the pupils have taken the test to the
point where results come out. It is about three weeks
into that period that the concerns that we expressed
begin to manifest themselves. That was an
appropriate time for us to begin to say what we did;
it would have been quite inappropriate to make a
prejudgment at the very beginning of the marking
process that things were going to go wrong, because
we did not have the evidence at that point. It is when
we have the evidence that the scripts are not getting
to the markers and that the markers are bogged
down by the itemised material that they have to
record that we begin to say, “Are we going to make
8 July?” At the beginning, we were being given
assurances that we would, but by the end of May,
beginning of June, we began to ask, as we did of
David Gee, “Are we going to make that date?” We
got some further assurances, but we were suciently
worried to put in place an accountability meeting
with the NAA on, I think, 3 July, which I chaired.
That was an indication of the seriousness with which
we were taking things. In June, we made those noises
to the NAA and to the Department, and
unfortunately our fears proved to be well founded.
However, we were given assurances that the deadline
would be met. It was a much later stage when other
people began saying, “No, it is not going to be met.”
Q214 Mr Chaytor: Was it the triumph of hope over
experience, given everything that you had observed
over the previous few months with the operation of
ETS?
Kathleen Tattersall: This is a situation in which some
things were good. We observed some things that
were good, and in spite of what has been said about
the organisation of the training, the training itself
was good. We were also impressed by their online
benchmarking and the standardisation of the
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marking. We were very comfortable with some
things, but on the question of hope over experience,
when we began to observe what was happening with
the slowness of the marking and with the movement
of the scripts, our experience said, “We are really
concerned that we are not going to meet that date.”
Q215 Paul Holmes: These test results are crucial for
schools. Teachers get their performance-related
pay—“professional pay” or whatever it is called
these days—on the basis of results. Schools can be
praised or threatened with closure on the basis of
results. Ofsted, when it turns up to inspect, has
number-crunched all this and come along with
preconceptions on the basis of these results. Are you
confident that the results are accurate this year, or, as
even ETS claims, better than in previous years?
Kathleen Tattersall: We have said that we believe
that the quality of marking is at least as good as in
previous years. That is our current position. The
judgment is based on the training, which we have
mentioned, on the level-setting, all of which was
observed by Ofqual sta , and on a realisation that
the markers themselves are not new people, but
people who have been in the system for quite some
time. New people will, of course, join the system,
but, generally speaking, we are talking about people
who have marked before. We are very aware that
teachers are making other statements. I have had
meetings with various teaching unions. I am aware
of the great concerns that schools have, and I very
much sympathise with them. However, we, as
Ofqual, have to distinguish the di erence between
the quality of the marking and the quality of
everything that surrounded it, which is what we are
trying to do. We will monitor very closely the review
process, which began in July, because those schools
that had their papers and results back at that point
would have put in their request for a review. Schools
that are getting them back still have the time to do
so, too. We will look at what goes on, and we will be
very interested to know the proportion of level
changes, because it might lead us to a di erent view.
However, we want to keep ourselves to the evidence,
and, at the moment, the evidence is that the quality
of marking is at least as good as last year.
Q216 Paul Holmes: But why are you so confident,
when the delivery and the logistics were a shambles;
when the training got o to such a bad start; when
there were lots of stories in the educational press
about experienced markers resigning, saying, “I’m
not having any part of this”; when people had to be
recruited at the last minute in the summer—after 8
July, when everything should have been done and
dusted and they were dragging people in to catch up
on the backlog; and when unmarked papers are still
turning up? It beggars belief that the quality will be
as good as in previous years.
Kathleen Tattersall: As I have said, we are trying to
draw a fine line between all those surrounding
problems, which caused a lot of anguish for teachers
and others who were handling the situation, and the
quality of the work by people who were in the
system. Those people in the system, whether they
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were recruited later or at the normal time prior to the
taking of the tests, will have received the same
quality training. Our belief is that that quality
training and the systems to weed out markers who
did not continue to meet the national standard,
namely the benchmarking exercises, are of good
quality and will have assured the system that the
markers who mark are good markers and that the
marking should be trusted. We might find problems
at the review stage. If there are, clearly Ofqual will
look at them, and we are open to revising our
judgment, if we have to.
Q217 Paul Holmes: We have a non-scientific sample
from the National Association of Head Teachers. Of
26 reading papers, 22 were marked incorrectly; all
English papers were wrongly levelled; 14 out of 29
papers were returned; and so on. Is there a
qualitative assessment at that stage to show whether
more complaints and more papers are being returned
than at the equivalent period in previous years?
Kathleen Tattersall: My understanding at the
moment is that we are not in a situation in which
more papers are requested for review, but I would
have to ask Isabel for the detail.
Isabel Nisbet: I am advised that normally in previous
years about 1% of the papers come back with
requests for review. So far, it looks like being a bit
above that, but we will not know until about a
couple of weeks down the line, because all the
September ones are coming in now. The NAA has set
up a new database. We have asked for weekly reports
on the outcomes of the reviews, particularly the
changes, and we expect to see them this week.
Q218 Paul Holmes: So there appears to be an
increase already.
Isabel Nisbet: A slight increase, yes.
Q219 Paul Holmes: But a number of the heads in the
NAHT report said that the new system this year
discourages schools from sending as many papers
back. Under a new system that discourages sending
papers back, there have been more than previously.
Kathleen Tattersall: I understand that from my
meeting with the NAHT, and we have raised the
issue with the NAA. All “artificial barriers” to
requesting reviews have been removed, so the NAA
responded to that.
Q220 Lynda Waltho: All that has happened so far
clearly has implications for you, as a regulator. Once
you are on a statutory footing, what might you be
able to do to avoid a similar situation next year or in
subsequent years? What have you learned?
Obviously, I understand that we have to wait for
Sutherland, but how you can avoid such problems in
the future? What could be your role?
Kathleen Tattersall: If I can answer first, perhaps
Isabel can then come in with some of the detail. I
hope—this is regardless of whether the legislation is
in place—that we can look at how we manage the
regulation of the NAA in a more systematic way
from next year. Isabel referred earlier to treating the
NAA as an awarding body. I think that we have to
do that by working with the NAA as we do with the
awarding bodies in GCSE, A-level and vocational
areas to identify the risks and agree between us the
management of those risks, and we also need to
consider the systems underpinning the delivery of
the examinations. If we consider the documentation
that Isabel held up earlier—the codes of practice and
so on—the emphasis is very much on the quality of
the test, the quality of the marking and so on. We
have to broaden that, and we do not need legislation
to do so. We need to do that anyway, regardless of
when the legislation comes through. As a regulator,
we expect to have greater powers to direct an
awarding body to take a particular course of action
in the interests of maintaining standards, and in the
interests of the pupils and the students who do the
tests and the examinations. At the moment, we do
not have those powers and my expectation, as chair,
is that we would be given powers of that kind, so that
we could exercise them in the interests of pupils and
students.
Lynda Waltho: Thank you.
Isabel Nisbet: We have not waited for anything, but
we have already asked for extra resources from the
Department to beef up our resources for looking at
the next year of the NAA’s management of the tests.
It will clearly be a new contract, probably for one
year. There is risk there, and we need to have people
to look at the systems. The other thing is that at the
end of July I put in place weekly accountability
meetings, which I chair with the NAA, to keep track
of exactly where things are moving, and I propose to
continue those for the foreseeable future. That is an
escalation. That is not a normal regulation, but these
are not normal times, and so we will be continuing
with that.
Q221 Chairman: Kathleen and Isabel, when did you
make the decision to call in Lord Sutherland to
conduct an inquiry?
Kathleen Tattersall: It was following my meeting on
3 July with the NAA, when it was apparent that the 8
July date was in great jeopardy. It seemed to me that
given the importance of the tests to pupils—and also
to teachers, schools and parents—that this was an
issue that was so serious that we needed to try to
bottom out all the issues, including our own role. As
a new independent regulator, we want to learn from
the experiences of this year and be able to apply
ourselves in the future in ways that will be very
eective in all regards. So we felt it best not to have
just an internal inquiry about what had gone wrong,
but to call in an independent person of standing—
Lord Sutherland—to take evidence and to reach an
objective judgment as to where the balance of
responsibility lay for particular parts of the process
going wrong. We also asked him to say—as part of
the brief—whether Ofqual had acted in a timely
manner. Did Ofqual ask the right questions? Did it
evaluate the answers in the right way? Could Ofqual
have done more? That was why we did that, and that
was the timing.
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Q222 Chairman: What were your communications
with the ministerial team, before you made that
judgment?
Kathleen Tattersall: Before we made that judgment,
we did not have any communications with the
ministerial team. Clearly we informed Ministers,
because we have always taken the view that there
should be no surprises, and it would be wrong for us
to do something so momentous that it became a
surprise in the public domain without alerting
people. But we were very conscious that that was our
decision and that we were going ahead with it.
Isabel Nisbet: I certainly told ocials that that was
what we had decided. As the Committee may know,
after we had made that decision Ministers decided
that they too would like to ask Lord Sutherland to
report some conclusions to them and so, with Lord
Sutherland’s agreement, the approach taken was a
single inquiry with two reports.
Q223 Chairman: There was communication with the
Department, which would have informed Ministers.
So Ministers knew what you were doing.
Isabel Nisbet: Yes.
Q224 Chairman: And they decided to join you.
Isabel Nisbet: Yes.
Q225 Chairman: I take it that Sutherland is getting
his teeth into it already. Is he not constrained by the
evidence that we had from the contractor, the ETS,
that it is still constrained by the contract and is not
fully liberated to frankly discuss with Lord
Sutherland what really happened?
Kathleen Tattersall: It was the first that I had heard
of that, today, and I was really alarmed. It seems to
me that in order to get a complete picture, Lord
Sutherland—and the Committee—needs to have the
evidence from all parties. I hope that whatever the
restrictions are, they will be lifted to enable ETS to
give evidence.
Q226 Chairman: There are great threats and
opportunities around now for you, as a regulator.
Were you conscious that when you, the new
independent regulator, asked Sutherland to have a
look at this that from the outside, a lot of people
might see the QCA, the NAA and yourselves as
being a bit cosy? You have shared roles with the
QCA—Isabel certainly has. It does look a bit cosy.
Although you are only a shadow regulator in one
sense, because the legislation has not yet been made
to make you absolutely o cial, the first thing that
you have done as a tough, independent regulator is
ask somebody else to be independent.
Kathleen Tattersall: In a strange way, that absolutely
demonstrates our total independence. As a regulator
that is quite separate from the QCA and the NAA,
we believe that something quite serious has gone
wrong, and that we might be part of it, in terms of
whether we asked the right questions, timing and so
on. Bringing someone in to look at what went wrong
demonstrates that we have the courage of our own
convictions. There needs to be objectivity in
considering the totality of the evidence, and we need
to be inquired into, too. That demonstrates a
strength on our part, because we are willing to
subject ourselves to public scrutiny as well as having
others subjected to that public scrutiny.
Q227 Chairman: You did not think that this
Committee had the ability to do that?
Kathleen Tattersall: At the time that we set up the
inquiry, there was no suggestion that there was also
going to be a Committee inquiry about this.
Q228 Chairman: You must have known that the
Select Committee on Children, Schools and Families
was bound to investigate.
Kathleen Tattersall: I am very pleased that this
Committee is looking at the issue, but I still think
that it was right and proper for us, as the regulator,
to ask a person of such standing as Lord Sutherland,
from outside the system, to look at the issues and to
report to us.
Q229 Chairman: Kathleen, Lord Sutherland might
be outside the system, but he does not have the
powers that we have as a Select Committee.
Kathleen Tattersall: Indeed not.
Q230 Chairman: Indeed, people can give evidence to
us in a free and frank way here, that they cannot give
to him. You will know that, because the legal basis
of our relationship with the witnesses is di erent.
Kathleen Tattersall: Yes, I understand that
completely, but I think that asking Lord Sutherland
to look at the issues and report to the Ofqual
committee gives us a good basis to go forward, in
terms of ensuring that our regulatory authority and
actions are e ective in the future.
Q231 Chairman: So you will be taking the report
from this Committee and from Lord Sutherland very
seriously indeed?
Kathleen Tattersall: Indeed.
Q232 Chairman: Well, when we come to discuss the
legislation that puts your organisation into a formal
context, after the Queen’s Speech, the threat and the
opportunity are that if your actions and reports are
seen to be robust and independent, it will be a lot
easier to vote for the legislation.
Kathleen Tattersall: We hope that what we have
demonstrated so far is that we are robust and
independent. Indeed, I do not think that we would
be talking about the national curriculum test in this
way, were we not in ourselves so robust and
independent.
Q233 Chairman: But Kathleen, if we look at the
record, your opening remarks were very diplomatic
about the NAA. If there is not a proper and robust
evaluation of not only what the contractor did, but
how the NAA and QCA operated as clients—were
they too interfering, did they get it wrong, was there
something flawed in the process of choosing the
contractor?—you know as well as this Committee
that you will be dogged by a question mark over
your independence as a regulator.
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Kathleen Tattersall: I fully appreciate that. That is
why we want to really get to the bottom of where
responsibility lies for what has happened in the 2008
national curriculum tests. We are taking this failure
very seriously, and we want to investigate that in the
manner that we have indicated and to place the
Ofqual committee in a position to act. If that
involves taking up issues with the NAA and the
QCA, we will do so in a very independent manner.
Q234 Chairman: Even if that includes robust
criticism of colleagues you have worked with for
many years?
Kathleen Tattersall: Even if that includes robust
criticism, yes.
Q235 Chairman: Right. When can we expect the
Sutherland report?
Supplementary memorandum submitted by Ofqual
On the further points required:
Timetable for the marker training and the impact that the face-to-face rather than online had on the timetable
Marker training has had a fairly fixed cascade for several years, culminating in the majority of markers
being trained during the first two weekends in May. For 2008, the earliest formal schedule of which Ofqual
had sight of is from mid-November 2007. It clearly indicates that the final marker training meetings were
scheduled for 10 and 17 May 2008.
Whether switching to a new online training model, or remaining with the established face-to-face model
ETS would have been aware of the need to meet the dates outlined in this schedule, and indeed in the Proof
of Concept Pilot—Design document (May 2007), section ix details the ETS contingency “in the event the pilot
proves it does not validate the acceptance criteria” would be a series of face-to-face training sessions.
How long did it take to conduct the face-to face training of all markers?
As in previous years the majority of face-to-face training sessions take place on a single day, for 2008 either
the 10th May (for key stage 3 markers) or the 17th May (for key stage 2 markers). The vast majority of
markers (around 5,000 per key stage) are trained on these days at a variety of training locations around the
country (around 50 dierent venues in total). This is the culmination of a five month cascade where by the
Marking Programme Leader develops the training materials with her deputies (meeting 1, 2 and 3), who
then train the senior markers (meeting 4 and 5), who then train team leaders (meeting 6 and 7) who then
train markers (meeting 8).
Supervising markers (seniors and team leaders) get two days of training. One day of training on the mark
scheme, and the second day of training for their role as supervisors. All training days usually run from 9.30
until 16.30/17.00.
Did the NAA reported to us that ETS had said that the change from online to face-to-face training would lead
to a long delay?
At the meeting with NAA on 19 Feb 2008, the regulator was given reassurances to the opposite at the
meeting with NAA to discuss the results of the proof of concept pilot, and as early as January, NAA had
assured us that venues were already being sourced as a contingency in line with the steps detailed in section
xi of the Proof of Concept—Design document.
Kathleen Tattersall: We are going to receive an
interim report in October and I would expect the
publication to be some time after that—perhaps
about November.
Isabel Nisbet: Lord Sutherland is reporting orally to
the Ofqual committee in mid-October. So far, until
he sees all the written evidence that has come in, he
has not committed himself to a final date, but I think
that it will be within a few weeks after that.
Q236 Chairman: Time is of the essence.
Kathleen Tattersall: Absolutely. We really want to
impact on the 2009 tests, and the report should
provide us with a basis on which to do that.
Chairman: This has been a very good session. We will
go away and decide whether we will have any more
sessions, and indeed, whether Lord Sutherland will
come to the Committee. We look forward to meeting
you again soon.
Kathleen Tattersall: Thank you all very much
indeed.
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At what point were markers trained in the handling of what we considered to be over-ambitious software? Was
that done in early May as well?
Markers were supposed to have completed an online training module before they arrived for their face-
to-face training in May. As this was to be conducted from home, this wasn’t something we could observe,
though we have heard reports that markers had considerable problems with this system. There also seemed
to be no eective method of confirming exactly who had and who hadn’t completed this module before
markers attended their face-to-face training.
The training module did not go live in time for supervising markers to have experienced the system,
meaning they were unable to answer queries on the system at the training meetings in May. Any queries on
the system had to be answered by ETS representatives, who weren’t always present at the training meetings.
This left the majority of our observers unconvinced that markers had been given enough training on the new
ETS software systems.
Also for clarification
Markers entered “question level data” rather than “item level data” onto the OMC system.
Q206—number of interventions
The Regulation & Standards Division of QCA had no formal involvement in the process of awarding the
test operations contract for 2008–12, although Ofqual’s Acting Chief Executive, Isabel Nisbet, was a
member of the QCA Executive at the time the contract was awarded. From the summer of 2007, the National
Curriculum Assessments monitoring team (“NCA monitoring”) was invited to comment on planned
changes which set out the ways in which markers were to be supervised and quality assured. NCA
monitoring raised some concerns at that early stage with NAA.
On 2 November 2007, NCA monitoring provided feedback to NAA on marker training for the marking
pilot which said that communications in the broadest sense gave rise for concern. For example, how contacts
with markers were managed; ease of access for venues.
ETS carried out a “proof of concept pilot”, examining the e ect on the quality of marking of four new
approaches to on-line standardisation and quality assurance. In February 2008, NCA monitoring, together
with the Director of Regulation & Standards, Isabel Nisbet, attended two presentations on the outcomes of
the pilot. On 21 February, Isabel Nisbet wrote to the Director of NAA (David Gee) expressing the
regulator’s support for the four approaches which had been trialled, but conveying two “significant
concerns”. The first was a systems—based concern that the volume of marker use at key points in the
marking process might compromise the ability of ETS to operate e ectively. This was to be tested through
load testing and NCA Monitoring asked to be kept informed of the outcomes. The second concern was that
the delays experienced in delivering the pilot and its report could indicate that the resources being assigned
by ETS [were] insu cient to meet the required deadlines and standards of quality.
David Gee replied on 6 March, agreeing to provide updates on load testing and sharing the regulator’s
concerns about the management of the pilot, but commenting that it was managed by a di erent team in
ETS than would be involved in the 2008 operational cycle. On 21 April, in response to a further request from
the NCA monitoring team for an update on load testing, David Gee wrote that significant work was done
by ETS over the previous six weeks, and concluded that the data would provide assurances that preparation
is well in hand.
In April 2008 Ofqual was set up within QCA. On 28 April Kathleen Tattersall, newly-appointed Chair of
Ofqual, had an introductory meeting with Ed Balls, Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families.
In a general overview of the issues facing Ofqual over the summer period, Kathleen Tattersall mentioned,
among other things, the heightened risk of there being a new contractor responsible for the delivery of the
National Curriculum tests.
The NCA monitoring team observed a sample of the ETS marker training events and, following a training
session on 10 May 2008, reported concerns to NAA about attendance of markers and the rigour of their
selection. During May, conversations with markers alerted the team to delays in the delivery of scripts for
marking and to problems in communications with ETS.
On 3 June 2008, Isabel Nisbet wrote to David Gee to seek reassurance from NAA that marking of
National Curriculum tests will be completed and the scripts returned to schools by the deadline of Tuesday
8 July 2008. Specific reassurances were sought about aspects of marking, communications and
administration on marker training. The letter also informed NAA that Ofqual would hold a formal
accountability meeting, chaired by Kathleen Tattersall, with NAA on 3 July. The decision that Ofqual’s chair
should chair the meeting with NAA was made on the basis of risk.
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David Gee replied on 11 June addressing each of the specific questions raised in Ofqual’s letter of 3 June
His letter stated that the NAA was heavily focused on ensuring the delivery of results to schools by 8 July.
Despite a number of challenges created by inadequacies in the ETS delivery process system David Gee had
extensive reassurances that this would be achieved. However, in order to reduce any risks further he
dedicated significant additional NAA resource to support ETS in meeting its contractual obligations.
On 11 June, the NCA monitoring team took up a long-standing invitation to visit the distribution centre
in Dewsbury. Following that meeting the NCA team raised concerns with NAA about the apparent absence
of control processes in the management of scripts.
In mid-June, DCSF asked Ofqual for a short briefing note to show to Jim Knight, Minster of State for
Schools and Learners, before a Ministerial meeting with NAA about test delivery. Ofqual’s note stated that
it was our clear impression at that time that there is a high risk that all schools will not receive their results
by 8 July as a result of marking not being completed and problems with the ETS marking and distribution
systems. The note went on to report problems with preparations for the following week’s level setting
meetings because of insucient marks on the ETS data system.
On 2 July 2008, David Gee wrote to Isabel Nisbet notifying Ofqual that NAA would be in breach of one
requirement of the Code of Practice because some schools would not receive all their data by the
published date.
The accountability meeting took place on 3 July. Following the meeting, Kathleen Tattersall decided that
Ofqual should set up an independent inquiry into the regulation and delivery of the 2008 tests, and on 4 July
she wrote to the Secretary of State informing him of that decision. Her letter also gave some reassurance
about the quality of the marking of the tests:
“While results will be delayed and I cannot predict the volume of reviews that schools will request
this year, from the processes we have observed, the quality of marking is at least as good as previous
years and justifies issuing the results.”
On 4 July, NCA monitoring requested from NAA details of the marking panels that ETS needed to set
up to complete the marking process and also details of the quality assurance arrangements for these panels.
Visits were made to marking panels on 16 July.
Starting on 25 July 2008, Ofqual has held weekly regulatory meetings with NAA (observed by DCSF) to
monitor progress in identifying and marking unmarked scripts and in the review processes. Those meetings
continue. A problem, particularly in the earlier meetings, was the di culty of obtaining a precise estimate
of the total number of unmarked scripts and assurance that they had all been identified and were being
dealt with.
On 28 July, NAA announced that it would take over from ETS the management of the review process in
2008. Ofqual publicly welcomed that announcement.
On 30 July, Isabel Nisbet wrote to David Gee expressing concerns about the adequacy of ETS’s resources
and quality assurance for marking the remaining unmarked scripts and asking NAA about their intentions
regarding deadlines and charges for reviews. David Gee replied on all these points on 8 August.
Concerns about data on the system were particularly relevant to the publication of Key Stages 2 and 3
data. These must be produced to the standards set out in the O ce of National Statistics Code of Practice
and free from any political interference. DCSF’s Head of Profession for Statistics (Malcolm Britton) twice
wrote to Ofqual seeking advice for him to consider when deciding whether to publish results for Key Stages
2 and 3 at national and local authority level.
Ofqual’s replies focused largely on what evidence was available on the quality of marking and the
confidence that could be placed in the outcomes. The advice sent on 4 August (about the Key Stage 3 results)
included:
“Ofqual recognises that the confidence of teachers, parents, pupils and the wider public has been
damaged by the problems in delivering this year’s national curriculum tests…[T]he credibility of
results published at this time will no doubt be challenged. However, in providing advice to inform
your decision on publication, Ofqual needs to consider whether there is hard evidence to call into
question the quality of the figures which you are considering publishing this year, compared with
previous years, to the extent that would justify a decision not to publish or require publication with
significant reservations. … [F]rom the processes that we have observed to date, there is no evidence
of widespread problems with the quality of the marks at Key Stage 3 that would justify withholding
publication of the provisional results at national level.”
Similar advice had been sent out on 28 July in relation to the Key Stage 2 results.
September 2008
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Members present:
Mr Barry Sheerman, in the Chair
Annette Brooke Mr John Heppell
Mr David Chaytor Mr Graham Stuart
Witness: Lord Sutherland of Houndwood KT, gave evidence.
Chairman: Lord Sutherland, it is a pleasure to have
you here in front of our Committee. You know the
rules, as you are a Member of the House of Lords,
and in that wonderful group of people in this
country who do not have to appear before the
Committee.
Lord Sutherland: Nobody told me that.
Chairman: I think one of your colleagues at one
stage had a rather interesting relationship with
Gwyneth Dunwoody, when he was advising on blue-
skies approaches in No.10, and refused to appear
before her Committee. It is a pleasure for us that you
have agreed to appear before our Committee, and
for someone who has known you and your work in
education for quite some time—I think we first met
when you were Vice-Chancellor of London
University—
Lord Sutherland: That is right. That was a while ago.
Q237 Chairman: It is a while ago. You know why we
are here. We have been looking at the mess that
occurred last summer. Indeed, I have to recount to
you a story that I picked up in the first week of term
after the Christmas holidays at Almondbury High
School in my constituency, where I went, as one does
in one’s constituency, merely to see how the school
was getting on. Out of the blue, they said, “We’re still
waiting for our last level 3 SATs tests to come back.”
I wanted to make sure that that was absolutely
accurate, so I rang them this morning, and they said,
“Mr Sheerman, you won’t believe this: the last 12
scripts arrived this morning.” Now, there is quite a
long gap between today and the date that we all
know they should have arrived in July. So, there we
are: I just mention that as a little bit of background.
Lord Sutherland, we know what this is about. It is to
find out what went wrong and prevent it happening
again. Would you like to say what you found in
your inquiry?
Lord Sutherland: If I could make a short opening
statement, I would then be interested in taking
questions and perhaps even having a discussion.
There are important things to work out.
Chairman: I do not think we can have discussions in
this Committee. Hansard does not take kindly to it.
Lord Sutherland: Thank you, Chairman, for inviting
me, and also for focusing on the report and on the
issues so promptly in July, as you did. I think you
were the first above the line, making very important
questions plain and putting them into the public
arena. I found that a good starting point for me. I
recognise that the Committee’s work has been
integral throughout the sad period since June or July,
when things started to go wrong. The sessions you
held before the school holidays were very important.
You picked out a number of major issues, and I was
able to build on that in the evidence I asked for and
in some of the cross-examinations that I carried out.
I share what is evident: you, like me, were hugely
disappointed in the treatment of teachers, pupils,
markers, parents and school governing bodies, and
what they had to put up with. I had direct evidence of
this in a number of schools and from talking to head
teachers of my own acquaintance. They were badly
let down this summer, and there is no excuse for it in
the end. I hope that my report has been instructive in
providing a description and an analysis of what went
wrong, finding the problems that were encountered
in the delivery. I hope too that there are messages for
the future. This is not simply a matter of looking
backwards. As you will have read, I identified a
number of contributory factors—there were very
many of them, in fact, which was part of the
diculty. Had there been just one issue, one would
have identified that fairly quickly and dealt with it in
the report. But, in the end, one of the key questions
that remains with me, and one of the key causes of
the di culty, was the lack of end-to-end testing of
the system. That was a major failure on the part of
the Educational Testing Service, and a primary
cause, because if you do not test the system end to
end, you do not anticipate problems that you could
have anticipated—you would know that a di culty
there will have repercussions further down the line.
ETS failed pupils, schools, markers and teachers,
and it has primary, but not sole, responsibility for
what went wrong. There were a number of
significant management failings within the
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority,
particularly in its management of risk, and no doubt
we will talk about that in due course. As I suggested,
it is not simply a backward-looking report: I hope
that it looks forward. I made a number of
recommendations, 19 in all, if I counted correctly,
and I wanted to take a constructive and forward-
looking approach. There are some specific
recommendations that I regard as especially
important to improve the system for the future.
First, there must be full end-to-end testing of the
system, not just checking that the individual bits
work within themselves, but that when you link
them up, they run as a single operation that does not
have the hitches we discovered last year. Secondly, I
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believe that forms of modernising the test delivery
process should be put in place, and I dare say that we
will look at that in your questions. We will have an
important opportunity to legislate for the regulation
of tests on the same statutory footing as the
regulation of exams in the forthcoming children,
skills and learning Bill. I hope that we make the most
of that opportunity. Taken as a whole, those three
key recommendations, and the others that stem from
them, give the Department for Children, Schools
and Families, QCA and Ofqual a clear direction for
the future. I know that the Committee has taken a
great interest in establishing the quality of the tests
and the results. I recognise that that is fundamental,
and it is important that you continue to do so: you
are a continuing body—my job is ocially done. I
believe, however, that the independent regulator,
Ofqual, performs a vital role in that respect. I believe
that the relationship between Ofqual and you is an
important marker for the future, and it will be a
critical way for it to report to Parliament. It has the
role of overseeing the tests to ensure that “pupils get
the marks their work deserves”. Many people have
asked whether they can trust the 2008 results—it is a
question that I have asked. Fundamentally, Ofqual
has to determine that, and I believe that a report is
forthcoming. It is important that it is an evidence-
based report—I anticipate that it will be. An
important part of the evidence, for example, will
look at the outcome of the reviews process, which is
not yet complete—you alluded, Chairman, to some
of the implications of that in your opening remarks.
It must look, too, at the content of test questions and
mark schemes, marker training—that is an
important part of quality in the system—and, as I
said, the outcome of the reviews process, which is not
yet complete. Ofqual has expertise in all those areas
and, more importantly, it has the responsibility to
consider that. Having said that the question of
quality is one that has to be finally decided in
relation to last year, there are two elements to that,
which I came across in preparing the report and
which I would like to share with you and comment
on later. First, the national curriculum test markers
are a small constituency of dedicated
professionals—they are often teachers or retired
teachers. I want to pay tribute to them, because
despite the di culties that they faced—and they
were severe and significant at times—they
persevered to mark 9.8 million scripts to the best of
their ability in increasingly problematic contexts. We
have relied on these same people in previous years,
and I have no doubt that we will continue to do this
year and perhaps into the future. They need to be
properly supported—and they were not this year—
and that is fundamental to the quality of what goes
on. I also believe, more than that, that they need to
be consulted about the delivery of the test system
and how it can be modernised and the quality
improved. They have the experience—many of them
over a number of years—that would be highly
relevant to ensuring that the best quality is identified
and continues into the future. If markers find it
di cult to access training—some of them did, and
that is itemised in the report; or if they find it di cult
to receive support, as the lines that were meant to be
available to them were not always functioning
properly; or if they are rushed in their marking
because of poor administration and scripts arriving
late in the day or at the wrong time, that can a ect
quality severely. I want to stress for the future that
paying attention to the role, support and, indeed,
wisdom that markers have about the system is
important. The recommendations that I have made
focus on delivery issues—that was the job that I had
to do—but they are also pertinent to ensuring the
quality of test results in future. One element of
that—and I have referred to it already—is ensuring
that Ofqual has adequate powers to carry out its
task, and that is a matter for legislation. That is
slowly being floated o shore. The process began last
April, and it will be complete when the Bill that we
all anticipate will be introduced goes through
Parliament. Equally, I stress the importance of
having the voice of the marking community
available to those administering and running the
system. If we put those in place, there will be
significant practical steps forward. That is as much
as I want to say at the moment, and I am happy to
pick up questions and comments.
Q238 Chairman: Lord Sutherland, thank you for
your introductory remarks. Can I open the
questioning by saying that we hoped this would be a
session with you for an hour or so—perhaps an hour
and a half—and a session with Ken Boston? At first,
we were given an indication that he, too, would
appear before the Committee today, but he found he
was unable to do so. As you know, he tendered his
resignation, and it was not accepted, but he is
currently on what I suppose most of us would regard
these days as gardening leave, and he is not available
to the Committee. Does that surprise you?
Lord Sutherland: I do not know if “surprise” is the
word, but it disappoints me and I hope he will be
available. I am sure there is quite a lot you could
learn in a process such as this that would help the
development of the system in future.
Q239 Chairman: It does slightly open up a problem.
When you were asked to look into this matter, it was
the Secretary of State who did so. Do you think it
would have been a better arrangement, even if he
had initiated it, if your report came back to this
Committee?
Lord Sutherland: The first approach I had was from
Ofqual. Immediately thereafter, I was also
approached by the Department. I pointed out
something that I am sure that it already knew—that
nobody wanted two reports and it would be sensible
to have one. However, I had a reporting line to
Ofqual which, from within the old QCA, properly
realised that there was something which would
benefit from external scrutiny. That is why it got in
touch with me.
Q240 Chairman: Do you think any of the characters
who played a significant part in last summer’s drama
have been badly treated?
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Lord Sutherland: Not to my knowledge.
Q241 Chairman: Well, some of us have always
respected Ken Boston as a highly qualified and wise
person at the head of QCA. As I read your report,
and reflected on the evidence that had already been
given to the Committee, I did wonder sometimes
why he had been suspended from his role. Here is a
talented man, presumably still drawing his salary.
However, as you said in your report’s introductory
remarks, the breakdown in the summer was a multi-
faceted, multi-causal problem. I will ask you again:
do you think it is absolutely necessary that Ken
Boston should carry the can on this?
Lord Sutherland: In a sense, we have all been pre-
empted on that, because he resigned when he read
the report. The QCA board, for its own reasons,
which I am not directly aware of, decided it should
be suspension rather than resignation. He made the
judgment—it is much to his credit and honour that,
if he felt responsible as a public servant, he should
stand aside.
Q242 Chairman: He is rather an old-fashioned,
honourable gentleman, is he not?
Lord Sutherland: Yes, I have high regard for Ken
Boston and what he has done.
Q243 Chairman: Your report, as I read it, surprised
me, in the sense that the number of failures are
surprising. It is like a road accident: it seems like a
very simple thing, but when you analyse it, there are
probably 10 dierent causes of the most simple
accident. However, this one did look like something
of an accident waiting to happen. The feeling we got
when we took evidence from other parties, was that
people totally over-estimated the capacity of the new
company to fulfil the function. Did you get the same
feeling as us that people here in the UK, who were
part of the process of drawing up and awarding the
contract, thought that this rather large and globally
active company was going to come with all its
resources and knowledge and take on this contract?
However, it started a new company as an o shoot
with no experience and hardly any personnel. Was
that not something of a surprise to you?
Lord Sutherland: It is easy to be dazzled by expertise
that is well presented. No doubt, ETS made a very
good presentation and went through the long-due
process—an iterative process—of putting in a tender
for this work. It is evident, however, that it was not
up to it. I say that quite explicitly: it did not deliver
on the contract that it signed, and therefore it did not
keep the promises that it had made.
Q244 Chairman: Why do you think that it decided
that it could not give evidence to you?
Lord Sutherland: You would have to ask it, but let us
hang on to that, as it is an important question. I have
no doubt that there was adequate evidence available
to me to make the judgments that I believe are
definitive about the role of ETS in this report. It
believed at one point, in view of something that it
said to your Committee—you were aware of this—
that there was an embargo on it in some way. I spoke
to the QCA chief executive, and he wrote to ETS to
make it plain that there was no such embargo. That
is point one. Point two: we extended the period
available to it to submit evidence. Point three: it
chose not to do so. Point four: the evidence was
available to us, through the QCA documentation—
we had all the exchanges of correspondence and
contracts and so on, so I believe I had adequate
evidence.
Q245 Chairman: Is there not a danger, Lord
Sutherland? I do not believe in conspiracy theories—
and I know that you chair a Committee similar to
ours in the House of Lords—but if you were sitting
in my place with my colleagues, you would see that,
first, we cannot get Ken Boston back to talk to
Committee. Secondly, we cannot get the company
after this time, after due reflection and after things
have settled back. Those are two important sources
of evidence for our inquiry, which is separate from
yours, with a slightly di erent focus, and their
absence sits rather oddly when you are trying to get
to the truth of the matter.
Lord Sutherland: I did not know the position over
Ken Boston before you told me just now. Putting
these two things together does not occur to me as an
obvious thing to do, but perhaps you have
background information that I do not have. As for
the ETS thing, in the end, the company cut its losses
and left, repaying, I have to say, significant sums of
money. It accepted that it was not delivering, to the
tune of nearly £25 million. For an American
company, that is a big acceptance. It accepted that.
I suppose, in its position, it thought, “We are a long
way away.” Head o ce said, “Oh, just pull up the
drawbridge; we’ve had enough.” However, I did
have a later correspondence when my conclusions
were evident, and I wanted to be sure that the senior
o cial within ETS was aware how critical some of
my conclusions were. I wrote to him, giving him that
information—not sending advance copies or
anything, but just saying, “This is what we are going
to say about ETS”. I had a very interesting and
discursive letter in response. There were one or two
helpful details—he could put numbers, facts and so
on, in place—but there was no response of the kind
that would lead me to go back to square one and
start again.
Q246 Chairman: Have we had a sight of that letter?
Lord Sutherland: I have no idea.
Q247 Chairman: Could we have sight of it?
Lord Sutherland: All the materials are deposited
with DCSF. I am sure you know the routes to obtain
information of that kind. I have not kept any of
these documents. They are the last thing I want lying
around my flat, I have to say.
Q248 Chairman: So it is available. Lord Sutherland,
you can see me smiling, but I do want to ask you a
more di cult question to conclude my opening
questions. In a sense, when a government set up an
inquiry, sometimes it is set up to take the heat out of
the situation and to take the focus o the Secretary
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of State and the Government, who might be seen as
responsible for the debacle of last summer. As you
said, a lot of people were hurt and upset by that
process. Do you feel at all that you were used by the
Government to help them to evade accountability
for their role in this mess?
Lord Sutherland: I will say straight out, if they
thought they were going to do that with me, they got
the wrong man. The report is firm—as you say, it
contains many criticisms, including comments on
procedures that relate to links in the Qualifications
and Curriculum Authority and the Department for
Children, Schools and Families. That is firm and
clear. I have to say that there was no attempt to
interfere with the processes, and I made it plain at the
outset, that if there were any such attempts I would
go to the press immediately, and I think they
believed me.
Q249 Chairman: I was asking you a slightly dierent
question, Lord Sutherland, from the one that you
answered. If you look at what was going on in the
Department and in QCA at the time that we are
discussing, this was not a ship that was changing
course: this was a ship where the engine was being
changed during the voyage. Perhaps a navigational
system was being changed, to use the analogy or
push it a little too far. At the time, if you were Ken
Boston sitting there as captain of the QCA ship, with
all these fundamental changes going through—there
was no legislation, but there were shadow
authorities, totally changing the nature of the QCA,
changing its role, splitting it up, shadow this,
shadow that—was that not rather di cult for the
leadership and the captain of the ship in QCA,
having all that going on as well as a major new
contract that had been arrived at only recently?
Lord Sutherland: It is a big job—no doubt about
that. On the other hand, in a position like that, you
need to be a big leader to carry it through. You get a
remit letter each year, and if at some point you say,
“I do not have the resource or the capacity to do all
of that,” that is the time to say it. However, if
someone accepts the remit and goes with it, the
expectation is that you believe you can deliver this
year.
Chairman: Okay, let us open up the questions to
colleagues, or they will be very unhappy. Stuart.
Mr Stuart: Or Graham, even.
Chairman: I am terribly sorry—Graham Stuart—it
is because I was talking to a Scot.
Q250 Mr Stuart: Two Scottish Christian names in a
row. Lord Sutherland, who do you believe is
ultimately responsible for delivering proper exam
results across the country?
Lord Sutherland: In the end, it is the Department and
the Secretary of State. Below them, they have an
arrangement where they issue a remit and resource
for QCA, as it currently is, to deliver that.
Q251 Mr Stuart: Do you think that your report is
explicit enough about that? I try to imagine a lay
person reading it and being clear about it. In it, as
you laid out the various organisations, the DCSF
sounded like just one more player rather than the top
of the pyramid and the driving force behind the very
structures that you were describing. Do you think
that is a fair criticism of your report?
Lord Sutherland: I hope that I am clear on that. The
DCSF set the policy, and it provides the resources—
that is its responsibility. It has to ensure that delivery
is possible, which means it must have an appropriate
mechanism. It believed it had, and on the basis of the
two or three previous years it did have, because
delivery was made. Below that, we come to QCA,
which has a set of responsibilities, and so on, down
the system it goes. In my understanding, the DCSF
is responsible for policy, resource and setting up the
overall mechanism. The kind of mechanism that is
set up relates to how well it might work.
Q252 Mr Stuart: Defining the Department’s
responsibilities in that way is very convenient for
Ministers who wish to push responsibility away;
they could say they did it in the best odds. One could
take issue with the point you just made about the
previous three years. There was a failure in 2005,
there were di culties in 2006–07. It made it a rather
peculiar situation in that it might have looked like it
was working, but it was only just. It made it rather a
peculiar decision by the QCA to take such a
monumental risk for 2008.
Lord Sutherland: You mean to do it at all?
Q253 Mr Stuart: Yes, and particularly to do it in the
way they did. Did you manage to find out to what
extent that was being driven by Ministers, being
driven by the Department? On the face of it, it is hard
to see why the QCA would want to enter into such a
high-risk strategy if they were not being pushed by
someone else who was going to be able to
commission an independent report and push the
responsibility away afterwards.
Lord Sutherland: You have to ask QCA why they
accepted the remit they were given and they did. You
have to ask why and what di erences there were that
year. I do—
Q254 Mr Stuart: I wondered whether you did,
because you did the inquiry.
Lord Sutherland: I do genuinely believe that they
thought that in ETS they had a winner. The external
signs were justification for the view they took. I am
critical of some aspects of that but they believed that
they had a winner and that they could build on the
previous experience of Edexcel. There was adequate
handover and coaching arrangements and so on in
place. Are you questioning the very idea of there
being an arms-length arrangement with anybody?
Most of Government is doing this now and I will put
in brackets—this is not in the Report; it is a point I
am making to you—I believe there is so much of that
now that it is time to pause and say, “Have we got the
best possible arrangement that allows such an
allegedly arms-length delivery?”. It sounds grand,
but the arm is a real thing and messages move up and
down. It is happening across Government. There are
choices such as whether you use the private sector to
deliver Government policy or not. I would be
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surprised if it was not necessary in a whole range of
areas, but that is a good reason to review how well it
is working. That has been done in this particular
case. One of the things that they had started doing
and which it is important we hang on to is the
process of setting up an independent regulator,
which was desperately needed—this is one of the
complications. If that regulator is given the powers
and the resources to do the job, many of the
diculties could be avoided.
Q255 Mr Stuart: You have put your finger on the
exact issue, which is that there is this tendency to use
the private sector. The question is whether it is
appropriate in a democracy and for Ministers
accountable to Parliament. In a democracy you are
supposed to be able to identify those you can vote
for who in turn take responsibility for what goes well
or goes badly. When they find it convenient to have
arms-length organisations doing the critical bits,
Ministers can wash their hands of it. I do not know
whether you intended that Ed Balls should be able to
use your report to wash his hands of responsibility
for last year’s fiasco. It took a long time and a lot of
parliamentary e ort to get him to say the word
“sorry”.
Lord Sutherland: I understand that he has said sorry.
I am not in constant communication with him. This
is not a close relationship, you should be aware of
that.
Mr Stuart: Fine.
Lord Sutherland: It is about how you run your
country. You have opened up a big issue and, I warn
you, I am a philosopher and we could go on a long
time on this. If the Government is going to run the
country using private agencies—this has been the
track for 20 years—it is not good enough to say that
in this particular case it is an excuse. It is a much
bigger issue. You are right, however, that you have
to watch very carefully. I had the Secretary of State
in to give formal evidence. He did give formal
evidence and he was asked the same hard questions
as everyone else. I had one of the other Ministers in
to do the same, and the permanent secretary, so it
was a formal process of review, including evidence
from those individuals. I hear the words you use: I
hope nobody is washing their hands of anything,
because the critical thing is to get it right next year
and the years after.
Q256 Mr Stuart: One further question, taking you
back to your evidence a little while ago to the
Chairman on the subject of ETS not giving evidence.
The way you told that slightly di ered from what we
have heard, or at least is a simpler version. ETS said
they did write. It took some time in the light of the
closing date of your inquiry for QCA to respond. In
fact they said that, in the meantime, because they
were asking for permission to give evidence to your
inquiry, they wrote to ask you to give them an
extension of the period. You refused to extend the
period, QCA took ages to come back to them and by
the time collectively everyone came back to them to
give evidence they said they had given up—wrapped
it up. They were paying millions of pounds in
compensation and they were not prepared to play
any more. Is it not fair to say, therefore, that the
version of events you gave just now is perhaps an
over-simplification or do you think there is no merit
in ETS’s arguments?
Lord Sutherland: I can tell you on the point on which
I have direct evidence that I did not refuse an
extension. They were o ered an extension and that
is on the record. The extension was quite adequate in
terms of the seriousness of the matter. This was a
£156 million contract. We had di culty getting in
touch with them—they had left their o ces in this
country and were in the States. Getting the
individual who would take responsibility was not
always easy, but they were given an extension—I can
tell you that for sure.
Q257 Mr Chaytor: May I ask about the procurement
process, which I was fascinated to discover from
your report was called Project Tornado? Somebody
in the QCA had a sense of humour, I must say. You
conclude, Lord Sutherland, that the procurement
procedure was sound, but then you go on to list a
whole series of criticisms of the procedure, many of
which seemed very substantial to most members of
the Committee. So, are you absolutely confident, in
the light of all the criticisms you make, that the
procurement procedure was sound?
Lord Sutherland: That is a point on which I could
have been clearer. The procurement procedure was
sound in this very clear respect: that they followed to
the letter the procedures laid down by the O ce of
Government Commerce. They went through that
process, and I have seen how they took evidence and
how they made their judgments. They made the
judgments first on the basis of capability, without
looking at the question of how much it was going to
cost. All that side was correct. What I then go on to
say, and I think this is a message for how these things
are done, is that there is additional due diligence
which I believe should have been carried out—I
think others have made that point as well—but it is
not required. I want to make it plain again that the
job that PricewaterhouseCoopers did in due
diligence was exactly what they were asked to do
within the Government’s procedures and guidelines,
which was to look at financial stability and whether
it was a viable company, and so on. But there were
clearly reputational issues that were not discovered
and should have been. That I regarded as outside the
formal procurement process. I did not want them
coming back saying, “Of course you said so on and
so on, but we followed all the rules.” Well, they did.
I did put this to the board of QCA: if you were
o ering a company a contract of this size, would you
not have done a bit more checking on the reputation
of the body? They did not, and that was a failure.
Q258 Mr Chaytor: In light of what you just said,
would it not be more accurate to say that the
adherence to the procedure was sound or complete,
but the procedure itself had significant deficiencies,
which you just referred to?
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Lord Sutherland: That is a distinction I recognise.
The procedure was there; they followed it right
through. It is a procedure that is laid down for every
government contract.
Q259 Mr Chaytor: But in terms of your
recommendations, based on the findings, you are
actually recommending that certain changes are
made to the procedure.
Lord Sutherland: Yes, other things should have been
done. I accept that.
Q260 Chairman: So who should have googled ETS?
Should it have been PricewaterhouseCoopers or
should it have been QCA? Because, as someone said
to us, you only have to google to get all that press
comment that was already there.
Lord Sutherland: PricewaterhouseCoopers did what
they were asked to do. They performed according to
contract, which everyone had. So I would not lay the
blame there. So I think it should have been QCA,
and I did put it to their board.
Q261 Mr Chaytor: On the role of
PricewaterhouseCoopers, your report says that they
were asked to do the following tests. They produced
the Dun & Bradstreet rating for each company, they
examined the last three years’ published financial
statements, and then they did a review of press
information over the past 12 months. That is the key
flaw, because, had they carried out a review of press
information over the last three years, the same
period for which they published the financial
statements, that would have highlighted a number of
press reports in serious publications in the United
States and, I think, in the UK, that would have given
a dierent picture. Is it conceivable that a large
multinational management consultancy such as
PWC would not have known of the activities of ETS
in the United States, and its track record prior to the
12 months for which it did the review of press
information? I would find that remarkable.
Lord Sutherland: I have two things to say on that.
PWC is a professional body—it had a job to do and
it did it. There are two constraints on how much
testing you carry out and how far back you look.
One constraint is the 12-month period and that was
given to them, and the other is that you look at
contracts worth more than £20 million a year, and
that was also given to them.1 Within those
constraints, PWC did what it was asked to do and so
I would say that it delivered on its contract. The
question is why, if we were dealing with such an
important company, was more not known about it in
the system, including in QCA and by those who
would be working with it. Indeed, I would have
thought—this is the point of your question—that
they would have had some international contacts
whom they could have asked, but they did not, and
that is a severe failure. When you go back to where
blame lies it is not simply ETS, it is the checking.
1 See Ev 47
Q262 Mr Chaytor: Is it absolutely clear that not a
single person in the Department for Children,
Schools and Families, QCA, National Assessment
Agency or Ofqual went on to their computer and
googled ETS?
Lord Sutherland: I cannot vouch for what several
thousand people did or did not do.
Q263 Mr Chaytor: There is no evidence that
anybody did that?
Lord Sutherland: No, and that is my criticism: not
that nobody did it but that there were people
responsible who should have done it.
Q264 Mr Chaytor: In your findings and
recommendations, some of your criticisms are
specific to QCA or the DCSF observers and so on,
and others are expressed passively, with more
reluctance to attribute responsibility: “Such-and-
such a process should have been carried out”, for
example. Is that conscious or just how the report is
written? Sometimes you are very clear as to who was
at fault and at other times less so, as if you do not
wish to point the finger of blame.
Lord Sutherland: The main driver of the report was
to produce an analysis of what went wrong.
Sometimes it was very clear from that analysis who
should have done what, and sometimes it was a
question of, “What was the arrangement operating
between NAA and QCA?” That is an uncertain area,
and interestingly, given that you suggest that
perhaps my report has not been tough enough, NAA
no longer exists. That is recognition that the
structure there was wrong or uncertain. That is why
sometimes you could not say that it was person X in
NAA or person X within the broader context of
QCA. Do not forget that Ofqual was not a separate
body most of the time, and was only a quasi-separate
body from 1 April 2008. I would have to see specific
examples, but that is probably why occasionally the
criticism is passive.
Q265 Mr Chaytor: Regarding the problems that
were identified in the early stage of the procurement
process, could you remind the Committee what your
recommendations for change are, and whose
responsibility it should be to flag up problems? There
were capacity problems: ETS said that it could
manage with 60 sta , which was a vast
underestimate.
Lord Sutherland: You have to go a bit down the line
that says who is awarding the contract. The contract
and its award is recommended by QCA. QCA is on
the front line in deciding who gets the contract. The
question then becomes, what tests might it or should
it have carried out that it did not? And is there
anything else that should have been done further up
or down the system? I have made some specific
recommendations on that. One of those
recommendations is that I believe that Ofqual
should in future be consulted. It is not its job to
award the contract, but it should be consulted on the
nature and the details of it. The reason for that is that
Ofqual needs to have certain kinds of information if
it is to carry out its quality assurance processes, and
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it was evident that it was not receiving that
information. Unless that is built into the contract
from the start, there will be diculties. That is an
example of why Ofqual should be consulted when
the details are being prepared. I do not believe that
the presence of DCSF observers on various
committees is as clearly based as it should be.
Perhaps there is an assumption that if a DCSF
observer is there and does not say stop, everything
must be all right. We will be told that that is not the
role of DCSF observers. Experience probably varies
from one committee to another because there are a
lot of them around. However, if somebody from the
DCSF or the O ce of Government Commerce
procurement agency is present, their role must be
made clear.
Q266 Mr Chaytor: Are you confident that the
structural changes to the QCA and the
establishment of Ofqual as a separate body will
resolve such procedural di culties in future
contracts?
Lord Sutherland: It is the right direction, but it is a
tight run this year. In the longer term, I hope that the
structural changes will have an impact on future
contracts. I hope that how scrutiny should be
allocated is much clearer in the future.
Q267 Mr Chaytor: Finally, in terms of reputation
and the track record of checks, you do not
recommend that procedure should change to require
a longer period for the press review: it remains as a
review over the last 12 months. Would it not be a
sensible change to the procurement procedure to
make it a press review over the previous three years?
Lord Sutherland: It certainly would be a sensible
procedure. It is the experience of my working life
that when you lay something out very clearly and
put it under the nose of those responsible, you are
able to scrutinise whether they have taken good
account of it. They claim that they are going to.
Q268 Chairman: But Lord Sutherland, on the
procurement question, there was gossip going
around when this all started that the QCA had taken
the lowest tender and that it was cheaper to take on
this new company. From what I have heard in this
Chair, I do not believe that. I think that it was based
more on a desire to not be too reliant on one supplier.
There are not many competitors in this area. You
might have picked up on this in the report and I
might have missed it, but I got the feeling that it was
not about the price. There were very few players in
the area and the QCA wanted a diversity of supply.
As you know, there has recently been controversy
over education maintenance allowances. A di erent
company is having trouble delivering those on time.
What is it called? Liberata. Sorry, I could not
remember the name.
Lord Sutherland: That happens to me sometimes.
Chairman: Is it not interesting that, again, there is a
great reliance on the company? In an inquiry on
individual learning accounts that we conducted
many years ago when I was first Chairman, we
learned lessons relevant to all procurement and all
contracts. I may have missed this in your report, but
what is the general advice that you give? In this case
it seems that there is a lot of reliance on the company.
If you want a diversity of contracts, you cannot
a ord for one of the small number of contractors
that o er the service to not be in business.
Lord Sutherland: There are real issues that this case
has helped to illuminate. You and I will remember
the Student Loans Company, which went
disastrously wrong a number of years ago. Its
headquarters was in Glasgow. There are any number
of examples, such as the Child Support Agency. This
issue comes back to Mr Stuart’s question over the
way in which contracts are awarded and whether this
is a good principle to follow. I have no doubt that
you need the reassurance that there is a good market
with customers who will compete with each other.
There must be choice in case a company proves not
to be adequate. To rea rm the point that you make
about, I have looked in detail at the process, and all
the evidence I have—and it is strong evidence—
suggests that the procurement process marked the
companies on abilities and skills first, before opening
the envelope containing the bid cost. ETS came out
No. 1 on all the indicators and was also the
cheapest—I am convinced that that was not a factor,
I agree with your judgement on that.
Q269 Mr Heppell: I am fascinated by the fact that
the di erence seems to be so great between what the
contractor and the QCA believed to be happening.
ETS were saying that they needed 60 sta , yet at one
stage were employing about 400 sta . A lot of the
pilot tests went wrong, but there did not seem to be
any communication that that had happened. As you
said, end-to-end testing of the system seemed to
disappear altogether. I think that ETS told us that
the original contract was for online training, but the
QCA say that that was not quite what it had said.
That makes me wonder—it does not reflect well on
the QCA whatever way we look at it. They drew the
contract very badly in the first place—with so many
ambiguities and holes in it that it was not going to
stand up—or was it the case that they changed their
mind about it as well?. I wonder about the online
testing—going through it and identifying that it had
not worked very well, suggesting that they do
something else instead—because, obviously,
enormous disruption and extra costs are caused for
the contractor when this happens during a contract.
Am I getting the sense of this right?
Lord Sutherland: I think there was a
misunderstanding. Whether you use the word
“genuine” or not—whatever that may mean—about
online training of markers, ETS believed that that
was the form that the training would take. The QCA
rightly say that the contract did not say that that was
the form it would take—it said that they would be
interested in looking at a proposal that was properly
piloted and showed that online training of markers
would work. There was a pilot and it was not judged
to be adequate. There was a disagreement—not only
did ETS say that they thought there would be online
training of markers, they did not have a reserve plan
either. They could not have deduced from the
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contract that there certainly would be online
training of markers. They did not have a plan B and
they rushed around setting up eye-to-eye, face-to-
face training sessions, which went badly wrong. If
you look at the evidence from markers, they were
appalled at how they were being treated. People
turning up in Manchester were told that their
training was in Birmingham; people were not given
the right date or adequate notice of when the
training session would take place. ETS would say
that there was an ambiguity, but the glass is running
against them considering their other delivery
failures. Whether or not there were other
ambiguities, there is a very strong case for looking at
online marking. That is a dierent ball game and I
am persuaded that it would produce a wide range of
benefits—we might come back to that. There was a
specific ambiguity—they said that they looked at it
in detail, but I do not believe that that is sustainable.
Q270 Mr Heppell: You mentioned the fact that there
was an assessment of each of the bidders before the
bids were actually opened. It would surprise me—as
we told them that—if we had had the facts in front
of us. Is it not the case that the bids should have been
reassessed as soon as they were opened? They must
have thought to themselves that the low cost did not
match with the services they were saying they could
provide. Did that not ring some warning bells?
Lord Sutherland: You made the point that the
original estimate by ETS was that 60 sta would be
allocated—they ended up needing hundreds in
addition to that. That came out of the QCA and
NAA’s pockets; they both had to supply the support
in many cases.2. Certainly, that is one of the probings
that did not take place and, at that stage—you are
right—it should have been a warning signal, leading
to the question, if that is the cost, have they really got
their numbers right?
Q271 Mr Heppell: I am a little intrigued as to what
reputational issues there actually are, because you
seem to be saying that they did an assessment of all
the people and so on. What other things would they
have been looking for if they went online and,
perhaps, searched for ETS? Are we in danger of
talking about gossip? That is my worry.
Lord Sutherland: That is where it takes a bit of
probing. It could just be gossip, but if they have
publicly failed to deliver on contract in previous
years—I am not talking 1920 here, but earlier, within
the current period, of five, six or seven years—that is
one of the questions that you would then ask, if you
had done that probing, to improve their delivery and
performance. Some scathing comments were
published in reputable journals and newspapers in
the States that may or may not have been justified,
but again those were su cient to make you want to
ask questions. I do not know of any major company
that would not have done that kind of probing if
they were bringing on board a relatively early,
completely new player into the game.
2 See Ev 47
Q272 Mr Heppell: But you are saying that we do that
with every Government contract. Am I not right?
Did you not just say that that is the normal
procedure and PricewaterhouseCoopers did not go
beyond that because it did not need to?
Lord Sutherland: That is right: 12 months and £20
million.3
Q273 Mr Heppell: Every other company outside,
you are saying, would go further, but the
Government’s procuring policy does not?
Lord Sutherland: I know of companies that do that
kind of probing, whether by telephone or googling.
If you google first, you will get the press cuttings and
then you say, “Ah, yeah, that’s so and so—no, no.”
But that is a serious report. Perhaps we need to
inquire further. That is what was not done.
Q274 Mr Heppell: And you have a recommendation
that that should be changed and become part of
Government—
Lord Sutherland: I have laid out the facts and
sensible people like yourself can hang on to them
and push them on this.
Q275 Mr Heppell: But could that not have been one
of your recommendations? If this is the fact and all
government procurement works under the same
system, should it not be changed?
Lord Sutherland: If you are asking whether we
recommended that it should be lower than £20
million and before 12 months, there is a general
recommendation that they should probe further into
the companies that they are dealing with.4
Chairman: Thank you, John.
Q276 Annette Brooke: Referring back to your earlier
comment, Lord Sutherland, I think that one of our
Committee’s advisers described this as an accident
or a disaster waiting to happen, given the problems
in 2005, which made it di cult to meet the deadlines
for 2006–07. Why on earth, when changing the
contractor, did we decide to make it even harder and
to change the goalposts so significantly in terms of
the timetable?
Lord Sutherland: That is a perfectly fair, appropriate
and penetrating question, and it is the right one to
ask. Why so many changes and why was the
company not probed? If you have complete
confidence in the company, perhaps you would do
that.
Q277 Annette Brooke: Right. It also seemed that
there was not enough time allocated. Is that QCA or
is it ETS not demanding enough time?
Lord Sutherland: For?
Annette Brooke: For picking up from the previous
contractor and then picking up this year.
Lord Sutherland: I do not believe that that is so. I
believe that there was a long run-in period. The
process of preparing to award the contract was
taking place in autumn 2006, which means that the
3 See Ev 47
4 See Ev 47
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companies bidding for it were thinking about these
things in 2006. The contract was awarded at the
beginning of 2007. That gave 19 months before the
actual delivery. That should be adequate.
Q278 Annette Brooke: Right. So the time is there,
but presumably things did not happen. So what sort
of things did not happen during that period?
Lord Sutherland: I think this is one of the diculties.
There were, clearly, late deliveries on the pilots for
training markers, for example. There were requests
to ETS for an outline of the details of the project and
whether testing had been carried out. Again, that
was not delivered on time, or in good time, as it
should have been. There was a whole series of events
like that. ETS was being questioned, and indeed
money was held back for late delivery of some of the
details in June 2007, a year before the disaster
happened. All those were warning bells, which is
why I am allocating significant responsibility to
those administering the contract.
Q279 Annette Brooke: Did the DCSF know that
there were problems in 2007?
Lord Sutherland: Those responsible—the National
Assessment Authority of the QCA, which was
responsible for withholding cash, for example, and
did—certainly knew. In part, they had a
responsibility, if they thought the issue to be serious,
to refer it upstairs—or escalate it: a piece of civil
service jargon that I have learned to say. If they think
it is going to cause major problems, they have a
responsibility to refer it upstairs. The essence of
much of the di culty was that each problem in itself
seemed to be manageable, but not when you strung
them all together—that, and that, and that, was a
problem. If you are late in delivering here, there will
be a consequence further down the line, and that was
just not taken on board. So, the management of the
contract in the QCA fell down.
Q280 Annette Brooke: Should there have been an
individual responsible for having an overview?
Surely there was such a person?
Lord Sutherland: There was—the chief executive and
the board of the QCA. That was their job.
Q281 Annette Brooke: That was their job. Given that
you have told us there was plenty of time for a
handover, do you think it necessary in the future to
be more specific about the timetable—X should
happen after so many months, and so on? We cannot
say it is just a matter of time here, because so much
did not seem to take place on time.
Lord Sutherland: That clearly was part of the
contract, and there were target dates, which is why,
for example, the money was withheld in June 2007.
That was an early warning shot. There is more than
that and it has to be laid out. Clear dates have to be
specified in the contract, so that those monitoring
and managing the system know when lines are being
crossed and when there are potential failures.
Q282 Annette Brooke: Should there be a named
person responsible for the monitoring, so that it is
not just with the chief executive? Should it be clear,
with someone allocated the job of monitoring such a
timetable?
Lord Sutherland: My understanding was that that
was the responsibility given to the NAA, which is
e ectively a division within QCA. You are quite
right, the Secretary of State, the permanent secretary
and the director of QCA cannot have every detail
constantly in front of them, so the responsibility
was there.5
Q283 Chairman: I am looking at some notes and,
actually, the National Curriculum Assessment
monitoring team—NCA monitoring—was doing
the monitoring. From the account that I have here,
it was constantly monitoring. A lady called Isabel
Nisbet is, very early on, flagging up “significant
concerns”—on 21 February—or “two concerns”.
She and her team seem to have been going at it all the
time, but were being rebu ed by NAA.
Lord Sutherland: The group you are referring to
became Ofqual and were expanded.
Chairman: Yes.
Lord Sutherland: Ofqual and the NAA had their
system within the structure—you referred to it in
your own evidence-taking as a fairly “cosy”
relationship, which can cut various ways—but they
existed within the same organisation, the QCA. The
lines of arm’s-length—dare I say—accountability
were not apparent at that time in the way that they
should be. Isabel Nisbet flagged up—we have given
the evidence about that—a number of points. There
are two aspects, one of which is that she did not
always get the evidence from NAA that she
wanted—
Chairman: They refused to give it on occasions.
Lord Sutherland: I wanted to say in relation to the
question of Annette Brooke that, additional to the
points we discussed about contracts, I would want
built into a contract the management information
necessary if such monitoring is to be carried out.
Ofqual in the future will know that the management
information it needs will be presented on such and
such a date and it will be of this kind and this quality.
That is a very important point about contracts in the
future. That is one aspect. The second aspect is that
very often, Ofqual then—the nascent Ofqual, pre-
Ofqual—was passing the messages back to the
NAA, whereas in the future the right thing to do is
pass them directly to the director.6 I have even
suggested that, in the legislation, Ofqual in the
future should have a responsibility to report to the
DCSF and to this Committee if it feels things are
going awry and if the “We’re not co-operating”
attitude seems to be breaking out.
Q284 Chairman: May I push you a bit further? What
was happening with the NAA? As I read this
evidence, it seems that the NAA is a problem, a
5 Note by witness: The responsibility was assigned to the
NAA.
6 Note by witness: The reference to “director” should be to the
QCA Chief Executive.
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blockage; it refuses to co-operate and give answers
to questions. Has it gone native? What has gone
wrong? Did it get too close to ETS?
Lord Sutherland: Essentially, the status of the NAA
was ambiguous. It looks like a separate organisation
that awards a contract. The NAA is not in a position
to award a contract; it is not a legal entity. It is
eectively a division of the QCA, and divisions
within these organisations often do not have the high
profile that the NAA had. Of course, if you are
basically saying, “NAA, if it’s your job, get on with
it,” the wisdom begins to accumulate with the NAA
and does not move out into the wider organisation.
Q285 Chairman: It gets its own culture?
Lord Sutherland: Yes, the wisdom does not move out
into the wider organisation in the way that the wider
organisation needs if it is to carry out its own
scrutiny in the light of its own responsibilities. I
think the issue was the ambiguity. Perhaps the
position should have been made plainer to the
individuals involved. I am not sure whether ETS
realised that the NAA was not a separate
organisation. I am not sure about it going native.
The di culty was that it was used to fixing things. If
there was a problem, it had a person who knew, and
they would go and fix it. There were just too many
things to fix this time round. If there was a problem,
it tended to take the view, which is very admirable in
some ways, “What are we going to do to sort it out?”,
rather than go shouting at the next stage up the line.
There is something admirable in that, but when it
gets this big, you have real problems.
Chairman: People in this Committee, I know, believe
that there were some extremely good people working
in these organisations who did their best even
though things went wrong.
Lord Sutherland: Yes.
Q286 Mr Stuart: Could you give us a quick insight
into what has happened to the people in the NAA?
As you said, it was a division, but it had its own chief
executive, so perhaps it was the fact that it was in an
ambiguous position that made it all the more
defensive culturally to try to assert itself. What has
happened to the chief executive of the NAA and
other leading people in it?7
Lord Sutherland: I understand he has been
suspended, and I do not know the outcome of the
QCA board deliberation on that. He and Ken
Boston were the two who were suspended.
Chairman: Can we move on? David, you will take us
through risk management.
Q287 Mr Chaytor: Do you think that if the system
had been tested end to end, all or most of the
problems could have been avoided? Is that the key
flaw, the key missing piece?
Lord Sutherland: It would have been a very di erent
position. There may be other di culties, but this was
right at the centre of the problem. What happened in
autumn 2007 would inevitably a ect what comes
7 Note by witness: David Gee (NAA Managing Director)
later. We have not checked how that happens. You
do not troubleshoot in advance. It was too late when
the problems appeared down the line.
Q288 Mr Chaytor: So end-to-end testing should be
part of any future contract?
Lord Sutherland: That is absolutely fundamental.
Q289 Mr Chaytor: In terms of the delays in reporting
or flagging up the problems that were identified over
many months, where does the key responsibility lie?
Can you put your finger on one issue or is it a
collective failure?
Lord Sutherland: I have recommended that there
should be a thorough look at the risk-management
processes in all these organisations: the DCSF, the
QCA and any body to which this is contracted. It
would have been within the NAA, because that was
an extra step on the way, and the more steps you
have, the less sharp some of these problems appear
further up the system. Do not forget: the QCA has a
huge remit and this is just one element of it.
Q290 Mr Chaytor: May I just pick you up on that.
Under the section of the chapter on risk
management entitled “Analysis and Findings”, you
do not make any reference to the DCSF and risk
management, and nor do you make any
recommendation about the DCSF in the two specific
recommendations. That interested me, because you
commented on the DCSF substantially, but you
seem to have let them o the hook when it comes to
drawing things together and making
recommendations for change.
Lord Sutherland: Let us be clear, the fundamental
role in this context of risk management lies with
QCA. They have to deliver, with their chosen
contractor, whatever the mechanisms they put into
place. The role of the DCSF is, from their position,
to be sure that there will be an outcome, but that is
not the detail of risk management and dealing with
individual problems. An issue should not go up to
the Department unless it really is major, but the
problems were not being escalated to the
Department. It asked all the right questions but was
given reassurances from QCA, which was given
reassurances from NAA, which was given
reassurances from ETS. When you are that far from
the action, if you have had three bodies who are
apparently dealing with it, it is very di cult to do
otherwise.
Q291 Mr Chaytor: You draw attention to the lack of
challenge of the DCSF observers on the supervisory
board for the project, but you do not make an
explicit recommendation as to how that problem
could be dealt with in the future.
Lord Sutherland: Yes, there are two things there. One
is that the role of observers is not a generic one—it
varies according to seniority and which committee
they are on and so forth. I recommend that that
should be reviewed and I have put that firmly to the
Department in relation to this evidence. This is
perhaps going beyond, but I believe that a model to
look at would be for each observer to have a set of
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desk instructions as to what their job is, as observer
on that group. That would be good management
without necessarily becoming over-bureaucratic.
The observer needs to know, “Am I just watching?
Am I taking part in the decisions? Am I required to
pass up the line, and if so, what? Because one up
from me will not like it if every time there is a minor
niggle I race to the oce.” A very clear desk
instruction is needed.
Q292 Mr Chaytor: Should that be a specific
recommendation?
Lord Sutherland: There might be better ways of
doing it, but it is now on the record, and if somebody
asks me how we should deal with observers, that is
the kind of response I would give them as a way of
doing it. The role of observers caused a long
confusion. The QCA and Ken Boston had some
beliefs about what they were doing and where they
were. I am sure that you have been on committees
where there are observers. Do you know what they
are doing? Unless you have the desk instructions too,
it is not evident that you can assume how much of
what you say automatically goes back to base, and
how much does not.
Q293 Mr Chaytor: Given your earlier comment
about the ultimate Secretary of State responsibility,
is there nothing at all in respect of the risk
management procedures within the Department
other than this particular point about a clearer brief
for observers on external committees that needs to
be changed? Are you confident that the existing risk
management procedures within the Department are
adequate?
Lord Sutherland: I have said in the report that the
DCSF should, at points, have challenged. I itemised
some of these places in the report. Eventually the
Minister of State asked good and pertinent
questions, to which he did not initially get adequate
answers, so he called in people. Some of the
challenging could have been done by the DCSF
prior to it reaching that level.
Chairman: Annette, you are going to look at the
quality of markers and marking.
Q294 Annette Brooke: I think it is the same process.
I want to look at the markers, follow through to the
quality and then look at whether the children get the
correct results. It is important that they all
interrelate, the last one being the most important
matter. You said quite a bit about markers in your
opening address but there were clearly lots of
rumours abounding: for example, 18-year-olds
being brought in to mark. In fact it was not
necessarily the usual band that got the marking and
I heard of people who were asked so late and were
asked to go to the other end of the country for
training that they thought it was not worth it for the
money. Did we therefore have a dedicated band of
markers with previous experience?
Lord Sutherland: We had a very large number of
markers who did, as far as I could see, a good job, as
they have done in the past. Because of the failure of
the administrative arrangements, there were some
new to the game who did not have the training they
ought to have had. Sadly, alongside that, they did
not have adequate resources and support—someone
they could telephone and automatically get the right
kind of discussion and answer. There were real
failings there, therefore. Because of the timing of
some of this, there was a cultural problem—ETS did
not know the significance of a bank holiday
weekend. The significance is that that is when many
school teachers have some time to do some marking.
Unless they deliver the scripts in time for that, they
are behind and the individuals will be back in the
classroom in another week’s time. It is a very
practical point, but the acculturation did not take
place and so people were being pressed to take on
marking. Someone would say, “I agreed to mark,
provided I got it by 20 May,” or whatever it was,
“and it is now 28 May and I have lower sixth, or
primary A, or year 12,” or whatever, “waiting for me
on Monday morning.” They were put under that
pressure. That can be resolved. How far was it
resolved last year? You raise the specific point of 18-
year-olds and so on, and there are a lot of rumours
about. When I saw that I asked, “What evidence do
we have about who did the marking?” The first point
of evidence is the ETS charts of who was doing the
marking. There was no di culty there. QCA looked
at these in great detail and said, “We do not see any
evidence of someone who is not an appropriate
person doing the marking and being listed and
getting paid for it.” That is the evidence. You will
have to assess this. Some of the evidence from ETS
was not as strong as it should be. I would not say the
same of QCA because by that time they were deeply
worried and they would have carried out a check like
that very rigorously. The question is whether they
had adequate evidence and paperwork. They believe
they did; that is the only evidence I have, and I share
it with you for what it is worth. We now have to wait
for Ofqual’s report on what happened in the system
and what the reviews were, in other words, the
referring back of papers that teachers and head
teachers thought had not been adequately marked.
They will say, as they have said every year, “There are
problems,” or, “You didn’t get this one right,” or,
“This group of children are better”—or in some
cases—“worse than this”. We will have to await the
outcome of that. I agree that this is a fundamental
problem that we have to pay close attention to when
that report comes out.
Q295 Annette Brooke: I seem to recollect that, in
answer to one of my questions, Ken Boston said that
every marker had received adequate training. I do
not have that evidence in front of me, so I say that
with some caution. I am absolutely sure, however,
that he said that to me. It is clear, though, from early
evidence that not every marker had the training that
they should have.
Lord Sutherland: The arrangements were so
disrupted and disruptive of the lives of individuals
that I would be very surprised if the quality of
training of the year before was replicated this year.
This was for the reason I have already given of
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people not being notified of the right place to go and
not having the support online that they reasonably
had hoped for.
Q296 Annette Brooke: Again, it is the degree: you
could make the claim that every marker had had
training, but it might not have been the same quality.
Lord Sutherland: That may be so.
Q297 Annette Brooke: I also seem to recollect that
Ofqual said at a very early stage that they did not
have any concerns about the quality of the marking.
Perhaps because it was a relatively new organisation,
it seemed a rather premature statement.
Lord Sutherland: I remember that being said—it was
said to this Committee, was it not?
Chairman: It was.
Lord Sutherland: When I read your evidence I
thought, “Careful, what are the words there?” As I
remember, the words were, “We had no evidence that
the standards would be lower than previous years.”
There is an interesting episode of “Yes, Minister” in
which the words “We have no evidence” are analysed
in great detail. However, as a result of the reviews,
they have gone back to look at whether that is true.
Q298 Annette Brooke: Finally, in this section, I am
sure that you took evidence from schools and the
media. We had the impression that the schools were
totally dissatisfied with the results, not only because
they had gaps, but because they were not in line with
teachers’ assessments. Would you say that from
what you have seen there were concerns about the
quality of marking?
Lord Sutherland: There are concerns. One piece of
evidence that there are concerns is that a much
higher percentage of papers have been referred back
this year. I think that it is over 5%, whereas it was
under 2% in previous years. That is a big shift, which
is not surprising in view of the noise that there has
been. There is discontent out there, but having said
that, you have to wait for the analysis of the
evidence. I confronted one group of head teachers,
with whom I have regular meetings for other
reasons, and asked what it was like for them. They
are all primary school heads in very dicult schools
in di cult areas, here and in Walsall, and to my
surprise, one of them just said, “No problems: all the
results were in, we were fine; no referrals, and they’re
okay.” So there are di erent stories about in the
system. I had to challenge the head in question and
ask “Are you sure?” and she said, “That’s what
happened in our school.” There was a group from
probably eight schools there at the time and there
was a variety, and that is why it is so essential to have
evidence. That is also why I have proposed, and
indeed recommended, that in future there should be
access to stakeholder or user panels, which should be
set up in advance, so that as the system unrolls
through the year, the Department or QCA or this
Committee does not have a sudden explosion of
things happening on the internet or on our website,
set up by TES or the BBC. There should be a
mechanism for having groups to whom reference can
be made, whom we can ask to tell us the reality. I am
quite convinced that that can be done and that it
would be a helpful way of dealing with the pressure,
which I wholly understand. Our grandchildren will
be going through it very soon. Lots of folks have
good reason to feel strongly about it.
Chairman: We are coming to the end of the sitting,
but we are going to cover a few more topics. Graham
will take us through corporate governance.
Q299 Mr Stuart: I shall try to gallop through this
quickly. We have touched on it already, but to what
extent do you think that the relocation of QCA to
Coventry and, at the same time, the loss of its
regulatory function to Ofqual contributed to QCA
taking its eye o the ball at board level?
Lord Sutherland: I have thought carefully about
that, because I heard what was said. In the end, if
you run an organisation like that—going back to a
point I have made—you get a remit letter and a
resource allocation that you will argue about and
discuss, and those two have to line up, and you either
sign o on it or you do not. You might think that too
much is being asked of you. I have moved
organisations and it is a big issue, especially if
relocation of sta is involved, but if you accept that
it is doable then you have not just sent a message,
you have made a commitment. I understand that
there are additional pressures that we all su er from,
and if this building had to be relocated for six
months, we would all be under pressure in the same
way, but if you have signed up to it, that is a
di erent matter.
Q300 Mr Stuart: So you think it is a meeting of
equals? It all depends on the culture, does it not? The
Ministry might want something to happen and an
individual might think that it will cause di culties
and say, “I don’t think we should do this, Minister,”
and the Minister might say, “Well, I’ve thought
about it and I think you should.” Are you saying that
they really are in a position to say “No, I’m not
doing it”?
Lord Sutherland: You can make a public statement.
The evident one is to say “Well in that case, I’m not
going to continue in this job.” When I was head of
the inspectorate, that was always an option open to
me. If there had been pressure on me from Ministers
that was unacceptable and unsustainable, that was
an option. The similar one I made this time was that
if there was any pressure I would go to the press, and
I would.
Q301 Mr Stuart: That comes back to the heart of
this responsibility issue which we started with. If we
rely on the fact that people will resign their job every
time they are pushed by Ministers to do something
that they should not do, we will not have many
people left in public service. The last thing I would
do is suggest that people involved in public service
are anything other than people of great integrity and
genuine commitment. The reality is that people do
not routinely resign. Again, to suggest that it is their
fault for agreeing to it is to get it completely the
wrong way round. Did the Ministry push this hard?
Short of Ken Boston saying, “I resign,” which looks
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prima donna-ish over such a thing—well, I do not
know. I am just trying to tease out whether you got
it the wrong way round.
Lord Sutherland: I hear what you say. There is no
doubt that that would be the nuclear option that we
should never rely on—but it is there. There are ways
in which you can make a clear and straightforward
point about this. Ken made his claims about the
organisation before and how well it would operate
and how well it would not, but I did not even see a
letter back from QCA saying, “You have asked us to
do all of this; it is too much.”
Q302 Mr Stuart: Fair enough. You have said that
you welcome Ofqual being put on a statutory
footing, yet you also say in your report that it was
reactive rather than proactive in its scrutiny. Do you
think that Ofqual was created too hastily and
without proper thought to the consequences?
Lord Sutherland: It is always a problem that if you
are going to do something new, you will do it in the
middle of something else. If it had not done it last
April, it would be doing it now when it was waiting
for the outcome of your response to my report or
whatever. That is always a diculty. I have seen
some legislation going through in other areas where
I have wondered about setting up shadow
organisations and appointing chief executives and so
on. All that has been done elsewhere. It is not as if it
is unique. The sooner it got on with it the better.
Q303 Mr Stuart: Do you thing that being on a
statutory footing will make it a better organisation?
Lord Sutherland: Yes, it will give it powers and if it
does not use them it will rightly be excoriated.
Q304 Mr Stuart: One more question, if I may. An
issue that I do not think we have touched on directly
is that your report is comprehensive in setting out
what was done, what was not done, by whom and
when, but it is less consistent in setting out why
something happened or was not done. Can you
explain why your report is not more consistent about
explaining the reasons behind the failures?
Lord Sutherland: The reasons why people do things
are many and various. I remember how once in a
senate meeting when I was a junior lecturer my
professor of philosophy tried to explain to the vice-
chancellor the di erence between a reason and a
motive, a matter on which there is extensive
literature in philosophy. He failed. The mistake he
made was to assume that everything is done on
rational grounds. It is not. People have motives and
emotions that move them. They are sometimes in
entrenched positions. Sometimes they feel
threatened. There are all sorts of reasons. You would
need a better amateur psychologist than I am to
chance putting that sort of judgment in a report of
this kind.
Q305 Chairman: As a former chief inspector—
Lord Sutherland: I knew I should not have
mentioned that.
Chairman: That was between 1992 and 1994. This
pertains particularly to this inquiry. We now have the
power to interview the applicant for the job of chief
inspector, the head of Ofqual and so on. How do you
react to that power of a parliamentary committee?
Lord Sutherland: We are in the Wilson room, and
this is a Harold Wilson-like comment. I remember
back in 1979, when Norman St John-Stevas
proposed that there should be select committees with
real powers, I said to somebody, “That is going to
change the way in which the House of Commons
works.” I am glad to say that it has. I think it is very
important that this Committee has a range of
powers. This is a pattern that seems to work very
well in the USA. I do not see why it should not work
well here.
Q306 Chairman: So you would have applied for the
job if you had known that you would have to face us?
Lord Sutherland: That is a di erent question.
Chairman: The present chief inspector says she
would not have applied for the job if she had known
that she was going to be interviewed by this
Committee, so that was a slightly mischievous
question.
Lord Sutherland: I was interviewed for the
principalship at King’s College many years ago;
there was a student on the committee. I was
interviewed for University of London; there was a
student on the committee. Having a student on the
committee often means that it is like holding it in
public, which is the issue here. I had no objections
to that.
Chairman: Let us look at the future of national
testing. David.
Q307 Mr Chaytor: Looking forward to 2010, there
is a question mark over the shape of the tests. There
will be no Key Stage 3 tests in 2009 or 2010. Do you
think it wise for the Government to proceed with a
testing system at a higher level of intensity than the
current one? If the pilots for the single level tests are
given the go-ahead we will have tests twice a year
and every 10 and 11-year-old will be sitting them. Is
that a sensible way to proceed?
Lord Sutherland: That is outside the report.
Q308 Mr Chaytor: Are there any lessons to be
learned from your inquiry that might inform future
policy about the way Key Stage 2 is assessed?
Chairman: We are trying to get value for our money,
you see; with all your experience we thought we
would throw a few other questions at you.
Lord Sutherland: Complexity is always an issue.
First, if you make the system more complex there are
additional risks of things slipping up to guard
against. Secondly, there is a group of able people
looking at this at the moment. One will read, with
fascination, what they have to say. Thirdly, I believe
it is important to have some sort of national testing
system. One of the di culties of the current one,
apart from its intensity, is that it tries to satisfy too
many di erent things. What is the point of national
testing? One is that it lets parents know whether or
not their children are meeting a certain standard that
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is regarded as, at least, acceptable throughout the
nation. Having that in place is important, whatever
form it takes. Another is that it ensures that if there
is a failure in reaching national standards, it is not
because of the particular way a school or a local
authority carries out its procedures. That has to be
checked as well. Also, people do not make enough of
the point that national testing is a way of deciding
whether Government policies and expenditure are
delivering the goods. They pin their policies and
expenditure to meeting certain targets which are not
just for the teachers but for the system that they are
planning and funding. I would want any system that
develops to take account of those three very
important tests—or checks—on what our national
testing system should do.
Q309 Mr Chaytor: Do you think, though, given your
support for the principle of a national testing system,
that each of the functions you described can be
adequately represented by a single form of test? Or
is the logic of your remarks that there should be
dierent forms of test to fulfil the requirements of
each function?
Lord Sutherland: I am not in a position to go as far
as that yet, because I am still thinking about it. I am
reassured, however, to know that people who are
more expert on this than I am are considering it. I
will test what they say against those principles, but
yes, that is a possibility. All teachers assess the
children in front of them, if they are good teachers,
so assessment goes on. The issue is that if it is
pedagogically important, is it important in relation
to these national criteria?
Supplementary memorandum submitted by Lord Sutherland
Thank you for inviting me to participate in your inquiry into the National Curriculum tests by providing
evidence on 26 January 2009. I am writing to clarify two points from the evidence which I gave.
In answer to question 270, I indicated that the costs for increasing ETS sta capacity were incurred by
the QCA. In fact, it is generally the case that ETS incurred the costs for its additional sta —this will have
accounted for part of its reported loss on the project (as described to your committee on 10 September 2008
by Dr Philip Tabbiner, Senior Vice President, ETS). In addition, QCA incurred a smaller proportion of costs
relating to an increase in the number of its own sta and temporary sta assigned to the project. The QCA
Chief Executive indicated that the additional costs incurred by QCA were around £580,000 which is detailed
on page 54 of my report.
In answer to questions 261, 272 and 275, I would like to clarify that the parameters I referred to were set
by the QCA. They were not set by the O ce of Government Commerce, PricewaterhouseCoopers or
another body. The parameters set were:
— the Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (first stage of procurement) asked for details of previous
contracts worth more than £20 million a year (this is detailed on page 25 of my report); and
— the press review commissioned from PwC as part of financial due diligence covered a period of 12
months (this is detailed on page 28 of my report).
My report recommends that more extensive and additional checks are made in the future in relation to
potential suppliers’ knowledge, capacity, experience and track record.
11 February 2009
Q310 Chairman: Did you have the moment, when
you were in the middle of this inquiry, that I did
when I looked at all this? There were 9.5 million
scripts whizzing around the country—an
environmental disaster, let alone anything about
education. There was a vast contract worth tens of
millions and people coming from all over the
country to be trained in centres. You can have a
national testing system delivered locally. It seems to
me that you can have a system, where the testing and
questions are done by a perfectly respectable group
of people, which is administered and marked locally.
Is that not a possibility?
Lord Sutherland: I think there are a lot of options. I
was reassured by various decisions taken this year
that the magnitude of the task has been reduced.
There is no Key Stage 3 for a start. That will be very
significant considering the timescale we have for this
year. In reducing the magnitude of what is going on,
I think this is a trend in the right direction. There are
di erent ways of doing it. This is not really all that
relevant but I will say it anyway. I chair the
Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music. A
primary core function that they carry out worldwide
is to set standards for musical performance. Now, if
you can do it for that, across the world, it must be
possible to check across the country whether our
children can read, count, spell and write. However,
the current system has had such di culties that I
would be surprised if there were not significant
changes.
Chairman: In the words of quite a well-known 20th-
century philosopher, I think we shall pursue that
intimation, with interest. That was a good session.
Thank you, Lord Sutherland.
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Letter to the Chairman from Dr Ken Boston AO
As you are aware, I resigned as Chief Executive of the QCA on 12 December 2008. On 31 March 2009
the QCA Board was given Government approval to accept the resignation. During the interval of more than
three months I was under so-called “suspension”. With the belated acceptance of the resignation, the public
silence imposed by that particular form of house arrest is over. I now hope again to contribute constructively
to the national discussion of issues relating to curriculum, assessment, qualifications and skills, although
regrettably from outside the system rather than from within.
There is however one matter which I believe it is proper to raise first with the Select Committee, rather
than in the media.
In his prepared statement to the House of Commons on the release of the Sutherland Report on 16
December 2008—and in his answers to Michael Gove and David Laws—the Secretary of State for Children,
Schools and Families set out to demonstrate (1) that I had been complacent in my management of the
delivery of the key stage tests; and (2) that I had repeatedly been pressed for answers by Ministers on
numerous occasions, the most recent being 17 June 2008, and had given them strong reassurances that the
tests were on track. He drew heavily on paragraphs 4.92 and 4.93 of the Sutherland Report (page 77) and
on paragraph 4.137 (page 85). The Secretary of State and the Schools Minister, Jim Knight again relied
extensively on these three paragraphs in their evidence to the Select Committee on Children, Schools and
Families on 4 February 2009.
Paragraph 4.92 quotes evidence given to Lord Sutherland by Jim Knight, who says that he met with me
and David Gee, the head of the NAA (the assessment division of QCA) on 17 June. Knight’s evidence
implies that I was complacent and disengaged at the meeting, and left everything to David Gee. Paragraph
4.93 refers to DSCF’s notes of the meeting, at which I am alleged to have been present.
This is fiction. I was not at the meeting Jim Knight arranged with David Gee, nor had I been asked to
attend. The DCSF note of the meeting does not in fact list me as one of the attendees. Further, there was
no meeting between Jim Knight, David Gee and me, on any date during the period covered by the events
into which Lord Sutherland was asked to inquire.
Paragraph 4.137 (page 85) is about the escalation of risk by QCA to DCSF during the test delivery period
up to the time of the failure, which became apparent on 25 June. It was quoted in full by the Secretary of
State in the House of Commons, and again two months later in his evidence to the Select Committee and
reads as follows:
“In practice what happened in 2008 was that DSCF observers escalated their own assessment of
risks to the DCSF ministers on a number of occasions. On this basis, ministers usually pressed
QCA’s Chief Executive for answers. At this point, because information was not being escalated
within QCA eectively, ministers were given strong reassurances by QCA that all was on track. As
late as 17 June when the Schools Minister met QCA’s Chief Executive and NAA’s Managing
Director, they provided reassurances.”
This too is fiction. Not only was I not present at 17 June meeting, but until the delivery failure at the end
of June I had had only two meetings with the DCSF Ministers in 2008. David Gee was present at neither
of them. On 18 March the QCA Chairman, Sir Anthony Greener and I met with Ed Balls and Jim Knight—
at QCA request—to discuss the future of the QCA. The national curriculum tests were mentioned only
briefly and in passing, and no specific delivery issues were raised by Ministers. On 2 June, the Chairman and
I met with Ed Balls and Jim Knight on a range of matters, including the tests: as I advised Lord Sutherland,
I did indeed on that occasion reassure the Secretary of State that earlier problems with marker recruitment,
marker training and the distribution of scripts had been overcome, and I did so on the basis of evidence
which I believed to be sound.
I was not asked to meet directly with the Schools Minister in the months leading up to the delivery failure
at the end of June, including the critical marking period in the final eight weeks. Nor was I being “pressed”
by Ministers for answers on the telephone or by email. There was a flurry of meetings once the delivery
failure occurred (2, 3, 24 July and 6, 14 August), but these meetings were about recovering from the failure
process, conducting the review of scripts returned by schools because of problems with marking, concluding
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the contract with ETS and tendering for a new supplier for 2009. They were not about the causes of the
delivery failure and the events leading up to it, which were the matters on which Jim Knight was asked to
give evidence, and on which Lord Sutherland reported.
During the test delivery period, QCA was of course closely monitoring the blogs and the many reports in
the media about problems with ETS, and working around the clock to resolve every issue which arose. We
were in close contact with DCSF ocials, who were also monitoring the situation. Many of the problems
were successfully addressed by ETS, but some quite major ones could not be resolved. Many allegations
proved to be false, such as the assertion that ETS was employing a first year undergraduate to mark Key
Stage 2 papers: he had in fact been employed by a school to assist in the review of marked returned scripts.
The flawed evidence on which paragraphs 4.92, 4.93 and 4.137 of the Sutherland Report is based has been
used to portray me as complacent, disengaged, and constantly beleaguered by Ministers with questions I
was unable to answer. This is far from the truth; it was not corrected by Ministers or DCSF o cials at draft
report stage; and it has been used by Ministers to my serious disadvantage.
All this had no bearing on my decision to resign. Clearly however, the record should not be allowed to
stand. The Secretary of State and the Schools Minister owe an explanation to Lord Sutherland, to the House
of Commons, to the Select Committee, and to me. And the explanation cannot be that Jim Knight was
simply mistaken about the date on which he thought he met with David Gee and me, because there was no
other meeting with which it could reasonably have been confused; nor that there were occasions other than
2 June when I was pressed by Ministers for answers, because that is simply not true.
15 April 2009
Witness: Dr Ken Boston, AO, former Chief Executive, Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, gave
evidence.
Q311 Chairman: Can I welcome Dr Ken Boston to
our proceedings. Ken, we have been waiting a long
time to have evidence from you. Your interpretation
of your contract of employment was that when you
were under suspension you could not appear before
the Committee. One member of the Committee may
ask you a question about that. You will know that
we broke all previous records by holding a meeting
of this Committee in the summer recess last year,
such was the urgency and importance, we thought,
of the tests situation at that time. So you know it is
of concern to this Committee. You know that we
have in a sense wrapped the issue up with the
problems that we faced with education maintenance
allowances, which are totally separate and not part
of your remit at all. But there were two systems, both
of which seemed to fail. Independent companies that
were hired to do a job did not seem to be able to
deliver satisfactorily. We hope that this evidence
session will allow us to come to some conclusions
and to write up our report, so there is a lot hanging
on this meeting because we have been waiting for
such a long time. This is the only Committee that
actually got evidence from the American company
that failed to deliver. That company did not give
evidence to the Sutherland inquiry, but it did give
evidence to us, so we have a particular responsibility
in this matter. Ken, we have known you for a long
time in your role. We have had a valued relationship
with you, so we start on that basis, but our job today
is to find out what went wrong and why it went
wrong. As with all witnesses, I am going to ask you
if you want to make an opening statement.
Dr Boston: Thanks, Barry. I would like to make an
opening statement, which touches on three things. I
think it might be a useful start. One is the letter that
I sent to the Select Committee.8 The second is the
8 See Ev 48
terms of reference for Sutherland, because I think
there is a lot to learn from that. Thirdly, I have a
couple of points about the role of observers on the
QCA, which I think has some lessons for Ofqual. Let
me begin by saying, in relation to the letter, that I
have resigned and I am not seeking to mitigate that
in any way. Even if Lord Sutherland had been able
to get to all the causes of the failure, and he was not
able to get to all the causes because of his terms of
reference, I would still have resigned because of my
part in it. So let there be no question that what I have
to say is attempting to go back over that ground. The
letter I sent to you sets out what I think are two
major flaws in the evidence—quite incorrect and
unsound evidence—which has been used against me.
At 2 o’clock this morning on the radio I heard that
the Department had in fact put out a statement
saying that Jim Knight had corrected this evidence
some time ago. I was not aware of that, but I think
any correction raises more questions than it answers.
The whole point of my letter is the last sentence,
which seeks an explanation as to why paragraphs
4.92, 4.93 and 4.137 in the Sutherland report are
without foundation. There is no fact to them, and yet
they were used against me, to my disadvantage, in
the House of Commons and in this Committee. I
want an explanation for that, and the explanation
cannot be simply that Jim Knight was mistaken
about the date on which he thought he met with
David Gee and me, because, as my letter sets out,
there was no other meeting with which it could
possibly have been confused. Secondly, there were
no occasions—other than the occasion on 2 June—
when I was pressed by Ministers for answers. You
will recall that in the House of Commons there was
some banter about what “usually pressed” means,
and the Secretary of State clearly used it to mean
“pressed on several occasions”. There was one. I
want to know why the document was so flawed; why
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the flaw was not discovered sooner; why the DCSF
ocial, who took the notes of the meeting, did not
draw the mistake immediately to the Minister’s
attention when the transcript of the evidence came in
a few days later from Sutherland, when the error
must have been clearly there; and why evidence given
on 14 October last year was not corrected, to my
knowledge, until 2 am this morning. I think that
reasons are required, and an explanation is needed as
to what that is all about. And what does Lord
Sutherland think? He was given, in good faith, false
evidence, which he had published. If I were him, I
would be furious, and I would be seeking an
explanation. On the second point, on the issue of the
terms of reference of the Sutherland report, I believe
that one of the lessons that we have learned—
because we need to look ahead—is that Lord
Sutherland should have been given a remit to
examine the role of all three partners involved in the
development and the delivery, which are the
Government, the QCA, and the contractor, ETS.
His inquiry, as we know, was restricted to the QCA
and ETS alone. Yet the Government, through the
DCSF, determine the nature of the tests to be
procured, the pupils who are to be tested, which
subjects they are to be tested in, how and when they
are to be tested and how much money has to be spent
on testing. The interval between the date of the test
and the date for results—the eight weeks’ interval—
is set by the Government. They also determine
whether the tests are marked manually or onscreen;
which results data are collected and how they are
collected; the form in which the data are required;
and how the results are returned to schools. In those
core elements of test development and delivery,
neither the QCA nor the supplier has any
discretion—decisions are made by the Government
alone. The development and the delivery of these
tests are not at arm’s length from the Government;
the Ministers and the o cials are at arm’s length
only from the detail of the test questions, and from
the marking and level setting. I believe that the
failure in the delivery of the Key Stage tests in 2008
presented Ofqual with its first opportunity to
establish itself as a truly independent regulatory
authority. If the Government had genuinely wanted
Ofqual to assume such a role, and to get to all the
root causes of the failure, it would have asked Ofqual
to establish terms of reference for Lord Sutherland
which encompass the role of all three partners in test
development and delivery. Consistent with
Government rhetoric, it should have been beyond
question that Ofqual, with Sutherland as its agent,
would account to Parliament through the Select
Committee, not to the Secretary of State, and report
on the roles of all three partners in the delivery
failure. I think that in giving Lord Sutherland
specific terms of reference to look at the QCA
management of the ETS contract, which inevitably
would have been the critical part of any Ofqual
inquiry, and in asking Lord Sutherland to report to
him—not Ofqual—on that matter, the Secretary of
State narrowed, not broadened, the scope of the
inquiry. His intervention put a protective fence
around the DCSF and Ministers, focused the
spotlight on the QCA and ETS, prevented some
major causes of the failure from being identified and
compromised the independence of Ofqual and its
capacity to determine its own a airs. No doubt the
Government wanted to avoid any risk of a public
inquiry into the purpose and use of the Key Stage
tests. But I think that Ofqual should have been
trusted, on that point, as a regulatory authority
rather than a body for policy review. It is beyond
question that it could have been relied upon to give
Lord Sutherland terms of reference which focused
broadly on the programme. I have no doubt that
decisions made by Ministers and o cials in 2006 had
a marked impact on the failure in 2008, most notably
staying with manual marking rather than moving to
the phased introduction of onscreen marking, as
with GCSEs and GCEs. Four years after it was
recommended to Ministers by me and others in the
QCA, onscreen marking has become one of Lord
Sutherland’s principal recommendations. The
further contributory factor, of course, was the
question level data being captured in the marking of
the 2008 tests—Lord Sutherland’s references to
several thousand clicks being required for each
bundle of papers, you know. My final point, briefly,
is that I think the appointment of DCSF observers
to the QCA board, and other QCA bodies, has
undercut the authority of the QCA and will undercut
the authority of Ofqual if we are not careful. By
reducing the formality of the relationship between
the two organisations—the Government and the
QCA—it leads to negotiated compromises from
time to time, which erode public accountability. The
role of observers on boards and committees has been
to take part in discussions, to provide advice to
Ministers separately from the QCA and to relay
ministerial feedback. It is in that third area where the
problem arises. Observers typically advise in
committees and boards that Ministers would be
“minded to” or “not minded to” agree with this or
that proposal or “content to” or “not content to”
agree to a particular recommendation, or even that,
“If I put that idea to the Minister it would be laughed
out of court.” Now certainly, prior consultation with
the DCSF is important to inform subsequent
decisions by the QCA on what advice it should o er
Ministers, but too often boards such as that of the
QCA are put into a position where it is expected that
they will seek to negotiate that advice in advance. I
think that is a pernicious process that compromises
integrity and independence, and if we are not careful,
in relation to Ofqual, it will cause real di culties
there. I do not think that for Ofqual the runes are
propitious at all. The reality of true independence for
Ofqual will need to be asserted, defended and won.
QCA, from time to time, has been seen as far too
independent, and that is one reason why its wings are
being clipped as the QCDA. The greatest risk for
Ofqual at the moment is of being cynically
outmanoeuvred by Government. I think we have to
be very careful about that.
Q312 Chairman: That is a very powerful survey of
how you see the situation, and we will now start
some questioning, but can we just clear one thing up.
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You talked about Jim Knight’s response. We have
given you a copy of a letter received by the
Committee—I am not sure whether you saw it; from
what you said, you did not.9 Jim Knight admitted
that he had made an error in evidence given to Lord
Sutherland; his letter is dated 9 February. Then you
have Lord Sutherland’s reply, saying that he did not
think that that made much dierence to his report. I
just thought that we should clear that up before we
go on to the substance.
Dr Boston: This is the first time, Mr Chairman, that
I have seen this letter. I think that it is disgraceful
that, if I was misrepresented by a Minister in
evidence in a public report, I have not been
contacted by the Minister.
Q313 Chairman: So you have never seen this letter?
Dr Boston: No, I have not. I have not been given any
information on this at all. I think that is outrageous.
If as, just glancing through, I see in the last
paragraph on the first page, the Minister is confusing
it with a meeting that took place on 2 July, and if that
meeting is the subject of paragraph 4.92, that is also
wrong. The Minister knew on 26 June that there was
a failure. The meeting on 2 July was put together at
his request to talk about where we would go from
there, with regard to releasing the results. It was the
first meeting I had with the Minister along with
David Gee, and others were present.
Q314 Chairman: That was with Jim Knight?
Dr Boston: Yes, with Jim Knight. We had before us
a set of data from ETS that was absolute nonsense.
It showed very clearly that it was going to fail, but
even from ETS we were getting some confusing
signals. The president of ETS in America sent an e-
mail the next day, 3 July, as you might recall from the
evidence in Sutherland, saying that he thought that
they were still going to make it. All the evidence we
were getting from the ETS people locally was that
they were not. Jim Knight knew on the previous
Friday that this was not going to succeed. The
meeting on 2 July was to sort out where to go from
there. Therefore, that was in my view beyond the
terms of reference of Sutherland. Sutherland was
looking at the reasons why failure occurred and the
whole run-up to the failure. At that point, on 2 July,
failure was evident and known. The key argument
we had at that meeting, which was very intense, was
whether to release the results. Jim Knight asked me
for formal advice on delaying the results day by a
week, and I refused to give that advice. My advice
was that the results available on 8 July should be
published, and as events turned out, 93.5% of Key
Stage 2 results and 85% of Key Stage 3 results were
available on the results day of 8 July. A large number
of schools, a minority, would still not have got results
for all three subjects at the one time, but my
argument was that letting the results go out would at
least allow the majority of schools to have results,
rather than penalising the whole lot so that they
would not be able to complete their evidence. The
Minister stuck with the decision that the results
9 See Ev 77
should be delayed, and I agreed to provide him with
advice on the length of that delay. That is in fact
another element of the Sutherland report that is
wrong. It reports—I do not recall the exact words—
that I advised the Minister to extend the date, but I
did not. My advice to the Minister was to stick with
the date, and when he asked how long it should be
extended if he insisted on doing so, I gave him the
figure of a week. I remember the 2 July meeting very
well. It is beyond the terms of reference of
Sutherland, and the description of it—it was quite an
intense meeting—has no relationship to the
characterisation of my performance or behaviour in
the meeting which is set out in paragraph 4.92.
Q315 Chairman: Can I take you back. On the one
hand, the Committee wants to find out what went
wrong. You, as the QCA, hired this American
company, and all of us agree that it failed to deliver
in the way we anticipated it should, in terms of our
hopes for the students taking the exams. Before I
bring you back to that, let us be clear that you are
very angry about how your role in this has been
characterised by the Government.
Dr Boston: Yes.
Q316 Chairman: That is very clear, and I understand
that and you have had three or four months to think
about it. On the other hand, would not the Ministers
say to us that they had asked the QCA to hire an
independent company to provide value for money
and deliver the test results but that did not happen?
Whatever we say about which Minister met you and
when, the fact is that the QCA hired these people and
they failed to deliver. What do you say to that?
Dr Boston: I say that is exactly true. That is why I
resigned. I was managing an organisation that had a
di cult task ahead of it—we can talk about aspects
of that—but it failed and I resigned. What I resent is
evidence against me being sexed up in a report by
Lord Sutherland, on the basis of false evidence given
by Ministers, to characterise me as something I am
not. I failed to deliver and I resigned. That is it.
Q317 Chairman: In terms of the broader brush,
though, in your introductory remarks you suggested
that there was something much deeper at the heart
of the problem, and that is that the QCA has been
abolished—we now have two organisations—and
the Ofqual that is emerging is weaker than it
should be.
Dr Boston: We were first advised of the changes
being made to the QCA by Ed Balls on 19 September
2007—that he wanted us to split. I support
absolutely the notion of a regulatory authority
reporting to Parliament rather than to Ministers.
That has always been a di culty with the QCA: it is
responsible for maintaining the assessment
standard, the height of the hurdle, yet reports at the
same time to the Ministers who want to drive up the
performance standard—the number of people who
leap the hurdle. There is a real inconsistency there. In
my view, and this was my view way back in 2003 and
2004, it would have been much better either to have
hived o the operating arm, the National
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Assessment Agency arm, to an awarding body, or to
have set it up as a separate authority, or even to have
abolished it and given an awarding body that
function and the contract, and put the whole of the
rest of the QCA, including its regulatory side and its
curriculum side, in a statutory authority that
reported to Parliament and not to Ministers. That
would have been a better solution. Regarding the
notion of now taking the statutory authority role of
the QCA away, there has been agitation there, and
that became very clear in the meeting we had with Ed
Balls and Jim Knight about the future of the QCA
on 18 March. One of the great sources of agitation
has been the way in which I have played my role and
allowed other senior people to play their roles,
including particularly perhaps Mick Waters, the
Director of Curriculum. The QCA was set up as a
statutory authority under the 1997 Act not to be a
critic of government but to be a constructive
participant in educational discussion nationally, and
I have seen it lead part of that discussion. I have seen
how it has not been bound by a set of speeches that
were basically constructed around the Government
press releases of the day, and how it has never
publicly criticised Government but has been
prepared to shoot the breeze about other ways of
doing things. Notably I, and Mick in particular,
have done that on curriculum and indeed on changes
to assessment and modernisation. Now, the
QCDA—the big debate has been about the right role
of the word “authority” rather than “agency”—will
not have that capacity. It will be virtually an arm of
the Department, and my personal view is, why not
incorporate it within the Department? What use is it
going to be as a body that is at arm’s length in one
sense but not able to do anything in terms of having
a public role?
Q318 Chairman: This is the last question from me. In
your view, the terms of reference of the Sutherland
inquiry were too narrow and excluded looking at the
Department’s role in all this.
Dr Boston: Yes.
Chairman: But what about the overall independent
scrutiny of Sutherland? Sutherland, as you know, is,
like you, a highly respected person in the educational
world. Do you not believe that he made a fair
appraisal and did a fair job, given his limited remit?
Dr Boston: I think he did a very fair job, and I have
said that on the public record several times. I think
that it was a very good report, but he was able to
look at the role of only two of the participants, not
all three, and he was fed some information that was
wrong. If I were him, I would be furious that it was
wrong, given that he had given two opportunities
through the process for it to be corrected. It now
stands on the record erroneously. If I had been the
inquirer, I would be very angry about that.
Q319 Chairman: You had a good and quite
harmonious relationship with the ministerial team
for five or six years.
Dr Boston: Yes, indeed.
Chairman: So the relationship between the
Department and the QCA is something that you
have thought about and reflected on since. I am
trying to tease out when the unhappiness that you
had about that relationship and the changes that
were mooted in the QCA emerged. I am trying to ask
you whether these are the words of a bitter man who
feels that he has been wronged and is picking a fight
with the Government, or have you had these views
for some time?
Dr Boston: I have had them since the decision to set
up Ofqual, which I strongly support, but I have had
real concerns about the related decision to dismantle
the QCA. The meeting on 18 March was very tense.
I was not the only one involved; the chairman and
another board member from the QCA were also
present. It was very clear that the Secretary of State
and the Minister thought that we were handling our
job in the wrong way. It has been dicult from then
on. In fact, in the whole run up to the test delivery
series to the end of June, I had only two meetings
with Ministers—in the entire year—as my letter says,
one of which did not even cover anything about the
national curriculum tests. When I go back through
my diaries for previous years, that is very much at
odds with the previous pattern; during the crucial
last eight or 10 weeks I would have met with
Ministers four or five times in previous years.
Chairman: It is certainly true that when you gave
evidence to our inquiry on testing and assessment
you shared some of your concerns at that time. Can
we hold that for a moment David.
Q320 Mr Chaytor: There are two separate issues
here. One is the relationship between yourself and
the QCA and Ministers in the context of the
appropriate degree of independence for the QCA
and its successor bodies. The other is the
responsibility for the events that led to the failure of
ETS to deliver the tests on time by 8 July. You are
trying to conflate the two and to suggest that there
was a hidden agenda that led the Sutherland inquiry
to focus only on your responsibility in not delivering
the contract to time. In retrospect, do you not accept
that there was a responsibility on the QCA and the
NAA, as the agency directly responsible for
supervising the contract, to inform the Government
at an earlier stage of the scale of the risk that you had
identified? You said in your evidence last year, and
you say again in your letter,10 that there had been
weekly meetings from September with ETS and
daily meetings from the beginning of May. Surely
that is exceptional—if there was no problem or if the
problems were being dealt with, why was there a
need to have daily meetings from 1 May?
Dr Boston: No, that was not exceptional. That was
in fact the plan, and it was very good management
and was similar to previous years. The daily
meetings in the final few weeks are the norm. It was
not because there was any particular crisis. As I have
said in evidence before, right up until late May and
the start of June there were some problems with
10 See Ev 48
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getting papers out to markers. There were problems
with distribution and return. They were fixed, and by
6 June 50% of the marking had been done. We were
on target, just as we had been in previous years. The
signs then were very good. It was not until, in my
case, 25 June that it became clear that we were not
going to make this.
Q321 Mr Chaytor: Given the scale of the problems
described by yourself and by Sutherland and
acknowledged by ETS in its evidence to the
Committee, it seems incredible that as late as 24 June
there could have been a general acceptance that the
target date of 8 July was going to be met. You refer,
for example—I have the transcript of your evidence
last year—to this backlog of 10,000 e-mails that ETS
had not responded to. This led to an identification of
the support provided by the NAA. This is
exceptional, is it not? Which organisation, operating
normally, has a backlog of 10,000 e-mails?
Dr Boston: Yes. The Department was fully aware
that that was the backlog, fully aware that we were
coping with it, fully aware that we had put in
resources to deal with it. It was a problem, and we
were working to fix it. In fact, the backlog was
removed. It is not a matter of the Department not
being aware of issues from day to day. The contact
we had through the NAA and elsewhere was very
close. Department observers attended the meetings
we were having with ETS and others. The broader
question is that every year this has been a high-wire
act. It is to do with the extraordinarily large scope of
the job, done manually, and packed into eight weeks.
We failed in 2004 when Key Stage 3 was late. We
were within hours of failing in 2005, even though we
had extended the Key Stage 3 results date. In 2006
and 2007 we were fine. In 2008 the whole thing
collapsed again. The enterprise, the whole archaic
nature of this thing, is incredible, and we are
persisting with it for 2009. Lord Sutherland has
made recommendations about end-to-end testing
which simply cannot be met for 2009. Key Stage 3 is
not being run this year but that does not halve the
risk. It simply means that there will potentially be
more markers who will be able to do Key Stage 2. In
the general qualifications where the major awarding
bodies have applied technology, are doing onscreen
marking, producing valid and reliable results and
identifying aberrant marking quickly and delivering
a top-quality product securely, an enormous
achievement has been made. Key Stage 2 and Key
Stage 3 is still the cottage industry it was in 2002. The
only change is that papers are now no longer left on
doorsteps and post oce counters—they are
barcoded and tracked. That is the only change that
has occurred in this period.
Q322 Mr Chaytor: You said earlier to the Chairman
that you had recommended four years ago that
onscreen marking should become the norm for Key
Stage 2 and Key Stage 3. What was the Minister’s
response to that recommendation?
Dr Boston: There was extensive discussion with
Ministers and o cials particularly over a long
period of time about introducing onscreen marking.
We wanted to introduce onscreen marking for
security, better quality and greater validity of results.
The Department was pushing continually for a trial
that would have had some papers marked manually
and some marked onscreen and, provided that the
results were the same, onscreen marking would be
gradually phased in. The whole point is that the
results would not be the same because the onscreen
results would be better. I do not know whether that
would make the league tables look better or worse,
but the one thing you can absolutely bank on is that
you will get a di erent, better and more valid result
with a process that identifies aberrant marking and
other errors early, does item level data collection
automatically and eliminates all that manual stu .
You will get much better results, but they will be
di erent. The compelling argument, finally, behind
closed doors where all of this was thrashed out was,
“Well, it’s too risky—the results might look
di erent.”
Q323 Mr Chaytor: Can I ask also about the role of
the DCSF observers, because your argument is that
they were involved with the NAA and the delivery of
the contract at every stage? They were present at the
weekly meetings from September. They were present
at the daily meetings from 1 May. Why did they not
report to Ministers earlier the scale of the risk and
the likelihood of failure?
Dr Boston: I cannot answer that. I don’t know. But it
is true that they were present at every level, including
board level. They were aware fully of decisions being
made and in fact were participating and contributing
to that. The ETS contract was not even signed by the
QCA chairman until we had the then Secretary of
State’s approval for it to be signed. She was being
briefed by o cials on, presumably, where this whole
thing was heading throughout. I am not objecting to
that, nor am I absolving the QCA from
responsibility. It was the management agent. I am
not saying that we should not have taken the rap on
this. It happened on our watch, but it cannot be said
that it came out of the blue or that the warning signs
of continued briefings were not making it apparent
when di culties arose.
Q324 Paul Holmes: I have two questions. First, in
the letter that you sent to the Committee on 15
April11 you say, “I was not asked to meet directly
with the Schools Minister in the months leading up
to the delivery failure.” We have already talked a bit
about that. Why were you not asking to meet the
Minister? Why had you not spotted that problems
were emerging? You have just said that it did not
become apparent until 26 June. How come you did
not spot that at an earlier stage?
Dr Boston: We were certainly spotting the problems
and dealing with them. As I said in my evidence to
Lord Sutherland, it is a fraught process. There are
di culties the whole time. Our approach was to roll
up our sleeves and get on with solving it, rather than
running round telling people that there was a
problem. If I had had a meeting with Jim Knight
11 See Ev 48
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every week for the last eight weeks in the run-up to
the closure, it would not have made him accountable
for the tests. It was still my accountability. It would
not have helped simply to put problems on his desk.
Our objective was to keep him and his people
briefed, but solving the problems and addressing
them and bringing the tests in. We have done that
year on year on year, except in 2004 and 2008. It has
worked before. Our anticipation was that it would
work again, but the risks in this are so high.
Sutherland is critical of the QCA board having the
tests at an amber risk on its risk register for 14
months. Amber means that likelihood is possible
and the impact would be very high. I cannot see these
tests ever having a risk rating less than amber. They
could always fail, given the eight weeks in which the
delivery occurs when they are done manually. And
the impact when they fail is—well, we saw it in 2008.
Q325 Paul Holmes: We will come back to the lines of
accountability in a minute. Given that you are
saying that it is always on a knife edge because of the
sheer volume of tests and the short time scales, why
were you not banging alarm drums much earlier,
both last year and the year before, and the year
before for that matter? Both you and I were at an
educational seminar—this was in the early stages of
the development of diplomas. When we were
chatting, you said you were worried about what was
happening with the development of diplomas, and
that you thought the Government were being too
complacent and that there was not enough feed
through from those people developing diplomas to
the schools and employers. You asked me to urge the
Committee to look at that. I think you also talked to
the Chairman separately and probably to other
people. The Committee looked at the matter at that
stage, and it did gee the Government up to get their
act together a bit more. In that case you were really
on the ball. Because you were not getting the
response that you wanted from the Government,
you used the Committee to try and push things
along. If you were very much on the ball in the early
stages regarding concerns about diplomas, why if
year after year the marking was such a problem were
you not banging the drum year after year? If you
were not getting anywhere with the Ministers, why
did you not raise the matter more widely?
Dr Boston: That is a good question, and it is one that
I have asked myself. I have frequently spoken
publicly about dierent approaches to testing and
the problems with this particular approach and how
it was administered. I have also pressed privately for
reform with Ministers and o cials—there is no
question about that. Over the past few months I
have asked myself why I did not resign in 2006. At
that point it was clear to me that I was not going to
get Government buy-in to necessary reform. I
continued through 2007 and 2008 to run an
organisation that was faced with close to an
impossible task, which I had seen go belly up in 2004
and had the prospect of doing so again. Probably my
greatest regret in all of this is that I was not more
honest with myself at that time and did not simply
say, “It can’t be done.”
Q326 Paul Holmes: Is there a wider institutionalised
problem about lines of accountability in general
between the Government and di erent arms of
business that are being hived o ? For example, in
this case a private company, ETS, was brought in,
and it was a disaster. We had a similar thing some
years ago with the delivery of individual learning
accounts and Capita and so on. We get private
companies, and the Ministers say, “It’s up to them
now—don’t ask us about it, ask them.” The
companies say that it is commercial confidentiality
and it all collapses and is a disaster. That seems to
happen over and over again. My second point
concerns quangos, whether it be the QCA or NAA
or whatever. We have seen the Learning and Skills
Council make a total disaster of sixth-form funding
allocations and of funding for college buildings.
However, the Minister keeps saying, “It’s nothing to
do with us, you’ll have to ask them.” Have we got an
institutional problem, which has developed over the
last 10, 15 or 20 years, about what the lines of
accountability are between the Government and the
private sector and quangos, who are delivering
things further down the system?
Dr Boston: Yes, I think we do. From my experience,
I certainly think that there is a problem. Looking
forward, that is a critical reason why Ofqual must be
completely separate from Government and report to
Parliament through the Select Committee. The
QCA’s problem has been that it is not at arm’s
length—to use the Government’s term—yet it can
end up carrying the blame for a whole set of
decisions over which it had no control. In my
statement I pointed out all the things to do with
national testing that the Government determine,
and it is virtually everything except what the
standard is and responsibility for the marking. If one
goes further, and looks at awarding bodies, one sees
that the delivery relationship works e ectively
because awarding bodies are quite remote. They do
not work with Government even on a contractual
basis. They deliver a public service and are funded
through schools to deliver that service, and it works.
Distance, with Ofqual, is going to be critical. If it
does not get that distance, there will be a problem.
As I said, I believe that Ofqual was made to stumble
at its first hurdle. That is not an auspicious sign for
the future of independent regulation.
Q327 Mr Stuart: As you have described it, the
system e ectively has been specified by
Government—they are the architects of the system
in almost all its components, except for the content
of the exams and the style of the marking. We have
a constitutional system, where Ministers are always
responsible. You said that if you had met every week
with the Schools Minister, he would not have been
accountable—you would have still felt accountable.
To follow up the last question, do you feel that the
constitutional convention of Ministers being
ultimately responsible for delivery, particularly
when the system is not genuinely independent, has
failed to be honoured in this instance?
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Dr Boston: Yes, I do. There comes a point where you
have to accept your accountability. From my own
point of view, I accept the accountability and I
accept the responsibility. On matters of detail, I was
not at fault, because I was not doing those detailed
things, but I was responsible for the management of
the people who were delivering them and for the
overall result. It would seem to me that a time does
come with all Ministers—over my career, I have
worked with more than 40 Ministers—when a
Minister has to accept accountability and go.
Q328 Mr Stuart: The evidence that Sutherland
quotes, particularly paragraph 4.137, says: “In
practice in 2008 what happened was that DCSF
observers escalated their own assessment of risks to
the DCSF ministers on a number of occasions. On
this basis, ministers usually pressed the QCA Chief
Executive for answers.” Is that an accurate account
of what happened?
Dr Boston: No, it is totally false. I was pressed, if
asking a question is being pressed, by Ministers—Ed
Balls and Jim Knight—on 2 June, at the start of a
meeting, as the first agenda item in a meeting that
covered a series of agenda items. I am aware that in
the House of Commons two Members sought
clarification of what “usually pressed” was, and the
Secretary of State referred to that as meaning
“frequent pressing”—those were not his exact
words, but that was the clear implication.
Q329 Mr Stuart: So Ministers’ role in the system was
to ensure, the Schools Minister told Sutherland, that
“the reality clearly is that some of these tasks that
they are doing are so mission-critical that we need
alongside that arrangement to be satisfied for
ourselves that things are going well.” That was the
responsibility on Ministers. Is it your evidence to us
that they falsely maintained to the House of
Commons that they had carried out that duty when
in fact they had not done so?
Dr Boston: I am not certain about that, because I am
not privy to the amount and detail of briefing that
Ministers were given by DCSF observers at our own
meetings. I cannot really comment on that.
Presumably, the briefings were sound. That is why I
find it so curious, for example, that the senior DCSF
ocial who took the note of the meeting of David
Gee and Knight on 17 June did not draw the
Minister’s attention to this mistake a few days later
when the transcripts came back from Sutherland.
The relationships between Ministers and DCSF
o cials over this I cannot fathom.
Q330 Mr Stuart: I know that it was a complex set of
circumstances that led to the failure of delivery.
However, do you believe that if the Government had
accepted your advice and brought in phased
onscreen marking rather than manual marking the
deadlines would have been met?
Dr Boston: I am certain of it. The evidence for that
is what we see with the awarding bodies and the
general qualifications. There is no question that
these tests could be delivered e ectively and well
within eight weeks using technology, giving us much
more valid and reliable results than we get at the
moment.
Q331 Mr Stuart: So the chief author of this failure,
in your opinion, was the Department, because of the
specification that it set for the way that these tests
were to be assessed. And, in the evidence to the
Sutherland inquiry, the Department failed to accept
that responsibility.
Dr Boston: I certainly believe that, if we had been
successful in introducing onscreen marking several
years ago, 2008 would not have happened.
Q332 Chairman: I have just listened to your replies
to Paul Holmes and Graham Stuart. Are you not
trying to have it both ways? On the one hand, you
are complaining that the record is not straight and
that you hardly ever saw Jim Knight or Ed Balls. In
other words, you were left alone to get on with the
job. On the other hand, you are saying that there
should have been greater ministerial responsibility,
because when everything went wrong Ministers
should have said, “Hands up, it’s all our fault,
because of decisions that we made, or failed to make,
some years ago.” So let us get this straight. You are
complaining: you said that Jim Knight made a
mistake, saying that you were at a meeting that you
were not at. It seems to me that someone could
interpret what happened as the Government saying,
“Get on with the job, Ken. Hire someone to do this
job. You are responsible. You’re a good guy and
you’ve got a good reputation, so get on with it.”
Actually, Ministers do not really get involved until
everything seems to be going wrong. That is true, is
it not?
Dr Boston: Yes, that is certainly true. Ministers were
not getting involved in the detail of it at all. Look, I
don’t think I am trying to have it both ways. I have
very clearly fallen on my sword over this. I have
taken responsibility, taken accountability, and that is
the end of it.
Q333 Chairman: But I am talking about the
ministerial responsibility, Ken. On the one hand, you
are saying that the Ministers were never there,
because they left you to get on with the job, and now
you are saying, “But we need clearer . . . ”, and we
need Ministers to stand up and say that they got it
all wrong.
Dr Boston: If I had met weekly with Jim Knight, I
think that this problem would still have emerged. I
am not saying that his failure to meet regularly was
the cause of what happened. I take your point.
However, I certainly do not think that I am, in any
way, trying to diminish, reduce or explain away my
own responsibility. I was foolish enough to continue
running an organisation doing this high-wire act,
when I knew fundamentally that it was deeply
flawed and that the only way that I could have made
it secure was to get ministerial agreement to do so
several years ago.
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Q334 Fiona Mactaggart: When did you first learn of
the public account by Jim Knight that was wrong,
and what attempt did you make to correct it? Was it
the letter that you wrote a few days ago to our
Chairman?12
Dr Boston: Yes.
Q335 Fiona Mactaggart: Why?
Dr Boston: I believed that I was unable to do
anything prior to that. Let me say that I first became
aware of this error—the flawed evidence—on 11
December, when I had a pre-release copy of the
Sutherland report to read in the Department, and
these three paragraphs just stood out as absolutely
flawed. I resigned the following day. I would have
resigned even if those three paragraphs had not been
there. On the following Monday, 15 December, the
day before the Sutherland report was released, I was
then suspended by the QCA board at the proposal of
the DCSF permanent secretary. I have contested
that suspension, or reserved a right to contest it,
because I believe that I simply should have been put
on gardening leave, rather than receiving some sort
of ill-defined suspension. I certainly was astonished
to be suspended before the report had even come out
and before anyone had even read it. Once that
suspension had occurred, I received a letter setting
out what a suspension meant. The letter did not
explicitly state, “You can’t speak to the Select
Committee or write to newspapers,” but that would
clearly have been inconsistent with the spirit of the
letter, which set out that I was not to contact the
QCA or do a host of other things. I simply felt that
the proper thing was not to make a media issue or
anything else out of it, but to come back to the Select
Committee in due course when the suspension was
lifted and deal with the issue in the forum in which
the faulty evidence was used against me. That was
my decision.
Q336 Fiona Mactaggart: So the correction that Jim
Knight made in February to Lord Sutherland and to
this Committee was not because you raised any
query; it was just done by him.13
Dr Boston: I am uncertain about that. The QCA
board had to set up a panel to conduct a review in
light of the Sutherland report, and that panel met on
14 January. On that date, I gave the panel, in a
confidential meeting, an account of my
performance, as well as an analysis of it in relation
to the Sutherland report. The QCA panel, and
subsequently the QCA board, then became aware
that I had not been at that meeting.14 The panel then
contacted the Department to obtain a copy of the
note of the meeting, which confirmed that I was not
in fact present and had not made a contribution. It
seems clear to me that that action, and the QCA
board getting on to the case with the DCSF, must
have led to this letter being written.15 As I have said,
I have been totally unaware of this letter until today,
12 See Ev 48
13 See Ev 77
14 Note by Witness: The meeting which took place on 17 June
2008 between David Gee and the Rt Hon Jim Knight MP.
15 See Ev 77
and of the fact that there had been a statement until
2 o’clock this morning. I think, in all fairness and
decency, that I should have been given at least this
letter and an explanation as to why I was so
misrepresented.
Q337 Fiona Mactaggart: That is a reasonable
request, but one of the things that you have alleged
in your evidence to the Committee today is that
Ministers—in the phrase you used—“sexed up” the
issue. I am slightly tempted to use the same phrase to
describe the way that you have dealt with it, because
you have made much of the “fiction” of Ministers.
But as you now know—I am quite prepared to
accept that you did not know this when you
started—Ministers had made a correction to the
Committee and to Lord Sutherland. I am concerned
that, although you have raised some serious issues
before the Committee, they might be designed to, if
you like, divert the attention from the very
substantial criticisms of your role in the Sutherland
report.
Dr Boston: Let me say this: if there has been an edge
to my remarks, there is a reason for it. I gave
evidence to Sutherland on 18 September 2008. On 24
September, which was six days after I gave evidence,
three weeks before Balls and Knight gave evidence
and nearly three months before the Sutherland
report was published, which was certainly before
Sutherland had even put pen to paper, the
permanent secretary sought to negotiate my early
resignation on the grounds that the Sutherland
report would be bad for me. The Ministers had not
even given their evidence. The permanent secretary
said to me on that date that he wanted me out of the
job before March 2009. I engaged an employment
lawyer who wrote to the permanent secretary. I made
it clear that my intention was to remain in post until
the end of the contract and that I would be willing to
consider departure only on the basis of the contract
being paid out. That was, in fact, the end of the
correspondence—once the permanent secretary had
replied to Lewis Silkin. The Ministers’ evidence
came after that—Knight on the 14 October and
Balls on the 15 October. On the 11 December, as I
said, for the first time I became aware that there was
a problem.16 I make no allegations or assertions,
but it was very clear that, by the time the two
Ministers gave their evidence, the skids were under
me—or it was proposed to put the skids under me—
at Department level. That goes back to the meeting
on 18 March and the whole issue of the future of
the QCA.
Q338 Fiona Mactaggart: So your contention is that
this is—I am going to use the word “plot”, but I am
not saying that you are saying it is a kind of secret
plot—a plot devised well before the failure of the
curriculum tests to get rid of you from your role,
with the failure of the curriculum tests being used as
an excuse.
16 Note by Witness: On the 11 December I read the final pre-
release Sutherland Report, and for the first time I became
aware that there was a problem.
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Dr Boston: I think that I was seen as a troublesome
priest, and the failure of the tests was perhaps a
catalyst seen to oer an opportunity to allow those
events to move forward.
Q339 Chairman: When would your contract have
run out anyway?
Dr Boston: On 30 September 2009.
Q340 Chairman: David Bell said that he wanted you
out by March 2009?
Dr Boston: Before March 2009. His argument was
that he would prefer not to have me identified with
the delivery of the 2009 tests. He was seeking a
resignation before or on the date of Sutherland’s
report.
Q341 Fiona Mactaggart: From this Committee’s
point of view, we do not need to deal just with a spat,
much of which has been properly dealt with by the
Sutherland inquiry. While you might contest some
things in it, actually much of its account is
universally accepted.
Dr Boston: I agree.
Fiona Mactaggart: It is accurate, powerful and
teaches us some lessons that we need to learn. The
issue that this Committee needs to focus on is
whether it is possible for Ministers to delegate their
responsibility for mission critical things. One of the
things that you have said about Ofqual is that it is
critical that it has a further distance from Ministers.
I shall quote another piece of evidence that Jim
Knight gave to Sutherland, when he said, “if you
looked at it theoretically, you would say that
ministers are delegating the scrutiny and challenge
function to the Board that we appoint. We have our
observer on the Board in the form of a Director
General monitoring and taking part in discussions,
and then we have regular meetings with the Chair
who we also appoint—and that is a major decision
for us—and that in many ways ought to be it. But
beyond that theory, the reality clearly is that some of
these tasks that they are doing are so mission-critical
that we need alongside that arrangement to be
satisfied for ourselves that things are going well.”
That is a way of saying that these arm’s length
bodies, substituting people like yourself, with
professional, long-term standing in the field of
examinations and assessment, for full ministerial
responsibility, just don’t work, because people will
always turn to Ministers. One of your contestations
is that they have not done that enough.
Dr Boston: I am sorry. They have not done what
enough?
Fiona Mactaggart: The public have not pointed the
finger su ciently at Ministers. You are saying that
giving Ofqual greater distance from Ministers will
assist with this purpose, but Jim’s point and this
discussion show that that distance will always be a
fiction. The public will always require Ministers to
be accountable.
Dr Boston: Yes. I think that is true. There are
occasions when Ministers would be better to push
back and stand back from issues and let bodies such
as the QCA or Ofqual as the new regulator deal with
it. One problem that has emerged from time to time
is that Ministers have almost become arbiters
between the regulator on one hand and a body
contesting something with a regulator on the other
hand. I can think of various examples where that has
happened with subject associations and other
groups. I think that is a problem for Ministers. They
would be far better to stand back and stand well
away.
Q342 Fiona Mactaggart: But is not that exactly what
you are complaining that Jim Knight did? That he
did not keep pushing you and pressing you and so
on? That he actually did what you are saying
Ministers should do?
Dr Boston: No, I think I have said twice at this
meeting that if I had met with Jim Knight once a
week for the critical eight weeks of the delivery, the
problem would still have occurred, the failure would
still have occurred.
Fiona Mactaggart: Absolutely. You said in your
evidence to the inquiry that you were unaware of any
escalation between 6 and 25 June, which is a
critical period.
Dr Boston: I am not saying that frequent meetings of
that sort, or Jim, could have solved the problem at
that point. It was our problem to solve.
Chairman: I am sorry but we have to move on. Other
people need to ask questions.
Q343 Derek Twigg: When I was a junior Minister for
a short period before I moved to another
Department, we discussed this issue of online
marking and the marking system, which you were
advocating at that point. As you have outlined, there
were di culties in moving to that system. I will come
back to that, as it is one of the key points you have
raised today. I want to get one thing clear. Are you
accusing Ministers of lying?
Dr Boston: No, I am simply saying the evidence in
the report is wrong.
Q344 Derek Twigg: So, on the basis of the meeting
it could be a genuine mistake, but you find it di cult
to believe because surely a civil servant should have
told the Minister?
Dr Boston: I find it di cult to believe because there is
no other meeting it could possibly be confused with.
Q345 Derek Twigg: That a Minister would actually
come to a Committee or submit to an inquiry and tell
a blatant lie would be quite amazing, knowing there
was no evidence. So it probably was a genuine
mistake, on the part of the Minister at least.
Dr Boston: Whatever it was, it was wrong.
Q346 Derek Twigg: Let us get some dates clear: I am
sure it would not have made a great deal of di erence
to what happened but in order to get it on the record.
You used a couple of dates. You said you first
became aware of the problem on 25 June and you
said that people—presumably in the Department—
knew on 26 June. Jim Knight’s letter says that “the
first time QCA notified Ministers that ETS would
not deliver test results on time was 30 June”. Which
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is it? On one hand, the Department is saying 30 June
and you are saying 26 June. I am not saying it would
have made a great deal of dierence to what
happened but it is useful to have it on the record.
Dr Boston: I am quite clear that after we obtained
from ETS the formal letter it had to provide us with
under the contract, which is called a duty to warn,
which we received on 27 June, the director general
Jon Coles was briefed on that day.
Q347 Derek Twigg: So it is 27 not 26 June now? You
said 26 before.
Dr Boston: The 26th was the day we wrote to ETS
and sent an e-mail saying it had to reply to us in
terms of this duty to warn. I understand that there
was a telephone conversation with the Department
on that day telling it that that had occurred.
Q348 Derek Twigg: The 26th or 27th?
Dr Boston: The 26th. Then on 27th there was further
contact when we had the letter from ETS.
Q349 Derek Twigg: So you are clear it was the 26th
not the 30th?
Dr Boston: Yes.
Q350 Derek Twigg: You have rightly and openly set
out that you accept responsibility, but actually you
want to take someone else with you, for whatever
reason that may be. As far as I can tell, based on
what you have said, the key point—you will correct
me if this is wrong—is that there were always going
to be problems with the manual system, although we
have had it for God knows how many years and we
have not had this situation occur. However, you
believe that moving to an online marking system was
the key point in terms of trying to solve this problem
of uncertainty over delivering these results on time.
Am I correct in saying that?
Dr Boston: Onscreen marking.
Derek Twigg: Onscreen marking, right. You alluded
to the point that the Ministers were somewhat
reluctant to adopt onscreen marking, on the basis
that it was a risk; 2006 seemed to be the key point,
and you said you might have resigned at that point.
If you do not mind me saying so—again, correct me
if I am wrong—there was a slight insinuation that we
were more bothered about the results not being as
good if we went to the new system, and therefore
a ecting the league tables and the general
Government policy about improving education,
than about those technical problems and the risk in
moving to the new system. Which was it, in your
view?
Dr Boston: It certainly was not the case that there
was risk in the system; this is proven technology and
it is used widely throughout the world for school
marking. It is used here extensively, with the general
qualifications. It was not the risk. As far as I was
concerned, the clear stumbling block finally was the
unpredictability of what might happen and the fact
that the results would be di erent. They might be
better, or worse, but the one thing that you could be
certain of was that they would not be the same.
Q351 Derek Twigg: When did you have the final
conversation about this issue, in terms of a decision
by Ministers? You mentioned 2006 as being a key
part for you, and a time when you could have
resigned.
Dr Boston: I do not have the date of the final
decision, but it would have been late summer and
certainly before the ETS contract was finally let. I
say that because one of the things that we wanted
ETS to do, if the delivery had been successful and we
had kept ETS on contract, was the phased
introduction—potentially—of onscreen marking
over a period of time, if we could get ministerial
agreement for it. It was actually built into the
contract that there would not necessarily be manual
marking for five years; manual marking could
transform into other forms of delivery. Of course,
ETS is a major international player in that field.
Q352 Derek Twigg: I just want to confirm that you
believe that that was the key to stopping the problem
occurring?
Dr Boston: The key to avoiding this problem in the
future is exactly what Lord Sutherland has
recommended: end-to-end testing of systems of
onscreen marking.
Q353 Annette Brooke: As you have been talking,
Ken, I have been reminded of the Foster report
regarding the Learning and Skills Council, which
found fault with the Department for Innovation,
Universities and Skills, as I recall, and also identified
complacency and so on in the Department, as well as
finding major faults with the LSC and the way that
it had handled the capital programme and capital
bidding. So it seems to me that the point that you
have made this morning is absolutely critical, which
is that everything follows on from the very limited
terms of reference for the Sutherland inquiry—the
very fact that the Government were left out of that
inquiry. I think that your evidence has confirmed
that. I am not at all clear what these DCSF observers
had to do and I cannot see how they got left out of
the equation, because I presume that they have been
hearing everything that has been going on. Could
you give me a little more information on the status
of the observers? Do they just sit and listen, and not
go and report anything back? I realise that that
question is a little di cult for you to answer. None
the less, it seems to me that the nub of this issue is
that you are accepting your bit of the responsibility,
but the Government and the o cials have not
actually had the questions really asked of them.
Dr Boston: Lord Sutherland has also put his finger
on this, in that he is calling for clarification of the
role of observers. In practice, what happens is that
observers are there to represent Ministers and the
Department. They take part in discussions. There is
an exchange of views and that is very helpful in the
main. It is good to have that exchange and to have
that interaction. The problem arises, as I have said,
when they are conveying ministerial impressions and
we get to the point where we are actually negotiating
the QCA’s advice with them, rather than listening to
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what they have to say, challenging it, pushing it hard
and getting everything from them we need so that we
can then say, “Well, we will write this advice so that
the Ministers know what we think they need to hear,
rather than simply what you think they might want
to know.” It varies so much from committee to
committee and from role to role, and I am quite
uncertain what the observers do when they go back
to the Departments. Do they sit down and brief
Ministers and write notes for them, or do they brief
other sections of the Department, which would
probably be very helpful? In short, there needs to be
clarification of their role. Frankly, although Ofqual
has talked about having observers at various levels
on its committees, and indeed on its board, my
advice would be that it is making a mistake right
from the start. We do not want organisations that are
distant and apart, but a good exchange of
information between them. But we do not want to be
too cosy if finally Ofqual has to assert true public
independence and accountability to Parliament.
Q354 Annette Brooke: That openness, transparency
and clarity seem to be really important, and there are
lessons to be learned. You have used the terms
“sexed-up evidence” and “flawed evidence”, and we
can play around with the dates and with who knew
what, but you actually go on to say that it was used
to portray you as complacent, disengaged and
constantly beleaguered by Ministers. If that is the
case, it seems to me that the outcome is more serious
than playing around with the dates on who said what
and when. I would like you to confirm that you feel
that, as a consequence of some misinformation
being put into the system, you have suered in the
way you described in your letter.
Dr Boston: I find the remarks o ensive because they
are untrue, but I am a resilient old bugger and at the
end of the day it does not matter all that much, but
it needs to be corrected.
Q355 Mr Pelling: You answered Graham Stuart by
saying that you felt the Minister should resign. Why
do you think he should resign?
Dr Boston: Did I say that?
Mr Pelling: That was the impression I got, but
perhaps you did not.
Dr Boston: I did not say that.
Chairman: You did not say that in those terms.
Dr Boston: I do not have a view on that. People make
up their own minds, and I made up mine.
Presumably Ministers are also, from time to time,
confronted with di cult decisions.
Q356 Mr Heppell: I am a little worried. I think that
one of my colleagues said that they thought your
letter was intended to divert attention away from
discussion of what actually happened—I am not
sure whether that was its intention, but it certainly
has diverted attention from what is relevant. I share
Lord Sutherland’s view that it does not really make
any di erence to what the final result would be. I am
not quite sure about your use of emotive language
such as “sexed-up”, because even though you have
not said that the Minister lied, just as you did not say
that he should resign, there is almost an implication
in the things you have said to the Committee that
would suggest that. I would like to clear up a couple
of things. Are you saying that DCSF observers
would report to you as well as to the Department?
Dr Boston: No, I do not think that they would report
to me at all, or to the QCA. On your first point, I
agree, as I have said to the Committee, that had
4.137, 4.92 and 4.93 not been in the Sutherland
report, I still would have resigned. There is no
question about that. On the other hand, at the end
of a 45-year career in education, I do not wish to be
portrayed by a Minister as complacent and as
unengaged—disengaged—when it is absolutely
untrue and unfair and based on absolutely false
evidence. I believe that needs correction and it needs
correction publicly.
Q357 Mr Heppell: I think you are right. I think that
you have a right to be annoyed that you never
received a copy of the letter that actually did correct
that.17 That was not made public at the time, and I
think that is something that most members of the
Committee would accept, but I would like to move
on beyond that if I may. One of the things you said
to us—and it really worries me—was about walking
the high wire act and that this is such high risk. I just
found it impossible to believe that we need to accept
the idea that, just about a week before the thing was
to finish, you had not realised that it was going to fail
almost completely. You say, “Well, we were looking
at things, we were spotting the problems and we were
doing things to try to put them right.” But to
actually say that you had not recognised that this
was going to fail when there was just a week to go—
I just cannot believe that. I mean if that is the case,
we might as well not have you at all. Part of your role
is to identify where there is something wrong and,
actually, the idea that the Minister was pestering
you—I have had these arguments before. People say
to me, “Get in touch with us when you need
something,” and I say, “Well, I won’t know if I need
something until you tell me when there is something
wrong.” So the Minister was not going to pester you
until you knew something. E ectively, what you are
saying is that it was a week before the thing was
finished and you still did not know there was a
problem. There must be a system where you could be
better informed than that.
Dr Boston: We have gone over this in the Sutherland
report and in our submission to the Sutherland
report and so on. The management information we
were getting was poor and it was conflicting. We had
the situation where on 3 July, when we knew it had
failed on the 25th/26th, the president of ETS
America was sending us an e-mail saying, “We are
going to make it. We are going to get there by the
8th,” while his local guy was presenting us with data
which clearly showed that it was impossible that that
was going to be achieved.
17 See Ev 77
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Q358 Mr Heppell: I recognise what you are saying
about conflicting stu, but surely you should have
had a system in place that actually spots that
something is going wrong?
Dr Boston: The series of daily meetings we had on
the detail of all of this, given the evidence that we
were getting from ETS, indicated that we were on
course. You are right to point to what seems—what
clearly is—a major problem: that right up until the
end of June, 25 June, as the guy running the place,
the information that I was getting was that we were
going to make it safely.
Chairman: We have got to cut you there Ken,
because Edward has not had a chance of a question.
Sorry, John.
Q359 Mr Timpson: I shall try to hold a positive note.
It has been a very illuminating session and I think
what has come out of it is that from the time that you
were aware of failures within the QCA delivery, you
have acted—from what I have heard and read—
honourably through that process and taken a lot of
the flak for the failure of many others, not just
yourself. I know that you are also keen to continue
to contribute to the educational system, particularly
where it comes to qualifications and curriculums and
so on. To that end, what advice have you got for the
Committee on how the procurement process—for
the delivery, for the service provider, for 2010
onwards, of testing—should take place to ensure
that we do not end up in this position again?
Dr Boston: I would simply say that the key things
that we need to look for are to move immediately
and sharply into onscreen marking and increasingly
into taking the tests by computer, onscreen—
working with the tests, delivering the tests—and
with the sort of diagnostic feedback that onscreen
marking can provide to schools, which is immensely
important in shaping their further programmes and
interventions. That is the key thing that we should be
looking for.
Chairman: Ken Boston, we have had a good session.
I hope that you feel you have had a fair hearing. I
hope that you feel you have been asked some
searching questions. I know that you intend to stay
in the education sector, making a contribution. This
Committee would very much value a considered
piece of work if you have the time to do it. Your
original comment when you took over the job was
that we are still in a cottage industry using quill pens
and ink. We have not in those six years moved very
far from that, as you said in your evidence today.
This Committee would very much like, before this
inquiry is finished and we write it up, some piece that
is not about what happened but about how you
would get us from that cottage industry to the system
that you would like. I would also like you to consider
that this Committee in its former report said that
there was too much testing and assessment, and one
small victory we have had is that we do not have
quite as much testing and assessment as we had last
summer. Thank you very much for your attendance.
Dr Boston: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.
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Q360 Chairman: I welcome the Secretary of State,
the Schools Minister and the Permanent Secretary to
what will be a quite brief session. We have two
sessions today, both of which are important.
Secretary of State, it is customary for you to say
something to open up the proceedings.
Ed Balls: I will do that. I start by thanking you, Mr
Chairman, and the Committee for allowing us to
appear before you today, following our discussion in
February about the findings of the Sutherland
inquiry and in light of Dr Ken Boston’s1 subsequent
evidence. I wish to say from the outset that I am very
grateful for the public service given by Dr Boston
during his time as chief executive of the
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority. He made
a number of important contributions that we should
recognise. I always had good relations with him
during our time working together. As Lord
Sutherland’s report made clear, it is also the case
that, while the primary responsibility for the delivery
failure in last year’s national curriculum tests lay
with the contractor, ETS, there was also a failure on
the part of the QCA to deliver its remit. Lord
Sutherland was clear in his report that QCA
demonstrated insucient oversight of the
management and risks associated with the delivery
of its biggest contract. I wish to address briefly four
issues raised by Dr Boston in his evidence. First, as
the Committee knows, the Schools Minister did, in
error, conflate two meetings with QCA management
in his evidence to Lord Sutherland: a meeting on 17
June at which Dr Boston was not present and a
meeting on 2 July when he was. The error was first
brought to the attention of the Minister on 6
February after our appearance here. The Schools
Minister immediately wrote to you, Mr Chairman,
to apologise and to Lord Sutherland. The letter and
the reply from Lord Sutherland were placed in the
Libraries of both Houses on 12 February. There was
no attempt in any way to conceal or to mislead and,
importantly, in his reply of 12 February, Lord
Sutherland stated that that “clarification does not
substantially alter the points that were made” and
“does not a ect my findings”.2 Secondly, Dr Boston
states that, contrary to Lord Sutherland’s findings,
he was not pressed by Ministers on whether marking
was on track. In fact, as I said in the House last
month, I personally raised the issue with Dr Boston
on a number of occasions: on 19 May when I asked
1 See also supplementary evidence to this session from Dr
Boston: Ev 73–77
2 See Ev 77–79
my o ce to contact the o ce of Dr Boston to seek,
and get, reassurance that marking was on track; on
2 June at a meeting with Dr Boston; and on 6 June
when I wrote to a constituent and said that I had
personally asked Dr Boston to write to him, which
Dr Boston did on 16 June. It is true that Dr Boston
did not attend the meeting on 17 June called at the
request of the Schools Minister. Instead, his
subordinate, Mr David Gee, did attend and
provided similar reassurances to those that I
received directly from Dr Boston. Thirdly, Dr
Boston expressed concerns that the remit given to
Lord Sutherland for his inquiry was too narrow. In
his statement on 22 April, Lord Sutherland said, “I
believe the terms of reference for my inquiry were
drawn up in a way which gave me ample scope and
every opportunity to examine the processes, roles
and responsibilities of all the key players, and that
was not only QCA and ETS, but Ministers and
o cials at the DCSF. I reject entirely any suggestion
that my activities during the course of the inquiry
were constrained. I am glad that Ken Boston
recognises that my report was fair. I was clear in the
report that the prime responsibility lay with ETS,
but that there were significant failures in the QCA. I
stand by it strongly. I was informed in writing by Jim
Knight of the error in his evidence. As I said in my
response to his letter, the error did not materially
a ect any of the key findings in my report.” Fourthly
and finally, Dr Boston told the Committee that last
year’s failures could have been avoided if onscreen
marking had been used and that Ministers and
o cials had blocked its introduction in 2006. That is
emphatically not correct. While it is true that Dr
Boston was clearly in favour of onscreen marking, it
was the QCA itself that decided on the basis of trials
that were carried out in 2005 not to proceed. Indeed,
in his statement about the onscreen marking trials
conducted during the 2005 test cycle, it was Mr
David Gee who said publicly, “Following analysis, I
have concluded that it is inappropriate to introduce
onscreen marking for either maths at Key Stage 2 or
English at Key Stage 3 in 2006.” We have always
been clear that last year’s failures let down teachers,
parents, pupils and markers. We are determined to
ensure that that does not happen again. That is why
we have acted to ensure that all Lord Sutherland’s
recommendations are implemented in full. We are
very pleased to have the opportunity to come and
discuss this again with you today.
Q361 Chairman: Secretary of State, thank you. Can
you give us some more background on the
relationship that the Department and you had
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personally with Ken Boston? Ken Boston was
viewed by many people not only as a very competent
head of QCA, but someone whose reputation was
broader than that. He was a well-liked public
servant. People thought that he had come into the
QCA at a very delicate time in its history. If you
remember, there had been a previous problem with a
former Secretary of State and in came Ken Boston
as a really rather refreshing force in QCA. He made a
lot of friends, so people are asking what went wrong
when a leading public servant who had given great
service to education in this country falls out of
favour and ends up not only being treated in a very
strange way by being put into purdah for three or
four months, but being very angry about his
treatment. What went wrong?
Ed Balls: In the 18 months when we worked
together, I never had a cross word or dicult
exchange with Dr Boston. From the beginning, we
worked closely together on issues around standards
in the run-up to our announcement on Ofqual, issues
around the Williams maths report, which we
commissioned at the time, and then through the
autumn, in particular, and the establishment of
Ofqual. I never had any di culties with him at all. I
had a great deal of respect for the contribution he
made. It is certainly the case that there were past
times before I was Secretary of State when there were
some individual clashes over issues, but there was no
policy issue over which there was a clash between me
or other Ministers or senior o cials in our
Department and Dr Boston during those 18 months.
It is also true to say that Dr Boston and the QCA
were responsible for managing the clearly
unsuccessful contract with ETS. There were
significant management and oversight errors on that
contract—the biggest—which were clearly
documented in the Sutherland inquiry, and for
which Ken Boston has taken responsibility. The
decision to suspend him was taken by the QCA
board and not by Ministers, and a final settlement is
being reached with Dr Boston. I understand that he
is not happy, but it very important for me to set the
record straight.
Q362 Chairman: But in evidence to this Committee,
we got the very strong opinion that it was your
arrival at the Department that sparked o some of
his discontent. Dr Boston believed that you thought
that he was a sort of turbulent priest who wanted too
much independence—a more independent role—for
the QCA. He specifically mentioned the discussions
about splitting the QCA into two new bodies and
whether Ofqual would really be independent. He
gave this Committee the impression that you were
very worried about too much independence and that
you did not like him standing up for a more
independent QCA and, subsequently, a more
independent Ofqual.
Ed Balls: That does not accord with my impression
of the facts, and I do not think it accords with the
evidence that Dr Boston gave to the Committee, in
which he clearly said that he supports the
establishment of Ofqual as an independent
regulator—he thought that that was the right thing
to do. And the new QCDA will be established on the
same non-departmental public body basis as the
QCA. As I acknowledged, there were past times
when there were di cult words between Dr Boston
and Secretaries of State over comments that had
sometimes been made by Dr Boston’s senior sta
about aspects of Government policy. But I have to
say that no such occasions arose at all while I was
Secretary of State, and there was never a point at
which I had to call, speak to or meet Dr Boston to
disagree with him over policy or the handling of it.
But, of course, there was a significant management
failure last summer by the QCA.
Q363 Chairman: Dr Boston’s view was that there
was a specific meeting where the future of QCA,
QCDA and Ofqual was discussed where he believed
that there was a disagreement between you and him.
Ed Balls: That meeting was not attended by the
Schools Minister; it was attended by the Permanent
Secretary and me. I actually think that those who
were at that meeting will tell you that the
conversation between the Chair of the QCA, Dr
Boston and me was amicable and friendly, and that
I said that there had not been a moment during my
time as Secretary of State when there had been a
disagreement. I said that.
David Bell: That is absolutely correct. The
discussion was about the detail of what was being
proposed, and, as the Secretary of State says, Dr
Boston was very clear about the value of the new
independent regulator. He asked questions and
sought clarification over the role of the QCDA, but
it would be wrong to characterise that as an
aggressive or confrontational meeting.
Q364 Chairman: Let us move the personalities to one
side and come back to what Ken Boston suggests is
a kind of systemic problem. The systemic problem
that he seemed to be getting at was that it may have
looked as though the QCA was independent, but all
the time there were very powerful departmental
presences at many of the meetings, and that was
crucial. So what he is suggesting, in a sense, is that,
up front, it might look as though you were allowing
the QCA a high degree of independence, but actually
the men and women from the Ministry were at every
meeting, reporting back and pretty much keeping
control over what his sta were doing.
Ed Balls: I understand that, but I feel no need to put
the personalities aside, because, as I said, at no point
did I have a personality disagreement, clash, angry
word or di cult meeting with Ken Boston.
Secondly, the Bank of England is independent of the
Treasury and reports directly to Parliament. Ofqual,
which we are establishing as an independent
regulator, reports directly to Parliament,
independent of Ministers. However, the QCA is a
non-departmental public body. It is not
independent; it reports to Ministers, who are then
accountable to Parliament for the national
curriculum and the delivery of tests. Ken Boston was
not an independent decision maker or commentator
on Government policy. At no point did he seek to do
so when I was Secretary of State, nor did any of his
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sta, although there had been issues in the past.
What is clear, though, is that the QCA, on behalf of
Ministers, is responsible at arm’s length for
managing the national curriculum test process. It
would have been quite wrong for us to attempt to
intervene in the detailed management of those
contracts; instead, Ken Boston and his senior team,
with management expertise, were paid substantial
sums to deliver those tests to that remit. As Lord
Sutherland says, although primary responsibility lay
with ETS, Dr Boston and his senior sta did not
succeed in meeting that remit. We are accountable to
Parliament for that failure, but the failure was that
of the QCA. That is why Lord Sutherland made the
recommendations that he did.
Q365 Chairman: It is refreshing to hear you say that
Ofqual will be as independent as the Bank of
England. That is good news to the Committee. May
I take you up on one particular point that you
made—a factual one? Rather than it being the
decision of the QCA board independently to
suspend Ken Boston, we understand that it did so on
the recommendation of your Permanent Secretary.
Ed Balls: You will need to put that question to the
Permanent Secretary and accounting o cer. I am
happy to say firmly on the record that at no point did
I ever seek, directly or indirectly, to make any
direction to the QCA board. Those were matters for
the QCA board to decide.
Chairman: That is a di erent point. I think that the
record will show that you said that the QCA made
that decision independently. That is the information
that we have.
Ed Balls: The QCA board? I did say that.
David Bell: Obviously, I am not going to divulge all
the details of that confidential board meeting. The
decision to suspend the chief executive of the QCA
lay with the QCA board.
Chairman: Right. Let us leave it there; and we will
drill down on it in a moment. Derek, will you open
the questions on the Sutherland inquiry?
Q366 Derek Twigg: Just to be clear, if I heard you
rightly you said that the decision not to go on with
onscreen marking was based on the QCA’s
recommendation.
Ed Balls: Yes.
Q367 Derek Twigg: We had Ken Boston here; he
clearly suggested that Ministers did not go ahead
because it would have changed the results. That
could have been better or worse, which was a risk
that they were not prepared to take. He was very
clear on that. You say that the organisation of which
he was chief executive made that recommendation.
Why do you think that he would come here and not
say that?
Ed Balls: It is not for me to comment on Ken
Boston’s evidence or motive. I cannot answer that
question. All I can do is tell you the facts. On 27
March 2008, Ken Boston wrote to me, informing me
of the way in which the QCA was going to proceed
with the marking of the 2008 tests. It proposed
online marking capture, online standardisation and
online benchmarking. At no point in all my dealings
with Dr Ken Boston did he ever make the case to me
for online marking—in writing or verbally. On 3
November 2005, David Gee, a subordinate to Dr
Boston, made a public statement entitled
“Statement on the use of onscreen marking: the 2006
NCT cycle”. He said, “As I confirmed at an earlier
NCT board meeting in October, the NEA has
received the evidence from Pearson responding to
the criteria set out in the reassurance trial. Following
analysis, I have concluded that it is inappropriate to
introduce onscreen marking for either maths at Key
Stage 2 or English at Key Stage 3 in 2006. The
primary driver of this decision was the impact on
schools, in particular achieving the safe return of the
original scripts to schools to time and to budget. I
can therefore confirm that we will continue with
conventional marking for all key stage subjects in
2006.” That was announced by the QCA in 2005. It
was the QCA’s decision, based on its analysis of the
evidence. To my knowledge, there was no ministerial
involvement in that statement, but, as I said, since I
became Secretary of State in the summer of 2007, at
no point did Ken Boston raise with me or put to me
the case for moving to online marking.
Derek Twigg: At any point?
Ed Balls: At any point.
Jim Knight: I think that predecessor Ministers had
some discussion about onscreen marking.
Derek Twigg: I did when I was a Minister.
Jim Knight: But there was a very clear statement
from David Gee at the QCA that that was its
decision.
Q368 Derek Twigg: Can we move on to the letter
issue? In your letter of 9 February to Lord
Sutherland, you stated that the evidence you gave to
the inquiry, “was absolutely correct in all but one
regard”, which was that Ken Boston was not at the
meeting, as previously stated, on 17 June.3 Why did
you not copy Ken Boston into that correspondence?
Ed Balls: In retrospect, had we known that Ken
Boston was going to appear before the Committee
and make those points, we would have told the QCA
to ensure that he was copied in. At that time, the
QCA had suspended Dr Ken Boston. We received a
submission from our sta , following, I believe, our
appearance before the Select Committee on 4
February, saying that they had seen the error. They
brought it to our attention on 5 or 6 of February. We
immediately decided that our priority was to tell the
Select Committee and Lord Sutherland straight
away, and then to ensure that it was in the public
domain by placing in both Libraries of the House
our letter and Lord Sutherland’s response. In our
view, it was for the QCA management and board to
pass it on to the suspended former chief executive.
As I said, in retrospect, had I known, I would have
told my o ce to ring the QCA and say, “You must
make sure that this gets to Ken Boston.”
3 See Ev 77
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Q369 Derek Twigg: The diculty is that it was
material to him, therefore he was incredulous that he
had not been copied in, and it seems strange that he
was not.
Ed Balls: I understand that, but from our point of
view the imperative was that Lord Sutherland’s
report was in the public domain. We had responded
to his recommendations and given evidence to you,
and we wanted immediately to ensure that Lord
Sutherland and you knew, and that Lord
Sutherland’s view of it was in the public domain.
That is what we did. “In the public domain” meant
available to all. In retrospect, I wish that we had also
contacted the QCA board and said, “Make sure you
get this to Dr Ken Boston,” but to be honest, our
assumption was that that was what they would do.
Our imperative was to make sure that it was made
public. Do you want to add anything, Jim?
Jim Knight: I think that Ken said in evidence to the
Committee that he realised in December that I had
made an error, and I regret that he did not tell me
then, and I could have corrected things sooner.
Equally, I regret that, because we told Sutherland
and every member of the Committee, and because it
was on the Sutherland website and the QCA knew,
we did not directly tell Ken. Naturally, I regret the
error. In Ken’s evidence to you, it looks like he
thought that I was at the meeting on 18 March that
was very tense, and I was not. People do make
mistakes when recalling meetings. It is unfortunate,
and as soon as you know, you need to put the record
straight. That is what I did.
Q370 Derek Twigg: In retrospect, if you had your
time again, would you have sent him a copy of that
letter?
Ed Balls: It is not clear that it was our responsibility
to send it to a suspended member of the QCA board.
Certainly, in retrospect we should have ensured, as
well as coming to the Select Committee and making
things clear in Parliament and in public, that the
QCA board sent the letter to Ken. Therefore, I am
happy to say—
Q371Chairman: We did not get an answer from the
Permanent Secretary when I asked—not a direct
answer—if he instructed the QCA to suspend Ken
Boston. Let me give you a parallel. Recently the
chief executive of the Learning and Skills Council
resigned. As you know, there was a problem over
capital funding, and he went. Ken Boston’s
frustration was that you, and certainly the QCA,
suspended him for about three and a half to four
months, which made him unable to come to this
Committee and give evidence. He was in limbo and
could not give evidence or speak to anyone, because
he was not on gardening leave—he was suspended.
We contacted him and said, “Will you come to the
Committee?” He said, “I can’t, I’m suspended.”
Added to that, when he eventually comes to the
Committee, he finds this letter that he had no
knowledge of. So, it does look like a bit of a
conspiracy, doesn’t it, when David Bell won’t really
tell us whether he instructed QCA to suspend this
man indefinitely?
Ed Balls: Let me ask David to answer that in a
second, but let me say first of all that the first
Ministers knew that there was an error was when
Ken Boston’s subordinate, who works for him, came
to a meeting, which Jim conflated with another
meeting—the first we knew about that was on 6
February. We immediately did what we thought was
the right thing to do, which was to make sure that
Parliament and the Committee knew about it—and
Lord Sutherland, who has said that it does not a ect
his conclusions or findings. Any suggestion that
there was any attempt to mislead or conceal is
untrue. We immediately made this known to you and
then to the general public, by placing it in the
Commons Library in February. That we tried to
conceal is not true and, secondly, the idea that this
was in any sense a deliberate attempt to mislead
Lord Sutherland is untrue.
Q372 Chairman: Secretary of State, we are not
saying that—we accept your explanation that it was
unfortunate that Ken Boston never got the letter.
However, set in that context, why was he put into
suspension for three and a half months and unable
to talk to anyone?
Ed Balls: That is a di erent point, entirely
unconnected to this particular issue of the report on
the 17 June meeting. I think you will find that the
Permanent Secretary is happy to answer any
questions you want to put to him about the whole
process.
Q373 Chairman: We never got a straight answer to
the last question, Secretary of State, which is why I
asked you.
David Bell: To be clear, the discussions at that
confidential personnel-related board meeting are not
for public consumption.
Q374 Chairman: It is not confidential when one of
the people there gives evidence to the Committee
about it.
David Bell: It is very clear. The QCA had a
confidential board meeting to discuss a significant
matter. What I said to you was that it was the
decision of the QCA board to suspend Dr Boston.
Chairman: Listening to your advice.
David Bell: I contributed to the discussion, but I did
not say, “You must suspend Dr Boston.”
Q375 Chairman: But you are the big boss, you are
the Permanent Secretary. If you picked up the QCA
and expressed an opinion, are you telling me that it
is not going to kowtow to you?
David Bell: This, in a sense, takes us back to previous
discussions that Dr Boston referred to. I made it very
clear that the decisions regarding Dr Boston’s
employment, which include disciplinary matters,
rest with the QCA. They do not rest with the
Permanent Secretary. That is a matter of fact. Any
decisions made by the QCA board are made by the
QCA board.
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Q376 Chairman: In any other part of the world, in
any other business, in any other sector, if you were
sitting there making a decision about someone’s
future, a top member of your personnel, and the big
boss was there—come on, Permanent Secretary, we
weren’t born yesterday—if you were sitting there
and you articulated a view, are you telling me that
they wouldn’t have said, “Yes, sir. That is the
Permanent Secretary, you are suspended for three
and a half months.”
David Bell: No, it would have been quite
inappropriate for the QCA to have made decisions
that were not its own. The QCA board had to make a
decision regarding suspension. In fact, I made it very
clear in earlier correspondence that any decisions
regarding disciplinary matters were for the QCA
board, and the QCA board alone.
Q377 Chairman: But Ken Boston had oered his
resignation. Why didn’t you just accept it?
David Bell: It was not for me to accept.
Chairman: But you were there.
David Bell: It was the QCA board’s decision not to
accept Dr Boston’s resignation, not mine. I had no
locus in that matter.
Q378 Chairman: And you didn’t think it strange that
taxpayers’ money was going to be paying a man for
nearly four months for doing nothing.
David Bell: Well, we have proper and well-accepted
procedures that when you suspend individuals you
suspend them on full pay, pending the outcome of a
disciplinary investigation. That is what happened
with Dr Boston. The QCA suspended him on full
pay and then carried out an investigation into his
conduct. That is entirely appropriate and you would
find that happening in almost all walks of life.
Chairman: Derek, sorry, I cut across you.
Q379 Derek Twigg: A key part of what Dr Boston
said, in terms, was that basically the evidence against
him in the report was sexed up. He specifically said
that your statement, Secretary of State, was
complacent and disengaged, and that he was
constantly beleaguered by Ministers with questions
he was unable to answer. I think he said that you
stated that he, Ken Boston, managed the test
delivery process at arm’s length from the National
Assessment Agency. What is your response to those
accusations, in terms of you misquoting him, not
putting the correct evidence and trying to blame him
for the whole thing?
Ed Balls: The remit for delivering the national
curriculum tests was a remit from the QCA, of which
Ken Boston was the chief executive, and it was
managed within the QCA by David Gee, the
managing director of the NAA. I think one of Lord
Sutherland’s points is that ambiguity in the
oversight of Ken Boston of the work of David Gee
was an issue for the QCA. On 19 May these issues
were raised in the House of Commons and I
contacted Dr Ken Boston’s o ce to seek
reassurance that the marking was on track, and
received that reassurance.I had a meeting with Dr
Boston on 2 June at which the first agenda item was
marking, because obviously we were concerned with
some of the feedback from the marking world. We
were told in terms by Dr Boston that any issues
around training had been sorted out and that
because ETS was doing things in a di erent way, that
was bound to lead to some noise in the system, but
things were under control. The Schools Minister
became more concerned in the next week or so by
reports and therefore asked for a meeting with the
QCA, but it was David Gee who attended that
meeting and gave the same reassurances. During
that period Ministers regularly pressed for
reassurances and received them. It was not until 30
June that the QCA position suddenly and
substantially changed, and it was on that basis that
we moved into a di erent phase.
Q380 Derek Twigg: So you stand by your statement
that Ken Boston managed the test delivery process
at arm’s length from the NAA?
Ed Balls: Is that a statement from me or from Ken
Boston?
Derek Twigg: You said it in your statement on 16
December.
Ed Balls: It is certainly the case that one of Lord
Sutherland’s criticisms of the QCA management is
that they treated the NAA as a separate body, when
in fact it was part of the management structure of the
QCA. Therefore one of Lord Sutherland’s criticisms
is that Ken Boston did treat the NAA as more arm’s
length than was in fact the case. But I have to say
that from my point of view Ken Boston regularly
gave me reassurance, so, far from being at arm’s
length, he was telling me on regular occasions that
things were on track.
Jim Knight: Let me just add, in terms of the sequence
of things from 30 June through to 2 July, which was
the meeting that I got confused about and thought
was on 17 June—in terms of describing the character
of the meeting—on 30 June there were some phone
calls with Jon Coles, the then acting and now full
Director General for Schools, when they said there
were some problems with their projections that Key
Stage 3 would be marked on time, and perhaps some
problems with Key Stage 2 English. There are some
e-mails that show that through the course of 30 June
that situation looked as if it was getting more
serious. That is when I asked for the meeting with
David and Ken, which Ken said to you he
remembers very well and is beyond the terms of
reference of Sutherland. I do not think it is at all
beyond the terms of reference of Sutherland, because
at that meeting, when, incidentally—looking
through the notes that my private secretary took of
it—David Gee contributed 24 times and Ken just
twice, we went through in a lot of detail exactly when
the marking might be done. At that point, none of
the technical problems that subsequently came to
light, which were causing so much di culty and
delay in the delivery of the results, were coming to
light; so from 2 July onwards we still had a lot of
work to do in understanding the problem. It was in
that set of conversations that Ken was distant and
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delegated everything to David. That informs the
nature of my comments that Ken took exception to
when I gave evidence to Lord Sutherland.
Ed Balls: It was Jim’s comments.
Q381 Mr Stuart: Can I momentarily take Mr Bell
back to the QCA board meeting on Monday 15
December. Was it held at your behest?
David Bell: It was initiated by the chairman of the
QCA.
Q382 Mr Stuart: And was it held at your behest?
David Bell: No. The chairman of the QCA called
that meeting.
Q383 Mr Stuart: You didn’t ask him to do so—you
made no contact with him to suggest that should
happen?
David Bell: No. He decided to hold that meeting.
Q384 Mr Stuart: That was obviously his decision to
make, but he could have been advised by you.
David Bell: He talked to me quite considerably
about the run-up to the publication of Sutherland.
Mr Stuart: So you did speak to him.
David Bell: Of course I spoke to him.
Mr Stuart: Okay. So you spoke to him before the
meeting, and then the meeting was held, and as he is
the chairman—
David Bell: I had to speak to him on a number of
occasions in the run-up to the Sutherland
publication.
Q385 Mr Stuart: This of course goes to the heart of
some of the issues here—that your Department is all
over the QCA, yet the QCA has the responsibility.
Was that meeting held when everybody was present,
or was it a teleconference?
David Bell: It was a teleconference.
Q386 Mr Stuart: And you attended?
David Bell: I attended along with one of my
directors general.
Q387 Mr Stuart: Had the rest of the board had the
chance to read the Sutherland inquiry at that point?
David Bell: This is quite important: the QCA board
meeting is a private one—it is a confidential
meeting—
Mr Stuart: Had they had the chance to read the
report?
David Bell: If I may say to you, Mr Chairman, I
received minutes of the meeting that the QCA said to
me were legally confidential.
Q388 Mr Stuart: Had they received copies of the
report by 15 December? It is nothing to do with
confidential minutes, Permanent Secretary.
Chairman: Graham, let us get some ground rules. Let
the witness give his reply, then you can come in
again.
David Bell: As a matter of fact, the QCA board did
not see an advance copy of the Sutherland report,
although a couple of members of the board did. That
was again in accordance with the instructions of
Lord Sutherland, who wanted to restrict
publication, so the full board had not seen the full
report.
Q389 Mr Stuart: Thank you. So you had spoken
extensively to the chairman. He decided to hold the
meeting on the Monday. It was a teleconference that
you attended. The other members of the board had
not read the report. It was decided to suspend—a
rather unusual process—rather than accept the
resignation of the chief executive.
David Bell: That was the decision of the board.
Q390 Mr Stuart: That was of course a decision of the
board on which they did not have the full facts—you
did and you attended.
David Bell: That was the decision of the board.
Q391 Mr Stuart: Thank you. I think that makes the
position extremely clear. Can I ask the Secretary of
State why you intervened when Ofqual was going to
conduct the inquiry? Instead you intervened and
said that Lord Sutherland should report to you and
specified the remit. I think there are two key points;
there are nine bullet points, but eectively you said
that Lord Sutherland should report to you on how
the QCA had discharged its remit from the DCSF
and how the QCA had delivered against its formal
success measures in relation to Key Stage 2. Apart
from a reference to the appropriateness of the
DCSF’s arrangements to monitor, basically Lord
Sutherland was asked by you to report to you, not to
Ofqual, and to do so on the basis of what the QCA
had done with ETS rather than looking at the
broader picture. Is that fair?
Ed Balls: No.
Jim Knight: No.
Chairman: Sorry, who is responding?
Ed Balls: I made very clear in my opening statement
the view of Lord Sutherland, which is that he felt his
remit was very wide and covered the role of the
QCA, but also Ministers and DCSF o cials. He
says he rejects entirely any suggestion that his remit
was in any way narrowed. The QCA does not report
to Ofqual, it reports to me. I asked Lord Sutherland
to look into aspects of this, but Ofqual also has
responsibilities for national curriculum tests and
standards. Therefore, in those parts of its remit, the
Sutherland inquiry reported to Ofqual, and that was
entirely appropriate, open, public and fully to the
satisfaction of Lord Sutherland.
Q392 Mr Stuart: Ken Boston, as you know, gave
evidence to us that the remit was constrained. If you
read the remit, I think it is quite clear. I am going to
move on, if I may.
Ed Balls: Mr Chairman?
Mr Stuart: I am asking the questions. You answer
them. I haven’t given you one, Secretary of State. I
will come to the next question in a moment.
Ed Balls: I don’t think this is the way to behave, Mr
Chairman.
Chairman: Let the witness come back, Graham. I
give everyone a fair hearing on this Committee.
Secretary of State.
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Ed Balls: It is not fair or correct to say that the remit
was narrowed. Lord Sutherland in his statement on
22 April says, “I reject entirely any suggestion that
my activities during the course of the inquiry were
constrained.” He also says he believes the terms of
reference were drawn up in a way that “gave me
ample scope and every opportunity to examine the
processes involved and the responsibilities of all of
the key players, not only QCA and ETS but also
Ministers and ocials at the DCSF.” Those are not
my words, they are the words of Lord Sutherland
who stands fully by his findings.
Q393 Mr Stuart: That is clear, Secretary of State.
The point I made was that Ken Boston, who was the
head of the QCA, doesn’t agree with that
assessment.
Ed Balls: Dr Boston doesn’t agree with that
assessment but Lord Sutherland does agree—that is
his assessment.
Mr Stuart: You don’t need to say so for a third time,
Secretary of State. We have limited time and I would
like to ask another question, if I may.
Jim Knight: I would like to say in response to you,
Chairman—
Mr Stuart: Who is dictating this, the questioners or
the witnesses?
Chairman: I am, as Chairman. I am going to give a
fair crack of the whip to everyone. The Schools
Minister wants to come in and then you are back in
the questioning.
Jim Knight: If I could add, in response to a question
from you, Chairman, Ken said, “I think he did a very
fair job and I have said on the public record several
times I think it is a very good report.” Ken thinks it
is a good report and it was a fair job. The person who
wrote it says that the remit was wide enough for him
to cover the DCSF. He makes a few small criticisms
of the DCSF along the way. I think the remit was
perfectly wide.
Q394 Mr Stuart: Thank you. Ken Boston says that
it is a good report, given the limited remit that Lord
Sutherland was given. But Lord Sutherland takes a
di erent view, and it was his report, so I think you
have that on the record. But this goes to the heart of
the issue—about independence, which often runs
like a thread through so much of the work of the
Department. Why was an o cial from the
Department seconded to the Sutherland team?
Ed Balls: Just to be clear, Ofqual is independent of
the Department. It reports directly to Parliament.
The QCA is a non-departmental public body, as the
QCDA will be. They are not independent—they
report to Ministers who then report to Parliament—
but we set them an annual remit in which they
manage certain aspects of their work at arm’s length.
In this case it is the delivery of the national
curriculum tests.
Mr Stuart: Could you answer my question?
Ed Balls: It is just as important to correct mistakes.
The issue of independence does not arise in the case
of the QCA. It is not an independent body.
Mr Stuart: I would quite like someone to answer my
question.
David Bell: This is about—
Mr Stuart: It is a simple question: why was an o cial
from the Department seconded to the independent
Sutherland inquiry?
David Bell: There is a very straightforward answer to
that. It is very frequently the case that when
independent inquiries are set up, the Departments
that have commissioned them draft over o cials to
carry out such work to support inquiries. That is
absolutely straightforward and happens not just in
our Department, but right across Government.
Q395 Mr Stuart: Right. So when you have an
independent inquiry looking into, according to the
Secretary of State, an apparently wide remit
including the behaviour of the Department, it is
appropriate for someone who works in the private
o ce of the Permanent Secretary to be seconded to
that independent inquiry to join the secretariat and
be part of the drafting team. Is that what you are
telling us? It sounds like an episode of “The Thick of
It”. You guys would make excellent characters in
that show.
David Bell: As I have already written to you this
morning, Mr Stuart, I pointed out to you that I
explained to Lord Sutherland that I thought we had
an exceptionally able member of sta who was able
to take part in this—
Mr Stuart: I bet you did.
David Bell: Mr Chairman, I find there is a question
of my integrity here. The suggestion is that somehow
I put to Lord Sutherland a member of sta who
would not—
Mr Stuart: From your private o ce.
David Bell: From my private o ce, who would not
be appropriate. The decision to take a member of
sta from my private o ce, given the expertise that
they could bring, was Lord Sutherland’s. As I also
pointed out to you in my letter this morning, Mr
Stuart, the final decisions—the findings and
recommendations of an independent inquiry—rest
with the person who carries out the inquiry, not a
junior member of sta who joins the inquiry
secretariat.
Q396 Mr Stuart: That would be just as the QCA
board was responsible for the decisions which you
helped to lead it to come to? The next question, if I
may: could you confirm that the member of sta
from your private o ce seconded over to this
inquiry played a part in drafting sections of the
report?
David Bell: I don’t know that, because it is Lord
Sutherland’s report. You would have to ask Lord
Sutherland that question. The final report is Lord
Sutherland’s, not a member of the secretariat’s.
Q397 Mr Stuart: I spoke to Lord Sutherland
yesterday. He is a man of the utmost integrity. He
told me that he took full and total responsibility for
the report, that everyone who worked for him
produced the report to his requirements and that he
had no doubts whatsoever about the e cacy and
professionalism of his team. But I put it to you,
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Permanent Secretary, that sending someone from
your private oce to join the drafting team of a
supposedly independent inquiry is not appropriate.
Mr Heppell: Would that not be the normal process?
Chairman: John. What’s the problem?
Mr Heppell: It just seems to me that in any inquiry
people are going to ask for people who have some
knowledge to assist them. Is it not normal practice
for somebody to be seconded?
David Bell: That often happens and I can cite a
number of examples when people who have been
working in the policy area go over to independent
inquiries. This is not just something that happens in
the DSCF, it happens regularly across Government.
If you appoint independent inquirers to carry out
reports, they need secretarial support. It is the
responsibility of the person carrying out the inquiry.
You have just quoted Lord Sutherland, according to
your conversation with him, Mr Stuart, saying that
the members of sta concerned behaved with the
utmost integrity, and the report and its findings were
Lord Sutherland’s alone. I am therefore struggling
to understand what the problem is if that is the
decision Lord Sutherland has come to about the
support he received.
Q398 Mr Stuart: That may be a problem in itself. I
think any outsider would find it odd that someone
from the Permanent Secretary’s private o ce could
be deputed. Is it possible that she could have written
draft sections of the report?
David Bell: I don’t know. I had no contact with the
individual concerned during the process.
Ed Balls: Does she work in your private o ce now?
David Bell: She does not work in my private o ce
now and she was physically out of my private o ce
during the time this inquiry was carried out.
Q399 Mr Stuart: But she did return to work for your
Department after her secondment to Sutherland?
David Bell: Of course she did.
Mr Stuart: So she worked for you beforehand and
she works for you again now.
David Bell: She works for the Department, so yes,
she works for me ultimately.
Q400 Mr Stuart: Permanent Secretary, I am sorry
for appearing cynical, but we are trying to get to the
truth here. What we have is a person from your
private o ce who was apparently in charge of the
recording equipment at the hearings and may have
been part of the drafting team, and then, days after
Ken Boston gave his evidence, weeks before
Ministers gave evidence to the Sutherland inquiry,
and months before it was published, you met with
Ken Boston and suggested—according to his
testimony—that he should resign because the
findings were not going to be good for him. Can you
explain that meeting and why you took that
extraordinary step?
David Bell: Just before I answer that question, I
think I should say that it was Dr Boston’s lawyers
who asked me to keep private and confidential all the
discussions I had with Dr Boston in September and
October. Dr Boston chose in this Committee to
breach that confidentiality. It was entirely
appropriate for me, as the principal accounting
o cer, to talk to Dr Boston about his position, and
yes, I did ask him to consider his position. However,
when Dr Boston gave testimony to your Committee
he said: “The Permanent Secretary spoke to me and
I made it clear that I would be willing to consider
departure only on the basis of the contract being
paid out.” In actual fact, that is not quite the case,
because when Dr Boston’s lawyers wrote to me, they
said: “Dr Boston should receive a payment
equivalent to 10% of his salary.” His lawyers went on
to say—
Mr Stuart: Chairman, that doesn’t answer my
question, and I’d rather he answered the question I
put, rather than the one he would like me to have
put.
Chairman: Hang on. Graham, if he doesn’t answer
the question, you will get another bite, but let him
answer first.
David Bell: You asked me why I had that
conversation, and I am referring to Dr Boston’s
testimony. Dr Boston’s solicitors said on his behalf:
“All success measures appended to the remit letter
from the Secretary of State have been met, other
than in relation to delays over the Key Stage tests.”
So when Dr Boston said he only asked for his
contractual entitlement, that is not the case: he asked
for additional payment if he was even to consider
early retirement.
Q401 Mr Stuart: Why did you say that the inquiry
findings were going to be bad for him?
David Bell: You didn’t have to be a prophet to work
out that the inquiry was going to be bad. The other
thing I should say is that as the crisis unfolded during
July and into early August it became apparent to me
that Dr Boston did not have a grip of the detail of
the issues. Therefore, I surmised that the inquiry was
going to be very di cult for the QCA and for Dr
Boston. I had no contact with anyone in the inquiry
and I did not know what it was going to say.
Q402 Mr Stuart: You did have contact. You said you
had contact with the person from your private o ce
who had joined the inquiry team—only on
discussing administrative matters relating to the
inquiry, but—
David Bell: Precisely.
Q403 Mr Stuart: But even after the appointment of
that person you were in contact with them on
administrative matters. That person worked for
your private o ce beforehand and was returning to
your Department afterwards, and you were in
contact with them during the inquiry. No wonder
you were so confident.
David Bell: I will give you the administrative contact
we had. She said, on Lord Sutherland’s behalf, “Can
we set up an interview to take your evidence?” My
reply was, “Yes, you can, and we will do it on this
date.” That is the administrative contact we had
during the process.
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Ed Balls: May I add briefly to that point? David
wrote to the Cabinet Secretary on 22 April 2009 and
made it quite clear that at the time of the discussion
he had in September with Dr Boston, when the
discussion with lawyers and the contractual
payments arose, there had been no prior discussion
at all with Ministers. That was a discussion that
David had with Ken in his role as accounting ocer.
The second thing I would like to say, and this echoes
what Lord Sutherland has said on the record and to
Mr Stuart, is that in my view our Permanent
Secretary and our civil servants have at all times
operated with the highest standards of integrity and
independence, and the insinuation that somehow
there was some kind of complicit co-operation in
trying to change the direction of the Sutherland
inquiry’s findings is absolutely untrue and
unfounded in my experience. I think that in this
Permanent Secretary we have somebody with the
very highest standards of integrity. It is really
important for me to put that fact on the record, on
behalf of the two Ministers here.
Q404 Mr Heppell: Following on from that, and to
get this absolutely clear, on whose authority did you
approach Ken Boston in September 2008?
David Bell: My personal authority.
Q405 Mr Heppell: And when was the decision taken?
When did you make a decision to seek his
retirement?
David Bell: I first met Dr Boston to discuss that on
24 September and that led to exchanges between me
and the lawyers. I went back to the lawyers and quite
explicitly said that it was not my responsibility to
initiate any action against Dr Boston. What I was
saying to Dr Boston, as principal accounting o cer
to accounting o cer, was, “I think you should
consider your position because it has been a very
di cult year.” So I initiated that.
Q406 Mr Heppell: So that was because of the
impending report? Was it anything to do with the
meeting on 18 March? That was what Ken Boston
said in evidence. He said he believed that Ministers
had decided to put the skids under him—his
words—following the meeting on 18 March.
David Bell: At no time did the Secretary of State, the
Schools Minister or any other Minister say to me,
“You have to have a conversation with Ken Boston,
telling him to go.” They never said that to me. I had
the discussion as the principal accounting o cer
saying to the accounting o cer responsible for the
QCA, “You should consider your position.” Dr
Boston implied to you that he was only prepared to
consider his position if his contractual entitlements
were met. Actually, Dr Boston was seeking a bonus
and some other additional payments before he was
prepared to leave. I wrote back and said that it would
be completely unacceptable to pay anything other
than his contractual entitlement. So Dr Boston was
seeking more than his contractual entitlement if he
was going to have a negotiation with the QCA board
about his future.
Q407 Mr Heppell: Do you think, with hindsight—I
know that such things are very useful—that it was a
good idea to be seeking resignation from Dr Boston
before Lord Sutherland had reported and before the
Secretary of State and the Minister had even given
any evidence at the inquiry? I know that you have
partly answered this.
David Bell: Yes, I think it was appropriate. The
principal accounting o cer has to take overall
responsibility for relationships with other bodies
and other accounting o cers, and given that I had
seen Dr Boston close up during the crisis and was
very concerned about the way he was handling it, I
think you would have been astonished if I had had
no conversation with him about his future. I saw that
and felt that a conversation would be appropriate in
the circumstances. Don’t forget that Dr Boston was
scheduled under his original contract to go in
September 2009 anyway, so there was a conversation
that would be had in the autumn. I decided to initiate
that conversation and say that I thought that in the
circumstances he should consider his position, but I
was only ever prepared to accept that he would have
six months’ notice.
Q408 Mr Heppell: Just one final thing about
something Graham said earlier. Would the minutes
of the QCA meeting that suspended Mr Boston not
be subject to freedom of information?
David Bell: I think you will find that if it was a
confidential personnel board meeting they would
not be, because you can utilise the arrangements
regarding personnel and confidential details in the
Freedom of Information Act.
Q409 Mr Timpson: Secretary of State, you have used
today as an opportunity to clarify a number of
matters by referring to correspondence between
your Department and Ken Boston.
Ed Balls: My statement was clarifying
correspondence between the Schools Minister, the
Committee and Lord Sutherland. The
correspondence that the Permanent Secretary
referred to is correspondence that we were not
involved in and I have not referred to it in my
evidence.
Q410 Mr Timpson: But it is coming from your
Department and it is being co-ordinated with Ken
Boston’s involvement in his role in the QCA.
Ed Balls: I have never seen any of the letters to which
the Permanent Secretary has referred between
himself, lawyers and Ken Boston. I did not know of
their existence.
Mr Timpson: I am not suggesting you have. All I am
saying is that you have read that correspondence.
Ed Balls: No, I have not seen that correspondence.
Q411 Mr Timpson: Perhaps if I put the question to
you rather than anticipating where this might go, it
might save us a bit of time. One of the periods that
has been in dispute—the confusion about who was
at what meeting and what happened during that
period—is between 19 May when questions were
asked in the House about the delivery of the tests
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marking and 2 July when, as I think it was said
earlier, it seemed to move on to phase two: it was
heightened. In order to help the Committee have
complete clarification and confidence in the answers
that you have given, and in the spirit of transparency,
do you not agree that it would be helpful to provide
to the Committee the correspondence between
yourself, the Schools Minister, your Department
and Ken Boston, so that we can be absolutely clear
as to what happened during that period?4
Ed Balls: All the correspondence was submitted to
Lord Sutherland. In a sense, we have been through
this. Lord Sutherland has seen all this evidence in
compiling his report.
Mr Timpson: But this Committee hasn’t seen it.
Ed Balls: The issues around the release of
information that was put together for the
Sutherland inquiry are matters for Lord Sutherland,
and then the normal processes for release. That is not
something that we, ministerially, would be involved
in. In terms of the particular issues raised, on 19 May
this was raised in oral questions. My oce spoke to
Dr Ken Boston’s o ce to ask for and receive
reassurances. I then had a meeting with Ken Boston
on 2 June. At that meeting I also raised a
constituent’s issue. I wrote to my constituent on 6
June. Ken Boston wrote on 16 June. On 17 June the
Schools Minister had a meeting with David Gee. On
2 July I had a meeting with Ken Boston and David
Gee. All of that is clear and in the public domain,
and all the papers that underpin that would have
been provided to the inquiry. It is not for me to pre-
empt processes around either the release of the
papers of the Sutherland inquiry or freedom of
information. There are proper processes for that.
But those are not processes in which Ministers would
ever be involved.
Q412 Mr Timpson: Can I go back to the original
question—do you agree that it would be helpful to
the Committee to have access to all that
correspondence in order to clear up the confusion
that has run on for months?
Ed Balls: I did answer that question, by saying that
it is not appropriate for me as Secretary of State to
comment on the release of information from an
independent inquiry or through freedom of
information.
Mr Timpson: I am not asking for it from Lord
Sutherland. I am asking for it from you.
Ed Balls: But all of the papers were provided to the
Sutherland inquiry.
Q413 Mr Timpson: But we have not seen them, and
that is the point I am making. Is there any reason
why we cannot see them?
Ed Balls: The answer I am giving you is that it is not
for Ministers to decide on the release of those papers.
It is a matter for the Sutherland inquiry and the
freedom of information processes. As far as I am
concerned, personally, there is absolutely nothing to
hide and everything to gain from full transparency. I
am completely relaxed about it. What I do not want
4 Correspondence published on the QCA website.
to do is pre-empt the proper processes around the
release of information. These are probably questions
that you should put to the Permanent Secretary for
an FOI point of view or that you should ask Lord
Sutherland.
Q414 Mr Timpson: Well, can I put on the record a
polite request for that information? If I have to go
through o cial channels, can I be given the
information by which to do that?
Ed Balls: It is not for me to make decisions about the
release of those kinds of papers. But we did say to
Lord Sutherland that he had to have access to
everything in order to do his inquiry, and he did.
Mr Timpson: So that is a no.
Ed Balls: It is the same answer as I gave you a
moment ago. It is not for me to make decisions
about the release of information in that way. But as
I said, I gave you a very clear answer. From my point
of view, full transparency is absolutely fine and the
right thing.
Q415 Chairman: Lord Sutherland has returned all
the documents supplied by the Department, as I
understand it.
David Bell: Yes, he has. But to reinforce the
Secretary of State’s point, there are proper
procedures regarding policy papers and other papers
that go through and flow through a government
department. If Ministers are approached, either by
parliamentary questions or via freedom of
information requests, o cials have to consider those
questions. They have to be considered under the
Secretary of State and by the proper procedures. We
don’t just put out all the papers on every policy area,
because even under the Freedom of Information Act
that would be considered inappropriate. But the key
point is that Lord Sutherland had access to all the
papers that he needed and he drew his conclusions
based on all of those papers. That is the most
definitive statement of what happened: Lord
Sutherland, an independent inquirer, published an
independent report.
Jim Knight: Incidentally, Edward, the Permanent
Secretary was copied into the letter to Michael Gove
from Lord Sutherland, where he raised similar sorts
of questions. It is a very thorough response from
Lord Sutherland which details the places in his
report that Michael could go to in order to see the
sequence of events, and how all of those questions
were properly answered in his inquiry. I would
imagine that Michael would be very happy to
share that.
Q416 Mr Timpson: As we are talking about
transparency, and independence seems to have been
the theme of this session, can I ask one further
question about Ofqual? Can you give assurance that
the full independence of Ofqual—you have referred
to it as having the same independence as the Bank of
England—will mean that there won’t be any DCSF
observers appointed to Ofqual?
Ed Balls: I think that in the end that is a matter for
the Ofqual board.
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Q417 Mr Timpson: What is your view?
Ed Balls: I am very happy to have the same
arrangements as the Bank of England.
Q418 Mr Timpson: So, your preferred view is for
there not to be DCSF observers on Ofqual?
Ed Balls: No, because the Bank of England has an
observer from the Treasury.
Jim Knight: We have got to be very clear, during the
course of the Bill that is going through Parliament,
that whether Ofqual invites observers or not is a
decision for its board.
Mr Timpson: I understand that, I was just using this
opportunity to find out your views.
Ed Balls: The Bank of England chooses to have a
Treasury observer at the monthly meeting of the
Monetary Policy Committee, but I don’t think that
anyone has ever suggested that that in any way
compromises the independence of the Bank of
England when it comes to making decisions on
interest rates.
Jim Knight: The reason why a board would
sometimes want to make that decision is that
Ministers still make policy decisions and there are
times when it might be helpful to a board to
understand the background to how those policies
were arrived at. If it has someone present that it can
ask those questions of, that can be helpful to it, but
in the end, that is the board’s judgment.
Ed Balls: That is absolutely how it works in the case
of the observer on the Monetary Policy Committee,
who will update regularly on aspects of fiscal policy.
Chairman: Thank you for that, witnesses. A quick
one from Derek.
Q419 Derek Twigg: I want to return to the issue of
onscreen marking because you made a very
unequivocal statement. I reread the evidence that
Ken Boston gave during the hearing, in answer to
my question. He said, “It certainly was not the case
that there was risk in the system; this is proven
technology and it is used widely throughout the
world for school marking. It is used here extensively,
with the general qualifications. It was not a risk.”
That is completely in contradiction to what you have
said. I cannot believe that you have come here and
said something that is not true, in any way, but I
wondered whether you have evidence from the QCA
saying what it recommends. I find it bizarre that you
came here and made a statement like that to this
Committee.
Ed Balls: In my opening statement, I said that while
Dr Boston was clearly in favour of onscreen
marking, which I understand from reading the
testimony to the Committee, the QCA itself decided,
on the basis of trials that were carried out in 2005,
not to proceed further. That was the QCA decision.
It may well be the case that Dr Ken Boston has, at
some point, in writing, or to ocials in the
Department, made the case for onscreen marking
since I have been Secretary of State. But what I said
was that at no point, to my knowledge, verbally or
in writing, did Dr Ken Boston ever make the case to
me for onscreen marking. It was the QCA’s decision
not to proceed, including in the case of the ETS
contract in 2008.
Q420 Derek Twigg: So you are saying that Dr
Boston and the QCA have completely di erent
views about this?
Jim Knight: In his statement, David Gee said that the
primary driver of this decision was the impact on
schools, and in particular how to achieve the safe
return of the original scripts to schools to both time
and budget. That was the principal reason why the
NAA—which is a division, but as Sutherland says,
probably too separate a division, within QCA—
made that decision. As I understand, when the
contract was procured for ETS it was procured on
the basis that it would start with conventional
marking, although it would use all the online things
that Ed referred to earlier. That was to move it on
from the quill pen, cottage industry that Ken likes to
describe it as, but some of the problems during the
summer were caused by how those online things
operated. The contract then left it open to move to
onscreen marking over the course of that contract.
People recognise that that works perfectly well with
other public examinations, but there are issues about
the return of scripts to schools, because schools
really value that. That was a part of the problems
that we had over the summer last year.
Chairman: We are running out of time. Paul Holmes.
Q421 Paul Holmes: You talked about observers on
the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee
and mentioned whether they might be required on
Ofqual. You had observers on the QCA. What was
their role exactly?
Ed Balls: The point that Lord Sutherland makes as
a recommendation for the DCSF is that we should
be clear about the role of those observers. We must
clarify that role, and that is what we have done in
discussion with the QCDA. The role of the observers
is to ensure a proper flow of information and an
understanding of the decision makers at the point of
decision. It is not to be involved in or seek to
influence those decisions, or to take away
accountability for those decisions from the decision
maker, which in this case is the QCA board. It would
be entirely inappropriate for a DCSF observer to
start trying to influence the final decision, but it
would be appropriate for them to ensure that the
QCA board knew the full facts in advance of that
decision. If the observer felt that there were
concerns, they could relay them back to the
Department. It is about information flow.
Q422 Paul Holmes: So were they there to clarify to
the QCA what was happening in the Department, or
were they there as an early warning to tell you that
there were problems coming up regarding the
marking of the tests? It is clear that they did not do
that.
Ed Balls: One of the problems, which the Sutherland
inquiry makes very clear, is that the QCA board did
not have a discussion that raised those kinds of
concerns and risks. It was not the case that we had
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observers who observed discussions but did not pass
the information on. Those discussions were not
really occurring, which is part of the problem about
the management of those risks. If the observers saw
something that concerned them at the point of
decision, of course I would have expected them to
tell me.
Q423 Paul Holmes: What level are these observers?
Are they level three, five, seven?
Ed Balls: They are sort of middle-ranking,
responsible ocials.
David Bell: We usually have a director general or a
senior-level o cial on the board. As the Secretary of
State said, we have given greater clarity to the role
of observers as we accepted the criticism that it was
vague. It is exactly as the Secretary of State has said.
There is no real di culty in providing a policy
framework for the QCA board to consider at the
same time as acting as an early warning back to the
Department. That is entirely reasonable and the
QCA board has accepted that.
Jim Knight: As Lord Sutherland makes clear, there
is a problem with scaling up the problems that were
happening. I was told throughout June that things
were going to be okay. In what became daily notes
from o cials on how it was going, I was told that the
NAA was confident that things were going okay.
It said that it was confident that it could deliver
results to schools—I am flicking through the
correspondence now. That is the information that we
were getting, but it is also the information that
David Gee, Ken Boston and the board were getting.
At the same time, about 40 people were put into the
NAA to try to sort the problems out, but it now
appears that people at the top of the organisation did
not know that.
Ed Balls: It would clearly be silly to say that because
there is an observer from the Treasury at a meeting
of the Monetary Policy Committee every month, the
responsibility for making interest rate decisions is
therefore really with the Chancellor. The same would
apply in the case of the CQA board. Observers have
a role to play, but it is really important to be clear
about where the accountabilities lie and where the
decisions are taken. In this case, it was the QCA
board.
Q424 Paul Holmes: So you have a fairly senior
observer there, a level 3 director general, but they are
neither influencing the QCA nor reporting back to
you. I am not sure exactly what—
David Bell: That is not the case, Mr Holmes—they
are reporting back. However, if you are making a
specific point about the national curriculum tests
and how they were going, it is very clear from Lord
Sutherland’s report that the board was not being
given information about potential problems.
Therefore, it would have been very di cult for an
observer on the board to report back something that
was not being reported to the board.
Q425 Mr Stuart: There would be issues raised about
the Bank of England’s independence if the Governor
of the Bank of England announced that, in his
opinion, observers from Government were trying to
shape the advice given to Ministers by the Bank of
England. That is exactly the allegation being made
by Ken Boston in this context.
David Bell: That is not true. If you think of the
people on the QCA board, they are not sitting there
in regular meetings having their decisions or advice
shaped by the departmental observer. What the
departmental observer would be doing—
Mr Stuart: That is what Ken Boston said, though.
David Bell: Well, that is Ken Boston’s view, but I
don’t think it accords with the facts.
Ed Balls: In any case, Dr Ken Boston was not the
chief executive of the QCA at the point at which he
made those comments and he never once made any
such comment to me at any point in the last 18
months in all the discussions that we ever had. At no
point did he ever say to me, “DCSF observers were
not playing a proper role.” The issue never, ever
arose.
Q426 Chairman: What lessons have we learned from
all this?
Ed Balls: We have learned that it is very important
that any organisation that has clear responsibilities
must also have proper risk management procedures
and ways of ensuring that information is escalated
up to the decision-making level, and that decision
makers are then able to look across the piece at all
the facts in assessing risks. On this particular
occasion, that did not happen at the level of the
QCA’s chief executive and board. That was a
substantial failure identified by Lord Sutherland,
alongside the failure of ETS itself to deliver. There
are some lessons for our Department, although Lord
Sutherland is very clear that our risk management
procedures were e ective. However, there is a need
for some clarity about the role of the observers.
When you are managing big contracts and you have
highly paid executives, it is essential that those
executives are on top of all the facts at all times,
know exactly what is going on and act in a pre-
emptive way, not just on individual risks but on the
accumulation of risks across the piece. In this case,
that did not happen at the senior management and
board level of the QCA.
Chairman: Thank you for that. That is the end of the
evidence session. Permanent Secretary, we have
received your letter and we will be in correspondence
with you about it.
Ed Balls: Thank you very much indeed.
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Letter to the Chairman from Dr Ken Boston AO
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the points raised in evidence given to your Committee on
20 May 2009 by the Secretary of State, the Minister and the Permanent Secretary.
Q360
As the Committee is aware, I became aware of the flaws in paragraphs 4.92, 4.93 and 4.137 in the
Sutherland Report on 11 December 2008. Neither the paragraphs nor the flaws had any impact on my
decision to resign the following day: they were an unnecessary irritant, but not material to the resignation.
I agree with Lord Sutherland that their correction does not aect his findings. What has disturbed me is not
so much the flawed evidence itself, but the repeated and quite unnecessary reliance on it by Ed Balls and Jim
Knight in the House of Commons and in the Select Committee.
The Secretary of State raised four issues in his opening statement to the Select Committee. My comments
are as follows.
1. The 17 June meeting: cock-up or conspiracy?
Does the evidence that “the Schools Minister did, in error, conflate two meetings” really stand up to
scrutiny? I think not.
A note of the meeting between Jim Knight and David Gee on 17 June was taken by a DCSF o cial. Given
the existence of the note, I find it odd—but not impossible—that Jim Knight gave incorrect evidence about
the nature and date of the meeting to Lord Sutherland, or was insu ciently briefed to give correct evidence.
But—that mistake having been made—surely he and his o cials should have discovered the error when
invited by Lord Sutherland to check the evidence against the documentation, and corrected it at draft
Report stage.
The Secretary of State and the Minister then relied heavily on this incorrect evidence in the House of
Commons on 16 December 2008. I found that extraordinary, given the competence of DCSF o cials. The
job of o cials is to protect their ministers; allowing ministers to mislead the House is a hanging o ence;
given the assiduous manner in which o cials attend to matters of detail, this account of events is highly
implausible.
Further, between my meeting with the QCA Panel on 14 January, and their letter to me on 30 January,
the Panel obtained a copy of the note of the 17 June meeting from the DCSF. The letter of 30 January
confirmed that the note did not record me as being present on 17 June. This meant that by 30 January at
the latest, DCSF o cials were aware not only that paragraphs 4.92 and 4.93 of the Sutherland Report were
wrong, but that statements made by the Secretary of State and the Schools Minister in the House of
Commons were incorrect.
I cannot believe that DCSF o cials did not immediately advise ministers of their error, knowing that
ministers were about to appear before the Select Committee. What circumstances led Messrs Balls and
Knight to repeat their statements—which their o cials knew to be wrong—in the Select Committee on
4 February 2009? Had they not been told of their error? Or did ministers ignore that advice? It is
incomprehensible that it was not until two days after his Select Committee appearance that Jim Knight was
supposedly informed of the error by o cials.
Further, the manner of correction of the error was contemptible. It is not su cient to have written to Lord
Sutherland and to the Chairman of the Select Committee, and to have placed the letters in the libraries of
both Houses. It is disgraceful that I should learn of the correction, and be given a copy of the letter of
correction, only on the morning of my appearance before the Select Committee on 22 April 2009. I should
have received a letter of explanation from both the Secretary of State and the Minister immediately the error
was discovered, and so should the QCA. The correction was mean, concealed and shabby.
No explanation has been attempted by ministers of paragraph 4.93 in the Sutherland Report. Lord
Sutherland clearly saw and read a note of the meeting on 17 June, which he referenced as a footnote. It
evidently lists me as attending the meeting. In late January however, the QCA Panel obtained from DCSF
a note of the meeting, which does not list me as attending. What is the explanation? Are there two di erent
notes of the meeting? Or was the note seen by Lord Sutherland subsequently amended to correct the error?
2. “Ministers usually pressed QCA’s Chief Executive for answers”
The explanation given by the Secretary of State is not consistent with any plain and fair reading of
paragraph 4.137 of the Sutherland Report, or with his responses in the Commons to Michael Gove and
David Laws. As I said in my letter of 15 April 2009 to the Select Committee “During the test delivery period,
QCA was of course closely monitoring the blogs and the many reports in the media about problems with
ETS, and working around the clock to resolve every issue which arose. We were in close contact with DCSF
o cials, who were also monitoring the situation”. Normal ministerial correspondence and telephone
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enquiries were properly being referred by DCSF to QCA throughout the test period, as a matter of course:
getting his oce to contact my o ce on 19 May, or my answering on 16 June just two of perhaps a hundred
items of ministerial correspondence referred to us and answered as a matter of routine during this time, can
hardly be construed as the Secretary of State personally and frequently pressing me for answers. During the
2008 test delivery period, I met with Ministers only twice: on 18 March, when the tests were not discussed;
and on 2 June, when—as I have previously said to the Select Committee—I gave reassurances on progress
to that date, on the basis of evidence I believed to be sound.
Further, I take exception to the spin in the Secretary of State’s statement “It is true that Dr Boston did
not attend the meeting on 17 June called at the request of the Schools Minister. Instead, his subordinate, Mr
David Gee, did attend”. I did not attend the meeting because I was not asked to attend; I was not aware
that Jim Knight had arranged a meeting directly with David Gee and not through my o ce until David came
to me a day or so before to clear the papers he proposed to table at the meeting; I was annoyed that DCSF
was again treating the NAA as if it were an independent organization rather than a division of the QCA; and
as I had an important and prearranged teleconference at the time of the meeting I was unable to reschedule.
3. The terms of reference for Lord Sutherland
The Secretary of State has not dealt with the real issue, which is that he himself caused Ofqual to stumble
at its first real hurdle.
The 2008 test failure presented Ofqual with the opportunity to establish itself as a truly independent
regulator. If Government had wanted Ofqual to exercise real independence, and to get to all the root causes
of the failure, it would have allowed Ofqual to establish terms of reference for Lord Sutherland which
encompassed the role of all three partners in test development and delivery: Government, QCA and ETS.
It should have been beyond question that Ofqual, with Lord Sutherland as its agent, would account to
Parliament, not to the Secretary of State, and would do so through the Select Committee.
Instead, the Secretary of State had Lord Sutherland report to him, not Ofqual, on QCA management of
the ETS contract, which would otherwise have been a critical part of a comprehensive Ofqual inquiry. He
narrowed the potential scope of the inquiry; put a fence around the DCSF; focused the spotlight on QCA
and ETS; prevented some of the real causes of the failure from being identified; and compromised the
independence of Ofqual. This should be remembered whenever we hear hollow Government rhetoric about
Ofqual being an independent regulator. Ed Balls cut o its oxygen at birth.
For example, I refer to the timeline on page 22 of the Sutherland Report, and to the chapter on
procurement as a whole. Lord Sutherland’s terms of reference required him to examine the role of QCA and
its division the NAA in the procurement process from March 2006, and he did this very thoroughly. The
remit he was given however did not allow him to take evidence from former ministers and o cials on the
role they played in determining the specifications to tender in that year. He did not interview Ruth Kelly
and Jacqui Smith on the events up to May 2006, or Alan Johnson and ministers on events after that date;
he did not interview present and former DCSF o cials on the role they played in relation to deciding
precisely what was to be procured; he was not able to interrogate o cials on what messages they conveyed
to the Procurement Board from ministers; nor was he able to investigate the decisions made by DCSF in
2006 for implementation in 2008 in relation to the maintenance of manual marking while insisting on the
introduction of online question-level data capture. In the preface to his questions to me at the Select
Committee on 22 April, the former minister Derek Twigg confirmed that ministers had discussed these issues
in 2006 and decided against onscreen marking.
In making this point, I am trying to ensure that Ofqual is never again wrong-footed by any government.
I am not trying to spread the the blame, or criticize Lord Sutherland, or diminish my own accountability
for the test failure in 2008. Flawed though it was, I accepted the remit given by ministers in 2006 for 2008,
and I do not expect anyone else apart from ETS to take responsibility for the failure. I do not question Lord
Sutherland’s findings. It is imperative however that, if Ofqual is to be a truly independent regulator reporting
to Parliament, neither it nor its agent should accept terms of reference dictated by Government.
4. The QCA itself decided not to proceed with onscreen marking (!)
From 2004, ministers and o cials declined to accept QCA advice to introduce onscreen marking, on the
grounds that it must first be proven by a pilot study that the national results obtained by that method would
be the same as (or better than) those obtained by manual marking. Onscreen marking is not novel; it has
been proven internationally to be a far more valid and reliable process than manual marking; and it is now
widely used by UK awarding bodies for delivery of GCSEs and GCEs. Such a trial would have been
worthless: onscreen marking cannot be judged by the extent to which it replicates results obtained by the
much inferior process of manual marking. Inevitably the results would have been di erent, although not
necessarily worse.
It is wrong for the Secretary of State to claim that the QCA itself decided not to proceed with onscreen
marking. We were told by ministers and o cials that it was not an option. The final stumbling block was
the Government requirement that whole scripts be returned to schools at the same time as the results, as in
the past. Onscreen marking requires that the spines be stripped from the scripts, so that each page can be
scanned electronically. It would have been possible to send electronic facsimiles of the scripts or even hard
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copies of the separately marked answers to schools by the results date, but not to reassemble and return
whole scripts. The fact is that onscreen marking can provide schools with a far richer and more useful
analysis of pupil performance than the return of marked scripts, as has been shown by the awarding bodies.
The purpose of the letter signed by David Gee on 3 November 2005 was to resolve uncertainty for 2006,
and to paper over what would otherwise have been a very public rift between the QCA and Government.
With the benefit of hindsight, we negotiated for far too long: I should have stood our ground and put QCA
advice publicly and in writing.
Q361
I did not work closely with Ed Balls. In 2007 I had telephone calls from him on 5 and 19 July; I first met
him two months later on 19 September; we met on 23 October, spoke by telephone on 22 November, and
met on 13 December. In 2008, I met him on 18 March and 2 June. In more than thirty years of working
directly with ministers in five educational jurisdictions, including England, I have never had less contact.
Further, it is not true that there has never been a cross word or dicult exchange: it was only once, but
it was memorable. I have been around for many years; I am hardly a shrinking violet; but I left the meeting
on 18 March 2008 with the certain knowledge that the Secretary of State had no understanding of what the
QCA was for, nor what it had achieved; that he had no respect for the capacity, integrity and dedication of
its sta , its Executive and its Board; and that he had no willingness to listen.
Q363
This was the meeting on 18 March 2008. The Chairman and I presented, on behalf of the QCA Board, a
case for retaining the name and identity of QCA although, in compliance with the Secretary’s wishes, not
its regulatory functions. We outlined the risk to ongoing service delivery (including key stage tests,
Diplomas, revision of GCSEs and GCEs, and the Qualifications and Credit Framework) arising from
Government requirements to relocate to Coventry (with the loss of at least 85 per cent of our sta and at a
cost in excess of £60m); from e ciency savings of 30 per cent over three years; and from the splitting of the
organization into QCA and Ofqual ahead of the necessary legislation. It was in my view an aggressive and
confrontational meeting.
Q 367
The process for marking the 2008 tests was set in stone from the point at which the decision to award the
contract to ETS was approved by the then Secretary of State in January 2007. The introduction of onscreen
marking, which requires special paper and printing and other technical requirements, involves a run-up of
two years. My letter of 28 March 2008 simply reported progress with the 2008 test series.
Q 368, 369, 370, 371
See above comments on responses to Q360, first issue.
Q 380
The QCA and DCSF o cials were in regular contact over the the progress of test delivery, as noted in my
comment on Q360, second issue. It is wrong however for the Secretary of State again to say “Ken Boston
regularly gave me reassurance” and that “he was telling me on regular occasions that things were on track”.
I did so once, and once only: on 2 June 2008.
The meeting with Jim Knight on Wednesday 2 July 2008, which I attended with David Gee and others,
could not reasonably have been confused with the meeting on 17 June. It had been arranged by the minister
because we had been formally notified by ETS on Friday 27 June that they would fail to deliver. It was a
meeting to assess the magnitude of the failure and to agree what to do about it.
There is no agreed note of the meeting. We had been monitoring the figures from ETS every few hours
for the previous five days; David Gee brought to the meeting the latest figures which had been received within
the previous hour. Being the only one familiar at that stage with the latest data, he led us through it. The
picture was very confused: as late as the next day, the ETS President emailed QCA to say they would meet
the July 8 deadline, when it was clear to us they would not.
The critical issue at this meeting was whether or not to release all available results on July 8, or withhold
them all until a later date. Jim Knight asked me to give him formal advice to delay the release of results. I
refused, on the grounds that I thought it better not to inconvenience the majority of schools, for which results
would be available. He did not accept this advice: on that basis, I agreed to provide advice on the length of
the delay, which I did next day in writing. This was a very tense exchange, which is etched in my memory
and I am sure in his: I cannot see how it can possibly have been confused with the meeting on 17 June at
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which I was not present. Had the results been released as scheduled on 8 July, 93.5 per cent of key stage
2 results and 85.1 per cent of key stage 3 results would have been available to schools, instead of no results
being available to any schools at all.
Q391
See my comments on Q360, third issue.
Q396
The “maxwellisation” drafts of the Sutherland Report were emailed to us in Word format, not PDF. They
consisted of a series of extracts from the Report, below each of which a response was to be made. The drafts
were forwarded by email by me and other recipients to the relevant members of the team which had prepared
the QCA documentation and data for Lord Sutherland.
The team began drafting proposed responses in Word format, using the “track changes” facility so that
drafts could be shared. This immediately revealed, by name, the authors of the “maxwellisation” drafts, and
the authors of subsequent changes. Substantial sections had been drafted by the DCSF ocial seconded to
the Sutherland Inquiry from the Permanent Secretary’s private o ce. This created a great deal of
consternation. My advice to the QCA team was that in preparing a Report such as this it is normal for
subordinates to do some of the drafting; that Lord Sutherland would without question take sole
responsibility for every word in the entire Report; and that as our job was to prepare a response, rather than
edit the drafts, the authorship was irrelevant and should be ignored.
Q400
On 24 September 2008, six days after I had given evidence to Lord Sutherland, three weeks before
ministers had given their evidence, and nearly three months before the Sutherland report was published, the
Permanent Secretary sought to negotiate and secure my early retirement. My subsequent response was that
any negotiation would need to be on the basis of paying out the value of my contract to its conclusion on
30 September 2009. The contractual conditions (Clause 13 of the contract) included a potential bonus of up
to 15%. Given the successful delivery by QCA in 2007–08 of such major reforms as the Diplomas, the review
of GCSEs and GCEs, the Secondary Curriculum Review, the recognition of employer qualifications, and
the Qualifications and Credit Framework—combined with the relocation to Coventry, the establishment of
Ofqual and the achievement of the final year of e ciency savings—a bonus of 10% would have seemed
reasonable even given the test delivery failure.
Negotiations were never entered into: I had no intention of standing down.
My resignation, on 12 December 2008, was entirely unrelated to the September meeting, and would have
taken place without it. I resigned in the light of reading the Sutherland Report, and did so unilaterally under
Clause 9 of my contract, without negotiation, without any special non-contractual deal being requested or
received, and without requesting any bonus.
Q 406
The Permanent Secretary significantly misrepresents my position. At no time during the discussion on
24 September, or in the subsequent response to it, did I seek any non-contractual bonus or other non-
contractual payments. At no time did I seek anything more than the value of the contractual entitlements.
And although my contract was with the QCA Board, the details of the contract and variations to it since
2002 had all been approved by the Permanent Secretary or his predecessor.
Q411
I agree that all correspondence should be made available to the Select Committee, including the
correspondence relating to Qs 400 and 406.
Q 419, 420
See comments in response to Q360, fourth issue.
Q421-425
The DCSF (and DIUS) observers within QCA have performed three functions: they have provided
specialist expertise; they have served the traditional civil service role of providing separate advice to
Ministers; and they have spoken on behalf of Ministers.
My view is that Ofqual should not have observers from any Government agency. The first of the above
three functions can be achieved by direct consultation with Government departments prior to decision-
making; the other two are quite inappropriate for an independent regulator reporting to Parliament.
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A particular problem arises when observers see their role as that of speaking for Ministers: typically, in
phrases such as “ministers would be minded to” or “not be minded to” agree with a likely proposal, or that
“ministers would be content” or “not content” with a particular recommendation. The risk is that
independent advice oered to the minister by the regulatory authority is negotiated in advance with DCSF
observers, rather than arrived at independently but with the benefit of prior DCSF input. This leads to
compromise solutions which erode the independence and public accountability of the regulator.
Ofqual will not be seen as conspicuously and unquestionably separate from Government so long as it has
it accepts DCSF observers on its Board and committees. The public and the Parliament need to be absolutely
certain that Ministers are being told what they need to know, not what they or their o cials might want
to hear.
A related problem is that formal QCA advice to ministers is in due course made public, and all other
correspondence is available under FOI provisions. Hence DCSF o cials like to see potential
correspondence in draft, and often seek to negotiate its terms so that it might be acceptable to both ministers
and the public. In the interests of good working relationships between organizations, and on many issues,
this is perfectly satisfactory, but on the big issues it is not. Regulatory authorities must be prepared to draw
lines in the sand, and do so publicly.
In conclusion Barry, since the Secretary of State’s statement in the House of Commons on 16 December,
all I have wanted was an opportunity to be heard. I thank the Select Committee for giving me that
opportunity, and for testing me and ministers thoroughly on substance and detail. I failed to deliver an
important QCA remit, and I resigned accordingly. My expectation was that I would have been allowed an
honourable resignation without Government “sinking the boot”, as they say in the Antipodes. I now want
to rule o on this latest chapter—the only sad chapter among many happy chapters—of my work in
England, which has been so professionally stimulating and personally rewarding.
It has been a privilege to lead the QCA, to serve the cause of education and skills, and to be a participant
in current important reforms in the building of human and social capital in the United Kingdom. My wife
and I shall continue to live in England for some time. My very best wishes to you and to the Select
Committee, and my thanks for your courtesy and fairness.
June 2009
Letter to Lord Sutherland from the Rt Hon Jim Knight MP, Minister for Schools and Learners,
Department for Children, Schools and Families
In giving oral evidence to your Inquiry, I stated that I met Ken Boston and David Gee on 17 June. That
statement is quoted in the report of your Inquiry, as follows:
[paragraph 4.137]: “As late as 17 June when the Schools Minister met QCA’s Chief Executive and
NAA’s Managing Director, they provided reassurances.”
and
[paragraph 4.92]: We had that meeting on the 17 June with Ken [Boston] and David Gee. I may
well have met David Gee before that point but it was the first time I had had a substantial
discussion with him about things in great detail. He basically answered all the questions; Ken
[Boston] referred everything to him. We went through everything with David [Gee]. He gave me
some reassurance about the measures that were being taken to mitigate the loss of time and
capacity, in particular the recruitment of marker panels, which seemed a reasonable way of dealing
with the problem to me.”
This evidence is absolutely correct in all but one regard. I have now realised that in my account of events,
I inadvertently conflated two separate meetings. On 17 June, I met David Gee (Managing Director of the
National Assessment Agency (NAA)). Ken Boston was not present at that meeting. My oral evidence to
you, quoted at paragraph 4.92 of the Inquiry’s report, accurately reflects the way in which Ken Boston
referred questions to David Gee, but at a meeting with both of them which took place on 2 July. Although
this does not alter the substance of my evidence, in relation to the points at which we were told of delays to
delivery and the fact that in order to receive accurate information I needed to question QCA very closely,
it may be helpful if I confirm the sequence of meetings that led to Ministers being informed of delays to the
2009 national curriculum tests.
As the evidence correctly records, on questioning David Gee on 17 June, I was told that ETS were on track
to deliver results on 8 July, that there were contingencies in place to mitigate the late delivery of scripts for
marking, including marker panels, and that—although Key Stage 3 English would be “a struggle”—results
should be released on time.
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As your report makes clear, “In practice, the first time QCA notified Ministers that ETS would not deliver
test results on time was 30 June 2008.”
It was not until the afternoon of 30 June that the Schools Director General was first informed by David
Gee and Ken Boston that there would be a delay to some results. They judged that 90% of school English
Key Stage 3 and 95% of school English Key Stage 2 marks would be available on 8 July, and were confident
that mathematics and science would be on time, except for a residual concern about a small proportion of
Key Stage 3 science scripts.
In a further message to ocials later that day these figures were revised to show that there were di culties
in mathematics as well as English and science. At Key Stage 3, NAA expected only 80% of schools to have
a full set of results in English by 8 July.
Having been alerted to these serious delivery issues by o cials on 30 June, I met both Ken Boston and
David Gee at a subsequent meeting on 2 July. It was at this meeting that I questioned David Gee and Ken
Boston in detail, with Ken referring questions to David.
I apologise unreservedly for the error in my evidence. There was no intention to mislead you, and the
position on attendance at the meeting on 17 June was correctly recorded in the Department’s written
evidence to your inquiry. But I believe that it is important to take this opportunity to set the record straight
on exactly when those meetings took place and with whom.
I am copying this letter to Barry Sheerman, Chair of the Children, Schools and Families Select
Committee.
9 February 2009
Letter to The Chairman from the Rt Hon Jim Knight MP, Minister for Schools and Learners, DCSF
Since the Secretary of State and I gave evidence to your committee, it has come to our attention that there
is an error in the oral evidence which I gave to Lord Sutherland during his inquiry.
This error is reported in paragraph 4.137, which was quoted by the Secretary of State at your committee
last week:
“As late as 17 June when the Schools Minister met QCA’s Chief Executive and NAA’s Managing
Director, they provided reassurances.”
I have now realised that in my account of events, I inadvertently conflated two separate meetings. On 17
June, I met David Gee (Managing Director of the National Assessment Agency (NAA)). Ken Boston was
not present at that meeting.
I have written to Lord Sutherland explaining the mistake and the accurate series of events, and I attach
a copy of my letter to him. As I say in my letter, there was no intention to mislead Lord Sutherland, and the
position on attendance at the meeting on 17 June was correctly recorded in the Department’s written
evidence to the inquiry. But I believe that it is important to take this opportunity to set the record straight
on exactly when those meetings took place and with whom.
I am copying this letter to Lord Sutherland.
9 February 2009
Letter to the Rt Hon Jim Knight MP, Minister for Schools and Learners, DCSF from Lord Sutherland
Thank you for your letter of 9 February 2009.
You have explained that in a meeting of 17 June 2008, you met with the National Assessment Agency
(NAA) Managing Director David Gee but that the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) Chief
Executive Dr Ken Boston was not present. You have apologised for conflating your recollection of this
meeting with that of a meeting on 2 July 2008 at which both Mr Gee and Dr Boston were present.
As reflected in my report, you had previously made this comment during your interview and had the
opportunity to review your transcript. However, I appreciate that you have now provided this clarification
and I have asked my secretariat to place a short note on the Inquiry’s website to reflect this.
I agree that your clarification does not substantially alter the points that were made. It remains clear that
NAA provided reassurances in the 17 June meeting that test results could be delivered by 8 July 2008 and
that contingency measures such as marking panels were in place. It also remains clear that NAA was playing
the leading role in managing the tests—with its Managing Director attending a meeting with you alone on
17 June and a joint meeting with the QCA Chief Executive present on 2 July. My report concluded that
within the QCA there was a strong emphasis on NAA’s responsibility for the tests and that there was
insu cient corporate oversight at QCA Executive and Board level. This is borne out by extensive evidence
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detailed throughout my report, for example at paragraphs 3.27, 3.30, 3.65, 3.67, 3.69, 3.95, 3.107–3.112,
4.80–4.88, 4.104–4.106, 4.125–4.135. I am therefore satisfied that your clarification does not aect my
findings.
I am copying this letter to the Chairman of the Children, Schools and Families Select Committee.
12 February 2009
Letter to The Chairman from the Rt Hon Jim Knight MP, Minister for Schools and Learners, DCSF
I wrote to you on 9 February to inform you that I had written to Lord Sutherland, to correct an error in
the oral evidence I gave to him during his inquiry.
Lord Sutherland has now replied to my letter, and has made clear that my clarification of the evidence
does not substantially alter the points that were made.
I am placing copies of my letters to you and Lord Sutherland, and Lord Sutherland’s reply to me, in the
libraries of both Houses.
12 February 2009
Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery O ce Limited
7/2009 406183 19585
